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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation consists of three empirical studies in entrepreneurial finance 
around the world. The first essay empirically compares the impact of entrepreneurship on 
GDP, unemployment, exports, and patents by examining three international datasets. The 
findings of this essay point to institutional and cultural impediments to the effectiveness 
of entrepreneurship around the world. The impact of entrepreneurship is significantly 
mitigated by excessively strong creditor rights that limit entrepreneurial risk taking. 
Furthermore, the data indicate that cultural attitudes associated with low risk taking limit 
the effectiveness of entrepreneurship. The results of this essay also show how different 
definitions of new business entry matter for empirical analysis of entrepreneurship across 
countries. 
The second essay documents angel investors’ investment behaviors and 
performances around the world as compared with private equity (PE) and venture capital 
(VC) funds. Angel investors finance small high growth entrepreneurial firms in exchange 
for equity. Unlike PE/VC funds, which invest capital from institutional investors, angels 
invest their own money. We compare the impact from legal and cultural conditions on 
disintermediated angel finance versus intermediated PE/VC finance. The data indicate 
that, relative to PE/VC funds, angel investors are more sensitive to stock market 
conditions, legal environments, and Hofstede’s cultural conditions. The data further 
indicate that investee firms funded by angels are less likely to successfully exit in either 
an IPO or acquisition, on average, whether those angels are involved in the first round or 
later stages. 
iii 
 
The third essay studies the different effects of legal and institutional factors on 
private equity divestment strategies of IPOs and acquisitions in the emerging markets. 
The data indicate that PE fund managers have a higher probability of successful exits in 
countries with better business and legal environments. We also find that PE investors are 
better able to mitigate the potential costs associated with inefficient and corrupt business 
environments to increase the probability of exits by IPOs in countries with higher levels 
of corruption. Moreover, our findings suggest that market shocks arguably concentrated 
in the developed markets result in a negative ripple effect as the probability of successful 
exits decreases for PE investors in emerging markets. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Entrepreneurial finance is the study of valuation and resource allocation in new 
business ventures and it has played a more and more important role in the development of 
the economy and financial markets. This dissertation contributes to the literature of both 
entrepreneurship and finance by providing insights about the economic impact of 
entrepreneurship with regards to the new business entry, how angel investors make 
investments as compared with PE/VC funds around the world as well as the divestment 
strategies of PE investors in the emerging markets. 
 All three essays in this dissertation are related to entrepreneurship and finance, 
discussing topics from the initial business entry stage that has significant impact on the 
economic development across countries, to the investment stage that compares angel 
investors with PE/VC funds from the perspective of legal and cultural institutions, and 
then to the divestment stage that investigates how PE investors exit their investments in 
the emerging markets. This dissertation not only provides theoretical and empirical 
evidences to develop current literature in both entrepreneurship and finance, it also 
provides practical and policy implications to encourage more entrepreneurial activities 
around the world. 
In recent years, it has become increasingly recognized that entrepreneurship is a 
key driver of economic growth (e.g., Acs et al., 2008; Audretsch, 2007a, b; Audretsch 
and Acs, 2008; Audretsch et al., 2009; Baumol, 1990; Chavis et al., 2011; Fairlie and 
Chatterji, 2009; Klapper and Love, 2011; Marcotte, 2012; McMullen, 2011; Naude, 2010; 
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Stam and Wennberg, 2009; Thirik et al., 2008). For this reason, government bodies 
around the world have sought ways to stimulate growth through entrepreneurship, 
including access to entrepreneurial finance (Bonini et al., 2012; Fossen, 2011; Nahata, 
2008; Wang and Wang, 2012) and appropriate governance and legal protections for 
contracts, shareholders and creditors (e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Fan and White, 
2003; Klapper et al., 2006; Armour and Cumming, 2006, 2008). For instance, many 
government bodies around the world have implemented direct investment programs to 
finance entrepreneurs through incubation centers and government venture capital funds 
(Cumming and Fischer, 2012). Governments have likewise implemented tax policies to 
stimulate entrepreneurial activity (World Bank, 2004). Prior work is highly consistent 
with the view that these policies are important for stimulating entrepreneurship 
(Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2003, 2004). 
 In the first essay, we seek not to assess and measure the determinants of 
entrepreneurial activity, but rather, the effect of entrepreneurial activity through newly 
established firms on economic growth. Our approach differs from national studies of the 
effect of entrepreneurship on growth (e.g., Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004, 2007) in two 
primary ways. First, we examine newly available international data, which enables one to 
assess whether or not there are legal and institutional differences across countries that 
enhance or impede the effect of entrepreneurship on growth. Second, we examine three 
different datasets that cover the same statistics but with different measurements and with 
different countries. To this end, we explore whether or not the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and growth is contingent on the use of different data, different countries, 
and different time periods. Third, we contribute to the theoretical entrepreneurship 
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literature by examining the economic implications of entrepreneurship in reference to 
legal and institutional barriers, and by providing international evidence in reference to 
different datasets that measure entrepreneurship in different ways. 
 In our analyses, we examine three datasets over the years 2004-2011 that offer 
different measures of new business starts, and each with different coverage in terms of 
years and countries.  The first and largest entrepreneurship dataset is that from the World 
Bank. The second sample is from the OECD and the third sample is from Compendia. 
The data highlight a number of interesting features about the impact of business starts on 
GDP/capita, exports/GDP, unemployment, and patents per population. First, there are 
significant differences across the data in terms of both the summary statistics and the 
regression analyses. In the summary statistics, the OECD data show a negative effect of 
business starts on GDP/capita, exports/GDP and patents per population, and a positive 
effect of business starts on unemployment. In the regression analyses, these effects are 
statistically insignificant when we control for other things being equal. Put differently, 
the implication from the OECD data is that business starts are either harmful to the 
economy, or the data are incomplete or improperly measured for the purpose of assessing 
the economic impact of business start-ups. Because both the World Bank and Compendia 
data offer the exact opposite inferences, we are inclined to believe that the OECD data 
that we examine herein are not perfectly appropriate for assessing the economic effects of 
business starts. 
 Second, from the World Bank and the Compendia data, we infer that business 
starts positively impact GDP/capita, exports/GDP, and patents per population, and 
negatively impact unemployment. These findings are statistically and economically 
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significant in regression analyses controlling for other things being equal. In the course of 
our analyses, we discovered that many of these country-year level control variables are 
highly correlated, and hence we acknowledge at the outset that the economic significance 
of our findings is highly contingent on the regression specifications. Nevertheless, in a 
wide range of plausible specifications, our findings are highly statistically significant. 
Moreover, even in our most conservative estimates, the data indicate that the economic 
significance of our results is very pronounced. 
Third, we show that the effect of entrepreneurship on economic outcomes is 
mitigated by legal and institutional barriers to risk taking, but enhanced by investors that 
stimulate risk taking. In particular, countries with stronger creditor rights make costs of 
borrowing relatively higher for entrepreneurs, thereby reducing entrepreneurial risk 
taking. Similarly, countries with higher uncertainty avoidance indices, or less cultural 
acceptance of risk, similarly have a smaller impact of entrepreneurship. Therefore, our 
study has shown how legal, institutional and cultural barriers to risk-taking influence the 
overall economic impact of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs are more likely to set up new 
entities and in turn have more positive impact on the economic growth only if the 
benefits of forming new ventures outweigh the related costs arising from such legal, 
institutional and cultural barriers. In addition, we find evidence consistent with the view 
that top tier venture capital funds enhance the impact of entrepreneurship. 
Intuitional theory is the cornerstone of a wide array of work in management, law, 
economics, and finance. Despite decades of development of work on topics that include 
the impact of legal institutions and culture on management theory and practice, there is 
scant theory or evidence that compares the importance of these institutional forces for 
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individuals versus organizations. The second essay attempts to fill this gap by examining 
the specific context of angel investments versus venture capital and private equity 
investments. 
Originally, the term “angel” referred to wealthy individuals who funded the 
expensive Broadway theatre productions in New York. It was first used as a business 
term when William Wetzel completed his pioneering study on how entrepreneurs raised 
seed capital in the U.S. and described the investors who supported those entrepreneurs as 
“angels” (Wetzel, 1983). Colorful quotes such as the one above illustrate the oft-repeated 
view that there is a culture to angel investing. However, unlike leading work in the 
private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) literature (Batjargal, 2007; Guler and 
McGahan, 2007; Zacharakis, McMullen, and Shepherd, 2007; Madhaven and Iriyama, 
2009; Guler and Guillen, 2010; Iriyama, Li, and Madhaven, 2010; Gu and Lu, 2010; Li 
and Zahra, 2012; Dai and Nahata, 2016), there is little theory or evidence on angel 
investments around the world and the comparative role of international differences in 
cultural and legal institutions in the determinants of and outcomes from angel 
investments.  
In this essay, we seek to add to the angel literature by examining institutional 
theory and international evidence on differences between angel investments and PE/VC 
investments. We aim to shed light on how angel investments look around the world, how 
angel involvement is different from PE/VC funds, and what legal and cultural 
environments affect angel investments and divestments, and whether or not legal and 
cultural conditions are more important for individual angel investors versus PE/VC 
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organizations. We also consider whether regulatory changes have promoted more angels 
and PE/VC funds activities. 
Our analysis exploits the comprehensive data collected at the deal level of 
investee firms from PitchBook, which comprise 85,940 completed private equity (PE) 
deals from 96 countries from 1977 to 2012. Within those deals, 5,397 from 42 countries 
are involved with angels (either single funded by angels or coinvested/syndicated with 
PE/VC funds). The dataset allows us to directly compare angels and PE/VC funds at both 
the deal and investee firm level.  
The data indicate that, relative to PE/VC funds, angels prefer investing in smaller 
entrepreneurial firms in wealthier countries with better stock market conditions, worse 
legal environments, and countries with cultures characterized by higher levels of 
individualism and lower levels of risk-taking. Such behaviors are robust both for the first-
round deals and deals at all other stages. We also find that relative to PE/VC funds, those 
investee firms funded by angels have a lower probability of having successful exits, in 
either IPO or acquisition. However, better legal environments can help mitigate the 
negative effects, especially for IPO exits (see also Nahata, 2008; Nahata et al., 2014). 
Moreover, in our subsample tests, the “stepping stone” logic of angels still cannot be 
proven, as we find that firms who have received angel investments in the first round have 
lower probabilities of successfully exiting in later stages. At a country/market level, we 
also find significant determinants that can work together to build a well-rounded 
environment and spawn both angels and PE/VC funds activities. In addition to these 
findings, we also perform difference-in-differences tests to confirm that more stringent 
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disclosure regulation and more forgiving bankruptcy law changes can also spawn the 
entrepreneurial activities induced by angels and PE/VC funds. 
The development and importance of emerging markets within the global financial 
system can no longer be questioned. Emerging market economies contribute more than 
two-thirds of global growth and more so their growth is projected to increase. It is 
suggested by IMF (2014) that growth levels reached 4.7 percent in 2013, 4.9 percent in 
2014 and potentially 5.3 percent in 2015. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
(BRICS countries) currently rank within the top 10 largest economic entities. Without 
emerging markets, worldwide economic growth would be much lower than it currently is.   
Financial institutions have for years sought to take advantage of this growth. As a 
result of the unprecedented growth in many emerging markets in the 1990’s, increasing 
numbers of private equity (PE) investors have navigated these risky markets to profit 
from not only the economic growth but also the lowering of state intervention in those 
markets (Leeds and Sunderland, 2003). The opportunities for PE investments were 
thought to have developed significantly in both scale and quality in emerging markets 
over the past decades. However, at the same time, the same investors were quick to come 
to the realization that there were challenges within the emerging markets that they were 
not prepared for resulting in unmet expectations. Not only were these emerging markets 
still relatively immature and, under-developed, but there were, and arguably are, 
insurmountable regulatory restrictions and corporate governance weaknesses. Also amid 
the expectation of emerging hot spot PE markets such as China and India achieving GDP 
growth rates in double-digits, it is possible that as a result of too much capital chasing too 
few good deals, PE investors may have rushed to invest without adequately preparing for 
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the risks of a prolonged slowdown (Cumming and Macintosh, 2006; Ippolito, 2007; 
Aizenman and Kendall, 2012; Klonowski, 2013). The third essay thus aims to explore the 
determinants of successful PE investments by measuring successful PE exits. We analyze 
the relationship between the development of business environments and legal protections 
and successful exit. We would be remiss in our analysis if we did not consider the role of 
corruption on the potential of success for PE investments in that previous researches have 
established the negative effect of corruption on the cost of doing business (Fisman and 
Wei, 2004; Fisman and Miguel, 2007; Fisman and Svensson, 2007; Fisman and Miguel, 
2007; Fisman et al., 2008). With more studies documenting the impact of corruption on 
the cost of doing business at both the economic and firm-specific levels (Mauro, 1995; 
Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck and Eden, 2005), very few of those studies focus on the PE 
investments in these corrupt jurisdictions. In a more recent study of Cumming, Fleming, 
Johan and Takeuchi (2010), they used 21 Asia-Pacific countries data to provide 
competing hypotheses regarding the impact of corruption on PE investments across 
markets. Our study aims to test similar competing hypotheses in emerging markets with 
wider range countries (35 jurisdictions worldwide) using a longer sample period (1992 - 
2012). Finally, we also seek to determine whether the dot com bubble and the recent 
financial crisis had any effect on PE investments in emerging economies.  
We believe our research will shed light on relatively opaque PE activities in 
emerging markets. PE investors, as sophisticated financial intermediaries catering to 
equally if not more sophisticated institutional investors, primarily invest in relatively high 
risk, illiquid securities in private firms. Given that such investee firm characteristics are 
combined with high risk and volatile political environments in emerging markets, we can 
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safely deduce that PE investments in emerging economies are riskier than that of 
developed countries. As such, the divestment or exit strategy which is the measure of 
success of an investment might be planned and executed by considering more critical 
factors. Our study is related to a growing body of research that establishes legal 
protection to be important factors to explain the size, structure and success of PE 
investments, results of course varying depending on the data analyzed (Lerner and Schoar, 
2005; Cumming et al., 2006; Cressy et al., 2007; Cao and Lerner, 2009; Johan and Najar, 
2011).  
Our study benefits from the comprehensiveness of PitchBook’s deal level 
database which provides us a unique opportunity to investigate the PE exit probabilities 
across emerging markets. The data documents the heterogeneities of investee firm-level 
characteristics together with business environments, legal conditions, security market 
structure and performance, macroeconomic and cultural dimensions as well as industry 
dispersions. We present our robust results based on 2,733 PE deals of 1,499 investee 
firms to investigate PE exits strategies and impact from multi-facet factors. Our findings 
suggest that better business and legal environments in emerging markets increase the 
probability of successful exits for PE investors. We also find that PE investors are better 
able to mitigate the potential costs associated with inefficient and corrupt business 
environments to increase the probability of exits by IPOs in countries with higher levels 
of corruption. Moreover, our findings suggest that market shocks arguably concentrated 
in the developed markets result in a negative ripple effect as the probability of successful 
exits, especially by way of IPOs, decreases for PE investors in emerging markets.   
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Our study complements the growing literature on private equity, business ethics, 
corruption and IPO. We believe our findings not only support those of Cumming, et. al 
(2006) and Cumming et. al, (2010), but also augment both studies as our analysis 
comprises more jurisdictions and include the unique period of the recent financial crisis. 
Our analysis of PE investments in emerging markets also adds to the existing 
international comparative literature on PE and emerging markets to provide more updated 
information regarding PE divestment strategies as well as to provide an analysis on the 
impacts from dot com bubble and the recent financial crisis on those divestment 
strategies in emerging markets. 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the first 
essay, The Economic Impact of Entrepreneurship: Comparing International Datasets. 
The second essay entitled Angel Investors around the World, is presented in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 covers the third essay Private Equity Exits in Emerging Markets. Chapter 5 
concludes. 
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Chapter 2 
The Economic Impact of Entrepreneurship: Comparing International Datasets 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 Neoclassical studies of growth have focused on the role of capital and labor in 
stimulating economic development (Solow, 1956, 1967). In more recent years, however, 
it has become increasingly recognized that entrepreneurship is a key driver of economic 
growth (e.g., Acs et al., 2008; Audretsch, 2007a, b; Audretsch and Acs, 2008; Audretsch 
et al., 2009; Baumol, 1990; Chavis et al., 2011; Fairlie and Chatterji, 2009; Klapper and 
Love, 2011; Marcotte, 2012; McMullen, 2011; Naude, 2010; Stam and Wennberg, 2009; 
Thirik et al., 2008). For this reason, government bodies around the world have sought 
ways to stimulate growth through entrepreneurship, including access to entrepreneurial 
finance (Bonini et al., 2012; Fossen, 2011; Nahata, 2008; Wang and Wang, 2012) and 
appropriate governance and legal protections for contracts, shareholders and creditors 
(e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Fan and White, 2003; Klapper et al., 2006; Armour 
and Cumming, 2006, 2008). For instance, many government bodies around the world 
have implemented direct investment programs to finance entrepreneurs through 
incubation centers and government venture capital funds (Cumming and Fischer, 2012). 
Governments have likewise implemented tax policies to stimulate entrepreneurial activity 
(World Bank, 2004). Prior work is highly consistent with the view that these policies are 
important for stimulating entrepreneurship (Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2003, 2004). 
 In this essay, we seek not to assess and measure the determinants of 
entrepreneurial activity, but rather, the effect of entrepreneurial activity through newly 
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established firms on economic growth. Our approach differs from national studies of the 
effect of entrepreneurship on growth (e.g., Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004, 2007) in two 
primary ways. First, we examine newly available international data, which enables one to 
assess whether or not there are legal and institutional differences across countries that 
enhance or impede the effect of entrepreneurship on growth. Second, we examine three 
different datasets that cover the same statistics but with different measurements and with 
different countries. To this end, we explore whether or not the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and growth is contingent on the use of different data, different countries, 
and different time periods. Third, we contribute to the theoretical entrepreneurship 
literature by examining the economic implications of entrepreneurship in reference to 
legal and institutional barriers, and by providing international evidence in reference to 
different datasets that measure entrepreneurship in different ways. 
 In our analyses, we examine three datasets over the years 2004-2011 that offer 
different measures of new business starts, and each with different coverage in terms of 
years and countries.  The first and largest entrepreneurship dataset is that from the World 
Bank. The World Bank sample comprises information on business starts for 125 
countries. The second sample is from the OECD, which covers 24 countries from 
Western and Eastern Europe as well as Brazil, Canada and the U.S. The third sample is 
from Compendia, which covers 11 Western European Countries, Canada and the U.S. 
 The data highlight a number of interesting features about the impact of business 
starts on GDP/capita, exports/GDP, unemployment, and patents per population. First, 
there are significant differences across the data in terms of both the summary statistics 
and the regression analyses. In the summary statistics, the OECD data show a negative 
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effect of business starts on GDP/capita, exports/GDP and patents per population, and a 
positive effect of business starts on unemployment. In the regression analyses, these 
effects are statistically insignificant when we control for other things being equal. Put 
differently, the implication from the OECD data is that business starts are either harmful 
to the economy, or the data are incomplete or improperly measured for the purpose of 
assessing the economic impact of business start-ups. Because both the World Bank and 
Compendia data offer the exact opposite inferences – i.e., that business starts have a 
positive economic impact – we are inclined to believe that the OECD data that we 
examine herein are not perfectly appropriate for assessing the economic effects of 
business starts. 
 Second, from the World Bank and the Compendia data, we infer that business 
starts positively impact GDP/capita, exports/GDP, and patents per population, and 
negatively impact unemployment. These findings are statistically and economically 
significant in regression analyses controlling for other things being equal. In the course of 
our analyses, we discovered that many of these country-year level control variables are 
highly correlated, and hence we acknowledge at the outset that the economic significance 
of our findings is highly contingent on the regression specifications. Nevertheless, in a 
wide range of plausible specifications, our findings are highly statistically significant. 
Moreover, even in our most conservative estimates, the data indicate that the economic 
significance of our results is very pronounced. Based on the most complete World Bank 
data, we show that a 1% increase in new business starts in one year improves GDP/capita 
in the subsequent year by approximately 0.24% relative to the mean values, reduces 
unemployment by 0.13%, increases exports/GDP by 0.03%, and increases patents per 
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population by 0.29%.  Put differently, a 1-standard deviation increase in business density 
gives rise to a 38.44% increase in GDP/capita relative to mean values, a 20.02% 
reduction in unemployment, a 5.33% increase in exports/GDP, and a 51.99% increase in 
patents per population. 
Third, we show that the effect of entrepreneurship on economic outcomes is 
mitigated by legal and institutional barriers to risk taking, but enhanced by investors that 
stimulate risk taking. In particular, countries with stronger creditor rights make costs of 
borrowing relatively higher for entrepreneurs, thereby reducing entrepreneurial risk 
taking. Similarly, countries with higher uncertainty avoidance indices, or less cultural 
acceptance of risk, similarly have a smaller impact of entrepreneurship. Therefore, our 
study has shown how legal, institutional and cultural barriers to risk-taking influence the 
overall economic impact of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs are more likely to set up new 
entities and in turn have more positive impact on the economic growth only if the 
benefits of forming new ventures outweigh the related costs arising from such legal, 
institutional and cultural barriers. In addition, we find evidence consistent with the view 
that top tier venture capital funds enhance the impact of entrepreneurship. Note, by 
contrast, that we do not find similar evidence of other legal and institutional differences 
across countries; for example, the physical cost of exports is not statistically related to the 
propensity of start-ups to stimulate exports. 
This essay is organized as follows. The next section discusses the prior literature 
and hypotheses. Thereafter we present the data, summary statistics, and regression 
evidence. The last section provides concluding remarks and discusses the limitations of 
this essay as well as future research directions. 
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2.2. Related Literature and Hypotheses 
Prior research is consistent with the view that entrepreneurial activities in newly 
established firms will have a pronounced effect on economic growth for the following 
reasons. First, start-ups have a direct effect in facilitating the development of new 
capacities. The importance of entrepreneurs was first fully recognized by Schumpeter 
(1911/1934, 1939, 1942). Schumpeter described the entrepreneurial process of initiating 
radical structural change and growth through creative destruction. The absence of 
entrepreneurship would hinder growth, as without entrepreneurs, the capital, labor and 
technology would be lacking the mechanism to instigate economic development. The 
importance of entrepreneurs in economic growth has been well established by Baumol 
(1990) and Audretsch (2007a, b), among others, as reviewed in a comprehensive 
literature review by Fritsch (2013). 
Second, start-ups have an indirect effect of exiting capacities. For instance, new 
entrepreneurs may displace incumbent businesses through competition and market 
selection. Start-ups have an indirect supply-side effect of securing efficiency and 
stimulating productivity. Baumol (1990) explains how start-ups can force incumbent 
firms to operate more efficiently. Fritsch (2013) explains that start-ups further accelerate 
structural change, amplify innovation, 1 and enable a greater variety of products and 
problem solutions. This in turn facilitates improved competitiveness and growth. 
Third, entrepreneurs in newly established firms typically take risk in a way that is 
disproportionate relative to established firms. These risks include but are not limited to 
spending money on research and development, developing new products, ideas, services, 
                                                            
1 In this essay we examine innovation by measuring patent counts by country and year. Alternative proxies 
to measuring innovation are discussed by Judge et al. (2013), among others. 
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product applications, among other things. While these types of risk-taking activities 
likewise take place in large firms, newly established firms do not have a track record that 
enables the same type of assessment of whether or not the idea behind the new firm will 
work. By contrast, established firms extending into new business lines or services do so 
typically leveraging off their established presence in their current activities. Given the 
risk costs of engaging in entrepreneurship in newly established firms are greater than 
engaging in entrepreneurship in established firms, the expected productivity from 
entrepreneurship among smaller firms is expected to be larger. 
Fourth, start-ups have a disproportionate impact on economic growth because 
small firms have larger growth potential than larger firms (Almus and Nerlinger, 2000). 
Larger firms exhibit more pronounced diseconomies of scale. Larger and more 
established firms involve greater organization monitoring due to hierarchical structures. 
New firms involve smaller more flexible employee organization structures, and 
encourage experimentation. New ideas are rewarded in entrepreneurial firms with stock 
options and incentive compensation. 
Fifth, start-ups have the potential to disproportionately impact exports insofar as 
there exists “born-global firms” (Knight and Cavusgil, 2004) as early adopters of 
internationalization.  Many companies successfully expand into foreign markets from or 
near their date of founding.  Knight and Cavusgil (2004), among others, explore cultural, 
capabilities and resource-based explanations of such internationalization that is 
potentially disproportionate among born-global firms. 
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Overall, therefore, the periods in which countries have relatively more new start-
ups are more likely to experience greater economic impacts in subsequent years, as 
summarized in our first hypothesis. 
 
H1.  Entrepreneurship will positively impact GDP/capita, exports/GDP, and patents 
per population, and negatively impact unemployment. 
 
International differences in the impact of entrepreneurship on economic outputs 
are impeded by legal and institutional factors that discourage risk taking activities. 
Barriers to the impact of entrepreneurship on growth include risk taking disincentives, 
including strong creditor rights which increase investor protection in times of bankruptcy 
(Glaeser et al., 2004; Armour and Cumming, 2006; Archarya et al., 2009). Barriers to the 
impact of entrepreneurship likewise include cultural differences across countries. Most 
notably, countries with stronger aversion to taking risk due to cultural norms will have 
less impact associated with new business starts. Relatedly, prior work is highly consistent 
with the view that venture capital is the ‘money of innovation’ thereby positively 
impacting the effectiveness of entrepreneurship (see, e.g., Groh et al., 2010; Groh, and 
von Liechtenstein, 2011; Klonowski, 2012; Nahata et al., 2013). However, not all venture 
capital is equal, as 80% of venture capital returns are earned by the top quartile funds 
(Cumming and Johan, 2013), and hence one would expect that if there is a role from 
venture capital, then it is from the effect from top tier funds. The importance of 
entrepreneurial risk taking is reflected in our second hypothesis. 
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H2a.  Legal and institutional factors that mitigate risk taking such as creditor rights and 
uncertainty avoidance will moderate the positive impact of entrepreneurship on 
GDP/capita, exports/GDP, and patents/population, and the negative impact of 
entrepreneurship on unemployment. 
 
H2b.   Institutional factors that encourage risk taking such as top tier venture capital 
investment will exacerbate the impact of entrepreneurship. 
 
These hypotheses are tested with three alternative datasets that are introduced in 
the next section. The subsequent section thereafter provides regression evidence. 
 
2.3. Data and Summary Statistics 
In our analyses, we examine three datasets that offer different measures of new 
business starts, and each with different coverage in terms of years and countries. The 
largest entrepreneurship dataset in terms of the greatest number of country-years is from 
the World Bank, and available online at the World Bank’s doingbusiness.org webpage.2  
As at January 2013, the World Bank sample comprises information on business starts 
from 2004-2011 for 125 countries. The second sample is from the OECD, which covers 
24 countries from Western and Eastern Europe as well as Brazil, Canada and the U.S. 
from 2004-2007. 3  The third sample is from Compendia, which covers 11 Western 
European Countries, Canada and the U.S. from 2004-2009.4 
                                                            
2 http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/entrepreneurship  
3 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264097711-en  
4 The Compendia data date as early as 1995, but for reasons of comparison with the OECD and World 
Bank data, we examine the subset of data starting in 2004. See 
19 
 
The main variables in the dataset are described in Table 2.1. The main economic 
output variables that we investigate as dependent variables include GDP/capita, 
exports/GDP, unemployment, and patents per 1,000 populations. In our regression 
analyses these output variables are analyzed with a 1-year lead period relative to the 
explanatory variables. The explanatory variables include the new business entry rate, 
variables for economic conditions, as well as legal and institutional variables. 
The new business entry rate takes on slightly different definitions depending on 
the data source examined, as explicitly defined in Table 2.1. In the World Bank dataset, 
New Density refers to the number of newly registered limited liability companies per 
1,000 working age people between the ages 15-64. In the OECD dataset, the Birth Rate 
refers to new employer enterprises with at least 1 employee in the birth year, or in the 
year prior to the birth year. The Birth Rate is relative to the population of enterprises with 
at least 1 employee. In the Compendia dataset, the Entry Rate is the share of new 
business owners as a share of the labor force, but with corrections to international 
differences and time-series differences to definitions of the terms business ownership and 
labor force so that the data are comparable across countries and over time. 
The cross-sectional summary statistics that show the relationship between new 
business entries and GDP/capita, unemployment, exports/GDP, and patents per 1,000 
population are presented in Figures 2.1-2.4, respectively. In Panels A-C of Figures 2.1-
2.4 we show the World Bank data, the OECD data, and the Compendia data, respectively. 
Consistent with H1 as stated in the previous section, the World Bank and Compendia 
data both indicate that there is a positive relationship between new business entries and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
http://data.ondernemerschap.nl/webintegraal/userif.aspx?SelectDataset=31&SelectSubset=113&Country=
UK  
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GDP/capita, exports/GDP, and patents per 1,000 populations, and a negative relationship 
between new business entries and unemployment. However, by contrast, the OECD data 
indicate that there is a negative relation between new business entries and GDP/capita, 
exports/GDP, and patents per 1,000 populations, and a positive relationship between new 
business entries and unemployment. This lack of consistency with the OECD data and the 
fact that these cross-sectional relations are simply not plausible leads us to believe that 
the OECD data are perhaps not the best source for the purpose of examining the effect of 
new business entries on economic outputs. 
We examine the data in a panel setting across countries and years. As a first step, 
we present simple correlations in Table 2.2 to highlight the relations across the variables. 
The correlations in Table 2.2 confirm the graphical relations in Figures 2.1-2.4 for the 
three different datasets. Also, the correlations highlight some potential issues of 
collinearity across different explanatory variables, for which we are careful to consider in 
our multivariate empirical tests in the next section. 
 
2.4. Regression Analyses 
Our regressions use standard panel data methods. We reports both random-effect 
and fixed-effect panel estimates in Panels A and B of Tables 2.3-2.5, respectively. Tables 
2.3-2.5 use the same regression models, with the differences being that Table 2.3 uses the 
World Bank data, Table 2.4 uses the OECD data, and Table 2.5 uses the Compendia data. 
In our main regression analyses we consider the impact of new business rates on 
GDP/capita, unemployment, exports/GDP, and patents per 1,000 populations, with the 
dependent variables leading 1-year ahead. The regressions include control variables for 
21 
 
economic conditions, as well as legal and institutional conditions. The main regression 
models make use of the following specification: 
 
Economic Output (1 year lead) = f (New Business Rates, MSCI Returns, Creditor 
Protection, Creditor Protection * New Business Rates, Uncertainty Avoidance Index, 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index * New Business Rates) 
 
All of the variables are defined in Table 2.1. For regressions that explain 
exports/GDP, we also include explanatory variables for the costs of exports and the 
interaction term between the costs of exports and new business rates. To be sure, there 
are a very large number of explanatory variables that could have been included but are 
not. The main reason for a parsimonious specification is as follows. First, the selected 
variables are plausibly pertinent to entrepreneurship and the impact of entrepreneurship 
on economic outputs for the purpose of testing H1. The specifications enable assessment 
of mitigating factors on the impact of entrepreneurship through creditor protection rights 
and uncertainty avoidance, for the purpose of testing H2a. Second, the variables not 
selected are highly collinear and hence additional control variables for the available set of 
countries and years are not perfectly tractable without introducing spurious results in the 
regressions. Such collinear variables that could have been included, but are not, include 
other cultural variables measured by Hofstede, as well as other legal and institutional 
variables from the World Bank’s Doing Business webpage, among other sources. We 
selected and reported these variables in order to assess factors that are directly pertinent 
to entrepreneurship and the incentives that entrepreneurs have with respect to risk taking. 
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While our right-hand-side variables are lagged by 1-year, it is technically possible 
that due to expectations, entrepreneurship may be endogenous to future values of 
GDP/Capita, unemployment, exports/GDP, and patents/population. We check for this 
possible reverse causality in the Appendix, and do not find significant evidence. 
Note that for all four of our dependent variables, our results are scaled in terms of 
population (GDP/capita, unemployment and patents per 1,000 population), and economic 
output (exports/GDP). Ideally we would like to scale patents by research activity in a 
country, but such a measure is difficult to reliably obtain. Even in countries where there 
is aggregate data on R&D expenses, many firms across countries have distorted 
incentives for tax reasons to classify items as R&D when they are something other than 
R&D. Moreover, there are time delays with translating R&D into patents which varies by 
industry, among other things. Hence, for our patents measure we use a consistent measure 
with dividing by population in the denominator. Similar to the raw measurement, there 
are extreme outlier countries. We therefore exclude the top 10% of patent-years in the 
data in order to make relatively comparable the sample of country-years. We note that 
with the full sample without excluding outliers, and with the full sample with winsorizing 
outliers, there are no significant factors that affect patenting in the regression 
specifications for the datasets considered. 
Note that in each of the three datasets, the entrepreneurship indicators are right-
skewed, as are our dependent variables. We exclude the top 5% of the outliers from the 
regression analyses from each of our regression models since these observations are 
highly influential in terms of the economic significance if they are included or winsorized 
(although the statistical significance remains similar regardless). Our economic 
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significance calculations below are based on the restricted sample after removing outliers, 
not the full sample as reported in Table 2.1. 
Finally, regarding our specifications, note that our only variable which does not 
vary over time is the uncertainty avoidance index (Table 2.1). As such, this variable is 
included in the random-effects panel data estimates but necessarily excluded from the 
fixed-effects panel data (by country and year) estimates. 
In Table 2.3 for the World Bank data, the random effect estimates in regressions 
Models (1), (3) and (4) for GDP/capita, exports/GDP, and patents per population, 
respectively, indicate a positive and statistically significant effect of new business starts 
(significant at the 5% level in Model 1, and 1% level in Models 3 and 4). The economic 
significance is large when one does not account for the mitigating factors (i.e., the 
interaction effects): for 1 standard deviation increase in new business density increases 
the subsequent year GDP/capita by 197.06% relative to the mean value of all the country-
years in the data (Table 1), increases the subsequent year exports/GDP by 105.11% 
relative to the mean value of all country-years, and increases patents per population by 
213.52%. In Table 2.3 Models (2) and (6) consider the impact of new business density on 
unemployment. The data indicate that new business reduces unemployment in the 
subsequent year, and this effect is significant at the 10% level for the random effect 
estimate in Model (2) but insignificant with the fixed effect estimate in Model (6). The 
economic significance in Model (2) is large: for 1 standard deviation increase in new 
business density reduces unemployment in the subsequent year by 96.43% relative to the 
average value of unemployment in the country-years in the sample, without accounting 
for the interaction effects. 
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We noted above that there are interaction effects or mitigating factors with some 
of the included variables, and some of these factors are collinear, and hence we re-ran 
these panel regressions without any control variables other than new business density (not 
explicitly reported in the tables but available on request). The results in all specifications 
but exports/GDP are statistically significant at the 1% level, but the economic 
significance is much lower. For 1 standard deviation increase in new business density, 
there is a 38.71% increase in GDP/capita, a 13.58% reduction in unemployment, and a 
6.97% increase in patents per population.  
Regarding the economic significance of these moderating effects in H2a, the data 
indicate that a 1 standard deviation increase in new density has a mitigated impact (i.e., 
the increase is smaller) on GDP/capita by 10.18% through creditor rights (Model 1) 
relative to the average level of GDP/capita in the country years in the data, has a 
mitigated impact on exports/GDP by 4.90% (Model 3), a mitigated impact on patents per 
population by 10.79% (Model 4), and a mitigated impact on unemployment (i.e., the 
reduction is smaller) by 3.83% (Model 2). The data further indicate that through 
uncertainty avoidance, a 1 standard deviation increase in new density has a mitigated 
impact (i.e., the increase is smaller) impact on GDP/capita by 1.59% (Model 1) relative to 
the average level of GDP/capita in the country years in the data, a mitigated impact on 
exports/GDP by 0.73% (Model 3), a mitigated impact on patents per population by 1.59% 
(Model 4), and a mitigated impact on unemployment (i.e., the reduction is smaller) by 
0.86% (Model 2). 
Taken together with the direct and moderating effects, the net effect of new 
business density relative to the average levels in the data show that a 1 standard deviation 
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increase in business density gives rise to a 38.44% increase in GDP/capita, a 20.02% 
reduction in unemployment, a 5.33% increase in exports/GDP, and a 51.99% increase in 
patents per population.5 Overall, the World Bank data very strongly support H1 that 
entrepreneurship stimulates GDP/capita, exports/GDP and patents per population, and 
mitigates unemployment. The data provide similarly strong support for H2a: risk taking 
disincentives, both by law and culture, mitigate the positive impact of entrepreneurship.   
Finally, note the control for economic conditions in terms of the MSCI returns 
have the expected effect in Models (1) – (3) and (5) – (7). MSCI returns are positively 
associated with GDP/capita and exports/GDP, and negatively associated with 
unemployment. There is no relation between MSCI returns and patents per population in 
Models (4) and (8), which is consistent with the view that the incentive to innovate can 
be pronounced in times of both strong and weak economic conditions. 
Table 2.4 with the OECD birth rate data shows no consistent evidence with Table 
2.3 with the World Bank data. All variables are statistically insignificant in Table 2.4, but 
for one exception – creditor rights in Model (13) is significant at the 10% level. The 
insignificance of the birth rate in Table 2.4 is consistent with the Panel B graphs depicted 
in Figures 2.1-2.4. 
Table 2.5 with the Compendia data, by contrast, shows quite consistent results 
with the World Bank data in Table 2.3. That is, Table 2.5 is very supportive of both H1 
and H2a. Again, these differences in support of H1 across Tables 2.3-2.5 are graphically 
depicted with Figures 2.1-2.4. There are some differences in the results between Tables 
2.3 and 2.5, which are largely expected due to the smaller number of countries and years 
                                                            
5 Put differently, a 1% increase in new business starts in one year improves GDP/capita in the subsequent 
year by approximately 0.24% relative to the mean values, reduces unemployment by 0.13%, increases 
exports/GDP by 0.03%, and increases patents per population by 0.29%. 
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in the Compendia data relative to the World Bank data. In terms of the economic 
significance of a 1 standard deviation increase in the entry rate from the mean in the 
sample, and taking into account the interaction effects, the regressions predict there is a 
36.38% increase in GDP/capita, a 17.32% reduction in unemployment, a 24.97% increase 
in exports/GDP, and an 11.78% increase in patents per population. We believe these 
economic significance estimates are too high, and an artifact of the smaller samples and 
collinearity across variables. In view of the much larger sample with the World Bank data, 
we believe the economic and statistical significance is best measured with the World 
Bank data discussed above in conjunction with Table 2.3 discussed above. 
Table 2.6 presents regressions using the World Bank data on the subset of 
countries and years for which there is Compendia data (Panel A) and OECD data (Panel 
B). The data in Panel A with the Compendia data highlight the continued statistical 
significance in support of H1 and H2a. In terms of the economic significance of a 1 
standard deviation increase in new density from the mean in the subsample, and taking 
into account the interaction effects, the regressions predict a 349.06% increase in 
GDP/capita, a 108.82% reduction in unemployment, a 57.29% increase in exports/GDP, 
and a 65.91% increase in patents per population. In Panel B, however, there is less 
support for H1 and H2a. The only significant factor in Panel B is for H1 in respect of 
GDP in regression Model (29), which is significant at the 1% level. As a result, we may 
infer that the issue of insignificance with the OECD data is mainly attributable to the 
smaller number of years and countries in the OECD data. However, to some degree, at 
least with respect to the impact on GDP/capita, the differences in the inferences are 
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attributable to definitions of business entry in the World Bank and Compendia measures 
relative to the OECD measure. 
In our final set of regressions in Table 2.7, we present evidence to ascertain 
whether successful venture capital has an exacerbating impact on the subsequent year’s 
GDP/capita. We proxy our measure of success in a way consistent with Nahata’s (2008) 
measure of venture capital fund manager reputation; that is, successful venture capital 
funds that have had IPO exits (see Table 2.1). The data show venture capital has a 
pronounced impact, consistent with the value-added and risk taking incentives from 
venture capital (see H2b and accompanying text). In particular, the economic significance 
in the most conservative estimate (Model 35) is such that a 1 standard deviation increase 
in venture capital from the average level is associated with a 34.35% increase in 
GDP/capita relative to the average level in the country-years in the data. The other 
findings are generally consistent with those reported above. But we note that the data in 
Table 2.7 are based on a restricted sample6 of countries as listed in Table 2.7 due to data 
availability, as data source is less complete in the other countries; and hence we do not 
include venture capital in the other regression tables. Also, we note that when we run 
regressions based on the full amount of venture capital in these countries and not the 
successful investments, the results for the interaction term show no significant economic 
impact, which highlights the pronounced effect of successful venture capital. Finally, we 
note that when we run the regressions on the other dependent variables for patents per 
population, unemployment and exports/GDP, the data indicate that venture capital 
                                                            
6 Since we used a method to set constrains on several independent variables to filter out the relatively most 
successful country and year observations (for example, set VC variable is over its mean value, etc), the 
available observation sharply decreased due to data availability. 
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(successful or otherwise) has no impact. These and other robustness checks are available 
on request. 
We have carried out a number of additional robustness checks that are available 
on request but not reported herein for reasons of conciseness. For example, we have 
considered subsets of the data by different years and countries, and the findings are 
robust. Our regressions control for changes in economic conditions over time and 
consider both fixed and random effects specifications, and as such, subsets of the data did 
not give rise to materially different results so long as there were sufficient observations in 
the sample. 
 
2.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this essay, we tested the hypothesis that the economic activity that results from 
entrepreneurial activity is relatively more pronounced in newly established firms, and 
therefore new business entry has a positive impact on GDP/capita, exports/GDP, and 
patents per population, and a negative impact on unemployment. Further, we found 
evidence of a moderating impact of legal and institutional impediments to risk taking for 
the strength of the relationship between new business entry and economic outcomes for 
both creditor rights and cultural uncertainty avoidance. As well, we found evidence of a 
pronounced impact from top-quartile venture capital fund investment. 
We examine three recently available international datasets from the World Bank, 
the OECD, and Compendia to test these hypotheses. The World Bank and Compendia 
data are highly consistent with the view that new business entry positively impact 
GDP/capita, exports/GDP, and patents per population, and negatively impacts 
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unemployment. The OECD data do not support these hypotheses. The inferences with the 
OECD data are in part attributable to differences in the definitions of new business entry 
from our three different international datasets, as well as differences in countries and 
years for which those data are available. Such results are not the spurious reflection of 
recent global financial crisis periods. It appears that the World Bank data are the most 
reliable and largest for the purpose for assessing the impact of new business entry on 
economic outcomes. 
As mentioned, in the Appendix of this essay we address issues of causality.  
Standard Granger causality tests do not provide support for the notion that endogeneity 
has significantly influenced our findings, particularly with reference to the World Bank 
data.  Future research may nevertheless explore further differences between the OECD 
data and the World Bank and Compendia data in respect of differences in the definitions 
entrepreneurship.  It is possible that poorer countries have entrepreneurs that are more 
likely to register as sole proprietors and partnerships rather than limited liability 
companies, and as such endogeneity may play a stronger role in explaining the findings 
with the OECD data which includes sole proprietorships and partnerships.  Our tests, 
however, showed quite consistent evidence across the World Bank data and OECD 
country-year observations (Table 2.6, Panel B). 
A contribution of the study is how legal and institutional barriers to risk-taking 
influence the impact of entrepreneurship. Said differently, entrepreneurship is an 
important channel through which institutional factors have a real impact on country GDP, 
growth, and exports. Stepping back though, institutional/legal barriers, if present, are 
likely to have a negative impact on entrepreneurship itself. So, entrepreneurs will form 
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their ventures only if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs arising out of 
legal/institutional barriers. And such benefits are likely to arise from increased impact 
through growth, exports, and patents. Admittedly, the counterfactual of not forming a 
venture because of institutional barriers is unobservable. Hence the study is conditional 
on entrepreneurial risk taking. And even so, the results show that institutional barriers 
have a negative impact on the real effects of entrepreneurship. So, not only barriers 
influence the decision to become an entrepreneur but also conditional on becoming so, 
they have a negative impact on GDP and future growth. As such, it is worth highlighting 
the potential negative impact of institutional and legal barriers to entrepreneurship in 
relation to the impact of economic outcomes.   
As additional years of data become available, further research could better assess 
the importance of other legal and institutional factors that impact entrepreneurial 
activities and the effect of such activities on economic outcomes. Also, other economic 
outcomes could be examined, such as different proxies for innovation other than patents.  
Further, different policy instruments could be considered with additional data, possibly 
with the use of natural experiments associated with policy changes in the future. 
 
2.6. Appendix 
In Tables 2.3-2.7 lagged values of New Density caused new values of 
GDP/Capita, Unemployment, Exports/GDP, and Patents/Population. Here, we consider 
the possibility of the reverse causation as expected values of GDP/Capita, for example, 
could give rise to new density. We focus our tests on the World Bank data. Table A2.1 
presents regressions with New Density as a dependent variable and lagged values of New 
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Density, GDP/Capita, Unemployment, Exports/GDP, and Patents/Population on the right-
hand-side each separately (Models A1 – A4), and jointly (Model A5).7 If the right-hand-
side coefficients for GDP/Capita, Unemployment, Exports/GDP, and Patents/Population 
are positive and significant then we worry about reverse causality. The data, however, 
show insignificant coefficients for GDP/Capita, Unemployment, and Patents/Population 
in Models (A2), (A4) and (A5), and a negative and significant coefficient for GDP/Capita 
in Model (A1) (the latter result suggesting that more business are started in times of 
economic downturns). Therefore, we do not worry about reverse causality affecting the 
positive affect of lagged New Density on GDP/Capita, Unemployment, and 
Patents/Population as documented in Tables 2.3-2.7. We do find in Models (A3) and (A5) 
a positive and statistically coefficient on lagged Exports/GDP, but the economic 
significance is very small such that a 1-standard deviation increase in lagged 
exports/GDP causes a 0.6% and 0.8% increase in New Density in Model (A3) and Model 
(A5), respectively. Overall, therefore, we believe there is relatively little concern that all 
of our major independent variables (GDP/capita, unemployment, exports/GDP, 
patents/population) do not Granger cause the new business entry rate, which further 
confirms the tests of our hypotheses H1, H2a and H2b. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
7 The mirror or reverse specification with lagged New Density on the right-hand-side and GDP/Capita, 
Unemployment, Exports/GDP, and Patents/Population on the left-hand-side is not presented for 
conciseness, but is consistent with Tables 2.3-2.7 which show a causal link between New Density and these 
economic outcomes. 
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Figure 2.1. Entrepreneurship and GDP/Capita 
Panel A. World Bank New Density
 
Panel B. OECD Birth Rate 
 
Panel C. Compendia Entry Rate
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Figure 2.2. Entrepreneurship and Unemployment 
Panel A. World Bank New Density
 
Panel B. OECD Birth Rate 
 
Panel C. Compendia Entry Rate
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Figure 2.3. Entrepreneurship and Exports per GDP 
Panel A. World Bank New Density 
 
Panel B. OECD Birth Rate
 
Panel C. Compendia Entry Rate
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Figure 2.4. Entrepreneurship and Patents per 1,000 Population 
Panel A. World Bank New Density [Outliers Removed] 
 
Panel B. OECD Birth Rate [Outliers Removed] 
 
Panel C. Compendia New Entry Rate [Outliers Removed] 
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Table 2.1. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
This table provides definitions of the main variables in the dataset, the data sources, and summary statistics. 
 
Variable Name Definition Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
observations 
GDP Per Capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is 
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It 
is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. 
dollars.  Source: World Bank.  Lead values are used for this variable for the 
dependent variables in the regressions. 
 
11785.14 4006.731 17689.45 125.236 134914.7 1242 
Unemployment 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but 
available for and seeking employment. Definitions of labor force and 
unemployment differ by country.  Source: World Bank.  Lead values are used for 
this variable for the dependent variables in the regressions. 
 
8.953 7.4 6.532 0.5 47.5 536 
Exports / GDP 
Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market 
services provided to the rest of the world. They include the value of merchandise, 
freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such 
as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and 
government services. They exclude compensation of employees and investment 
income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments.  Source: World 
Bank.  Lead values are used for this variable for the dependent variables in the 
regressions. 
 
43.89 37.824 29.472 0 241.402 1098 
Patents per 1,000 
populations 
Patent applications are worldwide patent applications filed through the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty procedure or with a national patent office for exclusive rights 
for an invention--a product or process that provides a new way of doing 
something or offers a new technical solution to a problem. A patent provides 
protection for the invention to the owner of the patent for a limited period, 
generally 20 years.  Source: World Bank.  Lead values are used for this variable 
for the dependent variables in the regressions and this variable is scaled by 1,000 
populations for each country to match other dependent variables. 
 
0.137608 0.037581 0.3612103 1.31E-05 2.716478 539 
New Density (World 
Bank) 
New Density is the number of newly registered limited liability companies per 
1,000 working-age people (those ages 15-64).  Source: World Bank.  Available 
for Years 2004-2011 for 125 countries. 
 
28.554 1.51 301.001 0 4388.97 859 
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Birth Rate (OECD) 
An employer enterprise birth refers to the birth of an enterprise with at least one 
employee, including limited liability companies and all other legal forms of 
enterprise such as partnership and sole proprietorship. The population of employer 
enterprise births consists first of “new” enterprise births, i.e. new enterprises 
reporting at least one employee in the birth year; and second, enterprises that 
existed before the year under consideration but were then below the threshold of 
one employee, and that reported 1 or more employees in the current, i.e. birth, 
year. Employer enterprise births do not include entries into the population due to: 
mergers, break-ups, split-off or restructuring of a set of enterprises. They also 
exclude entries into a sub-population resulting only from a change of activity. The 
employer enterprise birth rate corresponds to the number of births of employer 
enterprises as a percentage of the population of active enterprises with at least one 
employee.  Source: Entrepreneurship at a Glance 2011. Access the complete 
publication at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264097711-en. Available for 24 
countries for the years 2004-2007. 
 
11.1 11.171 2.552 3.65 18.122 71 
Entry Rate (Compendia) 
The dataset COMPENDIA contains harmonized data on the number of business 
owners and the business ownership rate (number of business owners as share of 
labor force) for 30 OECD countries over the period 1970-2007. The acronym 
COMPENDIA stands for "COMParative ENtrepreneurship Data for International 
Analysis". Business ownership rates have been made comparable across countries 
and over time. For that purpose figures from official OECD statistics have been 
corrected for deviating business ownership definitions and for trend breaks.  
Available for the years 1995-2009 for 11 countries. 
 
10.363 10.2 2.584 4.1 17.7 57 
MSCI Returns Annual MSCI country-specific stock market returns.  0.058 0.096 0.224 -0.727 0.825 1353 
Strength of Creditor 
Protection 
Strength of creditor rights protection, as measured by the World Bank doing 
business reports on an annual basis. 
 
5.423 5 2.482 0 10 1606 
Cost of Exports 
Cost of exporting containers, as measured by the World Bank doing business 
reports on an annual basis. 
 
1330.451 1100 843.065 390 8450 1451 
Uncertainty Avoidance 
Hofstede's index of uncertainty avoidance.  The uncertainty avoidance dimension 
expresses the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with 
uncertainty and ambiguity. The fundamental issue here is how a society deals with 
the fact that the future can never be known: should we try to control the future or 
just let it happen? Countries exhibiting strong UAI maintain rigid codes of belief 
and behavior and are intolerant of unorthodox behavior and ideas (i.e., high index 
scores mean people in the country do not like uncertainty). Weak UAI societies 
maintain a more relaxed attitude in which practice counts more than principles.  
Source: http://geert-hofstede.com/dimensions.html. 
 
64.967 68 22.342 8 112 582 
VC The number of venture capital-backed IPOs by the VC funds in the respective country-year.  Source: Thompson SDC. 4.0841 0 17.7413 0 196.74 672 
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Table 2.2.  Correlations 
 This table provide correlations across the main variables in the dataset. * Significant at least the 5% level of significance. 
 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
[1] GDP/capita 1 
          [2] Unemployment -0.29* 1 
         [3] Exports/GDP 0.38* -0.19* 1 
        [4] Patents/population 0.29* -0.19* -0.06 1 
       [5] New Density 0.42* -0.20* 0.32* 0 1 
      [6] Birth Rate -0.35* 0.23 -0.01 -0.31* 0.21 1 
     [7] Entry Rate 0.40* -0.18 0.21 -0.12 0.39* 0.4 1 
    [8] MSCI Returns 0.04 -0.05 0.08* -0.01 0 -0.08 0.12 1 
   [9] Strength of Creditor Protection 0.33* -0.11* 0.23* 0.18* 0.39* -0.13 0.67* 0.01 1 
  [10] Cost of Exports -0.24* 0.14* -0.19* -0.08 -0.21* -0.16 -0.53* 0.04 -0.16* 1 
 [11] Uncertainty Avoidance -0.18* 0.15* -0.37* 0.05 -0.23* 0.06 -0.65* -0.06 -0.51* 0.07 1 
[12] VC 0.23* -0.08 -0.09* 0.28* 0.11* -0.32* 0.09 0 0.25* -0.02 -0.21* 
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Table 2.3. Regression Models for the Impact of Entrepreneurship: World Bank Data 
This table presents random and fixed effects panel data estimates of the impact of entrepreneurship on GDP per 
capita, unemployment, exports, and patents.  In Panel B for the fixed effects estimates the Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index is dropped due to lack of time variation.  The regressions for patents exclude the 99th percentile outlier 
country-years for new density and patents.  Variables are as defined in Table 2.1.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Random Effects Estimates 
  (1) GDP Per Capita (2) Unemployment (3) Exports/GDP (4) Patents/Population 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
New Density 4306.712 2.39** -1.6011 -1.94* 8.5547 2.47*** 0.0545 4.73*** 
MSCI Returns 1255.609 1.84* -1.22 -3.31*** 4.11 3.95*** -0.0027 -1.23 
Strength of Creditor Protection 930.0081 2.37** -0.2231 -0.94 0.7007 1.06 0.0029 1.88* 
Strength of Creditor Protection * New Density -222.5856 -1.67* 0.0635 1.12 -0.3988 -1.66* -0.0028 -2.73*** 
Cost of Exports         0.0007 0.23    
Cost of Exports * New Density         -0.0016 -1.6    
Uncertainty Avoidance -29.6149 -0.25 -0.5583 -1.70* -0.4643 -2.59*** 0.0004 1.41 
Uncertainty Avoidance * New Density -34.781 -2.37** 0.0142 1.98** -0.0596 -2.22** -0.0004 -5.53*** 
Constant 15375.04 1.71* 13.7066 4.22*** 68.6363 4.68*** -0.0206 -0.83 
Number of Observations 303 201 236 130 
Adjusted R2 0.1519 0.0865 0.3359 0.5773 
Panel B. Fixed Effects Estimates 
  (5) GDP Per Capita (6) Unemployment (7) Exports (8) Patents/Populations 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
New Density 3701.831 1.94* -1.5784 -1.35 1.6747 0.46 0.0477 3.53*** 
MSCI Returns 1219.152 1.79* -1.2098 -3.24*** 3.8091 3.91*** -0.0028 -1.32 
Strength of Creditor Protection 793.6668 1.97** -0.2592 -0.79 0.006 0.01 0.0024 1.41 
Strength of Creditor Protection * New Density -185.1751 -1.3 0.0475 0.59 -0.0455 -0.18 -0.0025 -2.20** 
Cost of Exports         0.0019 0.66    
Cost of Exports * New Density         -0.001 -1.03    
Uncertainty Avoidance * New Density -30.0046 -1.96** 0.0144 1.46 -0.0043 -0.16 -0.0004 -4.02*** 
Constant 13864.36 5.13*** 10.4979 4.87*** 43.5774 7.71*** 0.0131 1.13 
Number of Observations 303 201 236 130 
Adjusted R2 0.1593 0.0734 0.2956 0.5262 
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Table 2.4. Regression Models for the Impact of Entrepreneurship: OECD Data 
This table presents random and fixed effects panel data estimates of the impact of entrepreneurship on GDP per 
capita, unemployment, exports, and patents.  In Panel B for the fixed effects estimates the Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index is dropped due to lack of time variation.  The regressions for patents exclude the 99th percentile outlier 
country-years for Birth Rate and patents.  Variables are as defined in Table 2.1.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Random Effects Estimates 
  (9) GDP Per Capita (10) Unemployment (11) Exports/GDP (12) Patents/Population 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient 
t-
statistic Coefficient 
t-
statistic Coefficient 
t-
statistic 
Birth Rate -1401.733 -0.26 -0.1918 -0.24 0.2373 0.04 -0.0049 -0.32 
MSCI Returns 8907.129 1.42 -0.6424 -0.7 -2.5371 -1.17 0.002 0.16 
Strength of Creditor Protection -1451.671 -0.29 0.0843 0.12 2.2644 0.49 0.0016 0.08 
Strength of Creditor Protection * Birth Rate 104.2457 0.24 -0.013 -0.21 -0.0015 0 -0.0005 -0.33 
Cost of Exports         0.0272 0.61    
Cost of Exports * Birth Rate         -0.0007 -0.22    
Uncertainty Avoidance -502.9548 -1.12 0.0174 0.27 0.0154 0.04 -0.0033 -1.51 
Uncertainty Avoidance * Birth Rate 1.3829 0.03 0.0035 0.59 0.0061 0.25 0.0001 0.62 
Constant 84887.79 1.41 4.8937 0.57 9.0941 0.13 0.3262 1.53 
Number of Observations 44 44 30 22 
Adjusted R2 0.4965 0.4471 0.0395 0.4848 
Panel B. Fixed Effects Estimates 
  (13) GDP Per Capita (14) Unemployment (15) Exports (16) Patents/Population 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient 
t-
statistic Coefficient 
t-
statistic Coefficient 
t-
statistic 
Birth Rate 3265.812 0.67 -0.8202 -0.85 0.0528 0.01 -0.0052 -0.29 
MSCI Returns 4699.575 0.95 -0.492 -0.5 -2.5348 -1.07 0.0012 0.09 
Strength of Creditor Protection 12629.89 1.91* -0.8486 -0.65 2.7109 0.51    
Strength of Creditor Protection * Birth Rate -292.5706 -0.79 0.025 0.34 -0.0441 -0.11 -0.0008 -0.44 
Cost of Exports                
Cost of Exports * Birth Rate         -0.0001 -0.04    
Uncertainty Avoidance * Birth Rate -11.4339 -0.29 0.0081 1.04 0.0055 0.2 0.0001 0.66 
Constant -54921.77 -1.19 12.9725 1.42 29.9783 0.71 0.0661 2.03* 
Number of Observations 44 44 30 22 
Adjusted R2 0.0672 0.3891 0.0002 0.2671 
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Table 2.5. Regression Models for the Impact of Entrepreneurship: Compendia Data 
This table presents random and fixed effects panel data estimates of the impact of entrepreneurship on GDP per 
capita, unemployment, exports, and patents.  In Panel B for the fixed effects estimates the Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index is dropped due to lack of time variation.  The regressions for patents exclude the 99th percentile outlier 
country-years for Entry Rate and patents.  Variables are as defined in Table 2.1.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Random Effects Estimates 
  (17) GDP Per Capita (18) Unemployment (19) Exports/GDP (20) Patents/Population 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Entry Rate 10367.57 2.92*** -3.2088 -3.07*** 41.4951 3.50*** 0.0053 0.27 
MSCI Returns 1813.176 0.95 -1.0182 -1.63 2.9351 0.33 -0.006 -0.88 
Strength of Creditor Protection 7397.961 2.68*** -1.1348 -1.38 41.6173 4.32*** -0.042 -4.18*** 
Strength of Creditor Protection * Entry Rate -776.5009 -2.56** 0.1871 2.10** -4.1748 -4.10*** 0.0024 1.96* 
Cost of Exports         0.0735 2.67***    
Cost of Exports * Entry Rate         -0.0043 -1.07    
Uncertainty Avoidance 555.5857 1.90* -0.1888 -2.19** 0.9601 0.87 0 0.02 
Uncertainty Avoidance * Entry Rate -69.2284 -2.50** 0.0245 3.00*** -0.1363 -1.23 -0.0002 -1.02 
Constant -48837.09 -1.42 30.632 3.01*** -384.1444 -3.18*** 0.2819 1.66* 
Number of Observations 46 46 32 14 
Adjusted R2 0.5535 0.5687 0.5664 0.9887 
Panel B. Fixed Effects Estimates 
  (21) GDP Per Capita (22) Unemployment (23) Exports (24) Patents/Population 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Entry Rate 3478.345 0.66 -3.1247 -1.78* -3.0064 -0.6 0.0258 0.86 
MSCI Returns 2135.336 1.12 -0.9378 -1.48 6.4387 3.97*** -0.0071 -1 
Strength of Creditor Protection 2919.022 0.78 -0.9002 -0.72 0.9764 0.26    
Strength of Creditor Protection * Entry Rate -181.2494 -0.39 0.1094 0.72 -0.1464 -0.32 -0.0011 -0.26 
Cost of Exports         -0.0423 -1.47    
Cost of Exports * Entry Rate         -0.0014 -0.69    
Uncertainty Avoidance * Entry Rate -28.6341 -0.74 0.0338 2.64*** 0.0581 1.6 -0.0002 -1.02 
Constant 17600.68 0.6 17.7122 1.83* 95.4722 3.17 0.0506 1.34 
Number of Observations 46 46 32 14 
Adjusted R2 0.3483 0.2886 0.0139 0.8634 
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Table 2.6. Regression Models for the Impact of Entrepreneurship:  
World Bank Data, Compendia and OECD Country-Year Observations 
This table presents random and fixed effects panel data estimates of the impact of entrepreneurship on GDP per 
capita, unemployment, exports, and patents.  In Panel B for the fixed effects estimates the Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index is dropped due to lack of time variation.  The regressions for patents exclude the 99th percentile outlier 
country-years for new density and patents.  Variables are as defined in Table 2.1.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Random Effects Estimates: World Bank Data with Compendia Country-Year Observations 
  (25) GDP Per Capita (26) Unemployment (27) Exports/GDP (28) Patents/Population 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
New Density 21418.59 3.73*** -4.8137 -1.70* 36.491 2.12** 0.106 3.04*** 
MSCI Returns 1970.383 1.11 -0.948 -1.33 7.9311 0.96 -0.005 -1.01 
Strength of Creditor Protection 5177.067 3.65*** -0.2174 -0.3 21.0257 5.04*** 0.026 2.50** 
Strength of Creditor Protection * New Density -1894.214 -4.17*** 0.3143 1.37 -4.4159 -2.85*** -0.009 -2.62*** 
Cost of Exports         0.1375 2.35**    
Cost of Exports * New Density         -0.0148 -1.1    
Uncertainty Avoidance 151.5718 0.73 -0.071 -0.71 -1.3779 -1.72* 0.001 0.2 
Uncertainty Avoidance * New Density -54.1446 -1.02 0.02 0.8 0.1811 0.86 -0.001 -2.67*** 
Constant -16315.42 -0.79 17.9055 1.76* -131.515 -2.09** 0.014 0.07 
Number of Observations 43 43 34 33 
Adjusted R2 0.6333 0.2495 0.6447 0.3464 
Panel B. Random Effects Estimates: World Bank Data with OECD Country-Year Observations 
  (29) GDP Per Capita (30) Unemployment (31) Exports (32) Patents/Population 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
New Density 23571.41 3.26*** -0.6964 -0.53 6.7097 0.87 -0.041 -0.56 
MSCI Returns 3084.922 0.77 -0.561 -0.59 -2.2282 -0.97 -0.008 -0.14 
Strength of Creditor Protection 7259.166 2.86*** -0.171 -0.48 5.8751 1.62 0.008 0.44 
Strength of Creditor Protection * New Density -1886.28 -3.45*** 0.0315 0.34 -0.5061 -0.8 0.004 0.81 
Cost of Exports         0.0459 1.53    
Cost of Exports * New Density         -0.0019 -0.37    
Uncertainty Avoidance 104.7732 0.35 0.0178 0.34 0.03 0.07 -0.003 -1.09 
Uncertainty Avoidance * New Density -96.22 -1.61 0.0063 0.54 -0.0303 -0.41 0 0.21 
Constant -36055.39 -1.2 6.6216 1.27 -23.9101 -0.51 0.364 1.19 
Number of Observations 42 42 28 38 
Adjusted R2 0.3222 0.4309 0.5192 0.6825 
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Table 2.7. Regression Models for the Impact of Venture Capital on Entrepreneurship 
This table presents random effects panel data estimates of the impact of venture capital on 
entrepreneurship on GDP per capita. The models restrict the sample to include different 
countries for which data are available Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, 
India, Israel, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and exclude outliers 
at the 95, 99, and 90th percentiles.  VC is the total value of VC investment at the top quartile.  
Other variables are as defined in Table 2.1.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  (33) GDP Per Capita (34) GDP Per Capita (35) GDP Per Capita 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
New Density 28999.074 1.76* 31496.915 1.99** 31410.603 2.62*** 
MSCI Returns 4700.6535 0.8 2030.9126 0.37 4484.8476 1.3 
Strength of Creditor Protection 9446.7806 1.97** 11123.457 2.39** 10561.037 2.98*** 
Strength of Creditor Protection * New Density -2767.5292 -1.65* -3367.437 -2.06** 
-
3293.6705 -2.65*** 
VC 165.593 0.47 120.4639 0.38 228.1982 0.83 
VC * New Density 196.323 1.91* 213.6556 2.27** 123.4118 1.71* 
Uncertainty Avoidance 285.897 0.88 118.1956 0.37 30.6753 0.12 
Uncertainty Avoidance * New Density -72.8475 -0.84 -44.5685 -0.53 -37.435 -0.59 
Constant -68580.307 -1.5 -68107.22 -1.56 
-
58283.144 -1.76* 
Number of Observations 33 32 44 
Adjusted R2 0.3294 0.3987 0.439 
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Table A2.1. Granger Causality Tests of New Density 
This table presents Granger causality tests between GDP/Capita, Unemployment, Exports/GDP and Patents.  *, **, *** 
Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Model (A1) Model (A2) Model (A3) Model (A4) Model (A5) 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
New Density  
0.9384 68.36*** 0.9924 83.71*** 0.9786 93.16*** 0.9653 89.10*** 0.9469 73.21*** Lag 1 
GDP per capita  
-0.00001 -4.11***             -0.000002 -0.63 Lag 1 
Unemployment  
    0.0008 0.09         0.0099 0.72 Lag 1 
Exports/GDP  
        0.0054 3.73***     0.0075 4.45*** Lag 1 
Patents/Population  
            -0.0575 -0.42 0.0255 0.17 Lag 1 
Constant 0.427 5.47*** 0.1201 1.04 -0.0888 -1.15 0.2131 3.07*** -0.1293 -0.69 
F-test F(1, 709) = 16.93 F(1, 482) = 0.01 F(1, 677) = 13.94 F(1, 439) = 0.17 F(4, 375) = 5.08 
  Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.9302 Prob > F = 0.0002 Prob > F = 0.6764 Prob > F = 0.0005 
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Chapter 3 
Angel Investors around the World 
 
“What bugs me is this whole start-up scene is a lifestyle, and there are these [angel] investors 
who think it’s sexy and want to be part of that lifestyle.”  
-- New York Times, December 2015, “Tips for the Aspiring Angel Investor”8 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Intuitional theory is the cornerstone of a wide array of work in management, law, 
economics, and finance. Despite decades of development of work on topics that include 
the impact of legal institutions and culture on management theory and practice, there is 
scant theory or evidence that compares the importance of these institutional forces for 
individuals versus organizations. This essay attempts to fill this gap by examining the 
specific context of angel investments versus venture capital and private equity 
investments. 
Originally, the term “angel” referred to wealthy individuals who funded the 
expensive Broadway theatre productions in New York. It was first used as a business 
term when William Wetzel completed his pioneering study on how entrepreneurs raised 
seed capital in the U.S. and described the investors who supported those entrepreneurs as 
“angels” (Wetzel, 1983). Colorful quotes such as the one above illustrate the oft-repeated 
view that there is a culture to angel investing. However, unlike leading work in the 
private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) literature (Batjargal, 2007; Zacharakis, 
McMullen, and Shepherd, 2007; Madhaven and Iriyama, 2009; Guler and Guillen, 2010; 
                                                            
8 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/03/your-money/tips-for-the-aspiring-angel-investor.html?_r=0  
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Iriyama, Li, and Madhaven, 2010; Li and Zahra, 2012; Jääskeläinen and Maula, 2014; 
Liu and Maula, 2016; Dai and Nahata, 2016), there is little theory or evidence on angel 
investments around the world and the comparative role of international differences in 
cultural and legal institutions in the determinants of and outcomes from angel 
investments.  
In this study, we seek to add to the angel literature by examining theory and 
international evidence on differences between angel investments and PE/VC investments. 
We aim to shed light on how angel investments look around the world, how angel 
involvement is different from PE/VC funds, and what legal and cultural environments 
affect angel investments and divestments. We also consider whether regulatory changes 
have promoted more angels and PE/VC funds activities. 
Our analysis exploits the comprehensive data collected at the deal level of 
investee firms from PitchBook, which comprise 85,940 completed private equity (PE) 
deals from 96 countries from 1977 to 2012. Within those deals, 5,397 from 42 countries 
are involved with angels (either single funded by angels or coinvested/syndicated with 
PE/VC funds). The dataset allows us to directly compare angels and PE/VC funds at both 
the deal and investee firm level.  
The data indicate that, relative to PE/VC funds, angels prefer investing in smaller 
entrepreneurial firms in wealthier countries with better stock market conditions, worse 
legal environments, and countries with cultures characterized by higher levels of 
individualism and lower levels of risk-taking. Such behaviors are robust both for the first-
round deals and deals at all other stages. We also find that relative to PE/VC funds, those 
investee firms funded by angels have a lower probability of having successful exits, in 
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either IPO or acquisition. However, better legal environments can help mitigate the 
negative effects, especially for IPO exits (see also Nahata, 2008; Nahata et al., 2014). 
Moreover, in our subsample tests, the “stepping stone” logic of angels still cannot be 
proven, as we find that firms who have received angel investments in the first round have 
lower probabilities of successfully exiting in later stages. At a country/market level, we 
also find significant determinants that can work together to build a well-rounded 
environment and spawn both angels and PE/VC funds activities. In addition to these 
findings, we also perform difference-in-differences tests to confirm that more stringent 
disclosure regulation and more forgiving bankruptcy law changes can also spawn the 
entrepreneurial activities induced by angels and PE/VC funds. Our tests results are robust 
under various clustering methods to correct standard errors while controlling fixed effects 
and are robust when performing propensity score matching. 
Our study adds to the small but growing literature on angel investors. While the 
existing literature has focused more on PE/VC finance, many studies have found that 
angels are as important as VCs for start-ups, and the total market for angels is 
approximately the same size as the VC market (Sohl, 2003; Mason and Harrison, 2002; 
Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch and Triantis, 2007; Sudek, Mitteness and Baucus, 2008; Shane, 
2008; OECD report, 2011); as such, more research on angels is clearly warranted. The 
most basic reason, we believe, for comparative lack of work on angels is the fact that data 
are readily available on PE/VC deals but scantly available on angels. 
Prior research has established that angels play a more and more important role in 
funding entrepreneurs in the seed and early stages, and their importance in the 
entrepreneurial economy has been recognized in recent years (Wetzel, 1987; Mason and 
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Harrison, 1995; Morrissette, 2007). Angels usually can be found among the friends or 
family members of an entrepreneur, and their capital support could be a one-time 
injection or an ongoing support over the lifecycle of the start-up. Besides the financial 
support, most of the angels often provide managerial assistances as well (Landstrom, 
1993; Shane, 2009; Maxwell, Jeffrey and Lévesque, 2011). Angels also geographically 
prefer investing in local firms; they do not prefer using conventional control mechanisms 
such as board seats, staging financings, or contracting provisions, and they usually hold 
small positions in the investee firms as compared with VCs (Wong, Bhatia and Freeman, 
2009; Wong, 2010; ARI Halo Report, 2015). 
Recent empirical studies of angels are more focused on their contributions to the 
investee firms as well as documenting the differences between VCs and angels. Kerr, 
Lerner, and Schoar (2014) found that angels can improve the survival, exits, employment, 
patenting, web traffic, and financing of investee firms using a regression discontinuity 
analysis. Although their study only used two angel groups’ investments, their findings 
confirm the positive side of angel group financing in that firms funded by those groups 
are achieving successful exits and reaching high employment levels. In another recent 
study, Lerner, Schoar, Sokolinski, and Wilson (2015) extended the results of Kerr et al., 
(2014) to an international setting by using 13 angel groups from 12 countries and 
confirmed similar positive outcomes. This study also compared the firms funded and 
unfunded by angels to determine if the development stage and maturity of the startups is 
negatively related to the angel host countries’ entrepreneurship friendliness. But, 
unfortunately, these studies cannot investigate the interrelationships between angels and 
VCs. Hellmann, Schure and Vo (2015) found that the investor type is dynamically 
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persistent as well as angels and VCs are dynamic substitutes of which companies that 
obtained more angel financing in the past are less likely to subsequently obtain VC 
funding, and vice versa. Their tests results favor the views that VC funding is still 
associated with better exit outcomes. Dutta and Folta (2016) find successful exit rates are 
more likely to be associated with VCs, but they also found that angels have as equivalent 
an impact as VCs on improving the innovation rates using patents data. 
Moreover, there are several theoretical studies that have built useful foundations 
to compare angels and VCs. Under the assumptions that VCs add value to the investee 
firms while angels do not, Chemmanur and Chen (2014) developed a model to explain 
the reasons behind why entrepreneurs might want to obtain angel investments first before 
approaching VCs. Schwienbacher (2009) assumed that both angels and VCs can add 
value, and his model explains the differences in choosing early-stage financiers between 
angels and VCs from the perspective of entrepreneurs. Hellmann and Thiele (2014) 
provides a “Friends or Foes” theory that explicitly models the interdependences between 
angels and VCs. Their model assumes that the investee firms want to proceed from angel 
financing to VC financing, those VCs might use their market power or control rights to 
squeeze out angels in later stages. Angels need to seek alternative exit routes when facing 
situations like this. One key insight from this theory is that the bargaining dynamics 
between angels and VCs may determine whether the relationship between them is 
complements or substitutes. 
Our study builds on these important prior studies by providing large sample 
empirical evidence on angel investments versus PE/VC investments around the world. To 
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to use a multi-country private equity deal-
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level database to observe the investment behaviors of angels versus PE/VC funds. We not 
only document angel activities around the world but also show how legal and cultural 
differences affect (not intermediated) angel investors versus (intermediated) PE/VC funds. 
We provide evidence that legal and cultural differences around the world have a more 
pronounced impact on angel investors relative to PE/VC funds. 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. The next section discusses 
the prior literature and develops our hypotheses. Thereafter we present the data and our 
summary statistics, followed by the regression analyses and robustness checks. The final 
sections discuss some limitations of the dataset and possible extensions, as well as some 
concluding remarks and an outlook for future research. 
 
3.2. Hypotheses 
There is extant research confirming the significant role of private equity 
investments that are catalysts for entrepreneurial growth and innovation and, thus, are 
spawning economic growth around the world (Timmons and Bygrave, 1986; Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Cumming and Johan, 2013; Makhene, 
2009). Prior studies of angels, however, mainly focus on the U.S. market (Kerr et al., 
2014; Dutta and Folta, 2016). Very few studies jump beyond this scope to consider the 
international differences between angels and PE/VC funds. Mason and Harrison (2002) 
study the U.K. cases by using survey methods while Li, Shi, Wu, Wu, and Zheng (2015) 
discuss the Chinese government policies in promoting angel investments. Ding, Sun, and 
Au (2014) compare the angels’ selection criteria in China and Denmark. Most of these 
studies offer single-country or two-country comparison analyses of angels, and they do 
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not consider the institutional differences between angels and PE/VC funds in an 
international setting. The most recent international angel study is Lerner et al., (2015) 
which focuses on the heterogeneity of angel groups’ countries, but their study does not 
discuss the characteristics of entrepreneurial firms in different institutional environments 
across the world. In the literature of VC and entrepreneurship, international studies have 
highlighted that institutional differences matter for financial market and economic 
development as well as the contractual provisions and oversight intensity of PE/VC funds 
transactions (Cumming and Johan, 2013; Nahata et al., 2014; Lerner and Schoar, 2005). 
However, previous studies of angels have not considered such international differences. 
Our study fills the gap and complements previous studies to investigate how angels are 
different from PE/VC funds when making their investment decisions facing different 
institutional environments across the globe. 
Angel investors have a long history as informal investors in the narrow subset of 
the private equity market (Lamoreaux, Levenstein and Sokoloff, 2004; Shane, 2009). A 
current trend for angels is to form angel groups to pool money in order to make larger 
investments like seed-stage VC funds (Shane, 2012; Kerr et al., 2014; Lerner et al., 2015). 
Such an assembly of angels, however, only account for about 2% of the total investments 
they have made (Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007). 
Prior literature has outlined several major differences between angels and PE/VC 
funds. First, angels prefer investing in the seed or early stage of the start-ups, while 
PE/VC funds usually take part in later-stage deals when firms get more mature. Second, 
the investment screening process is more sophisticated for PE/VC funds, such that due 
diligence and term sheet tools are used to build their portfolios (Cumming and Johan, 
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2013). On the other hand, angels select projects only based on their personal relationships 
and use relatively informal procedures (Sudek, 2006). Third, the investment amount is 
much smaller for angels (Ibrahim, 2008). Although Sohl (2003) estimated that there are 
around 300,000 to 350,000 angels in the U.S. who invest about $30 billion in around 
50,000 firms yearly, the average investment amount is only around $1 million to $2 
million. Fourth, angels use their own money to invest, while PE/VC funds as financial 
intermediaries invest in private firms on behalf of their investors (Avdeitchikova et al., 
2008). In this way, theoretically, they are facing different incentives and constraints 
where their investment risk tolerance profile and expected returns are deemed to be 
different. Aernoudt (1999) estimated that PE/VC funds are looking for investment 
projects with expected returns around 35% to 45%, while angels only expect returns 
around 20%. Fifth, there are different fee structures for the two types: angels only pay 
fees when they form groups to make investments, but PE/VC funds have management 
fees plus a carried interest rate of up to 20% to 30% (Cochrane, 2005). Moreover, 
according to the survey study of Shane (2005), angels are not only investing for financial 
returns but also for other social or economic reasons, such as supporting communities, 
favoring known partners, finding a job, learning, helping a company succeed, and for fun, 
etc. Angels also invest their knowledge and time (Chua and Wu, 2012). It seems the 
original aim for angels is quite different from PE/VC funds; they are investing in the 
person more than the company, and they want the company to succeed but not merely for 
a huge profit on their investments.  
Because PE/VC funds invest “other people’s money,” while angels invest their 
own money, we may expect that angel investments will be more closely linked to legal, 
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economic, and cultural conditions relative to PE/VC investments, even after controlling 
for all things being equal in terms of the types of investments. PE/VC funds act as 
intermediaries between large institutional investors and entrepreneurial firms, while angel 
investors invest their own capital without the process of financial intermediation. Prior 
work has well established that PE/VC activity is positively affected by better economic 
conditions, better stock market development, better legal protections for minority 
shareholders, and cultures favoring entrepreneurship development (Nahata, 2014). 
The governance structure imposed in a venture capital fund through institutional 
investor veto rights, monitoring through annual (or semi-annual or quarterly) reports, and 
limited partnership agreements implies that PE/VC funds activities will be less sensitive 
to behavioral biases than angel investors that can act without such constraints and 
oversight. PE/VC funds managers face less-pronounced risks associated with losing their 
own money and have primarily financial reasons for investment; by contrast, angels 
invest their own money directly and may do so not only for purely financial reasons. We 
can expect that angel investments will be subject to cultural conditions of uncertain 
avoidance. Furthermore, as they typically make investment decisions by themselves, 
angels are more likely to be in individualistic societies. Finally, as individuals are more 
financially constrained in economic downturns relative to PE/VC funds, and because 
angel investment decisions are made alone and are more subject to behavioral biases, 
angel investments are more likely to be affected by economic conditions relative to 
PE/VC funds. 
 
54 
 
Hypothesis 1:  The difference between angel investment and PE/VC investment 
will be more pronounced with respect to legal, economic, and cultural conditions around 
the world. 
 
PE/VC funds can provide benefits such as certification, guidance, and network to 
start-ups, and such certification and endorsement has been shown to be very important for 
the investment performances and exits in previous studies (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; 
Stuart, Hoang and Hybels, 1999; Hsu, 2004; Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu, 2007; Dutta 
and Folta, 2016). Angels are different from PE/VC funds, as we have discussed; they 
may lack the expected expertise and benefits, which can bring a certification effect to the 
investee firms, especially during the divestment stages. Therefore, we expect that by 
controlling international differences, the successful exit rates will be lower for the 
investee firms funded by angels, as posited in Hypothesis 2a: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Firms funded by angels will have a lower probability of exiting 
successfully by IPO or acquisition compared with firms with PE/VC funds. 
 
Although angels might not be as good as PE/VC funds at bringing start-up IPOs 
or acquisition exits, if such a company attracts angel investments in its early stage, this 
still sends a positive signal to the market and enables further credit through the 
investment tracking process. Moreover, it has been documented that PE/VC funds rarely 
invest in companies who received angel funding before; only a very small fraction of 
those companies will attract PE/VC funding later on (Shane, 2009). Ibrahim (2008) also 
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found that angels will try to simplify contract terms to seek selling companies or attract 
PE/VC funds to reduce costs. In this sense, if those companies succeed in IPO or 
acquisition exits, it is still possible that the certification effect from angels exists (Kerr et 
al., 2014). This is similar to a common view that angel financing is a “stepping stone” to 
obtain venture capital, and angels and VCs are synergistic members of a common 
financing ecosystem. The best companies like Google, Facebook, and Tesla Motors all 
benefit from the combination of these attributes and powerfully illustrate such “stepping 
stone” logic. We, therefore, expect that investee firms who have received angel 
investments in the first round might have a better chance to exit successfully by an IPO or 
acquisition, as summarized in Hypothesis 2b: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms receiving angel investments in the first round will have a 
relatively higher probability of exiting successfully by IPO or acquisition. 
 
In addition to the above hypotheses regarding the international institutional 
differences between angels and PE/VC funds as well as the performances in terms of 
successful exits, we extend our study to explore a national/market level test to find out 
what factors can determine the density of both angel and PE/VC funds activities. Over 
the past four decades, there are extant researches confirming the significant role of 
private equity investments that are catalysts for the entrepreneurial growth and innovation 
and thus are spawning the economic growth (Timmons and Bygrave, 1986; Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Armour and Cumming, 2006; Cumming 
and MacIntosh, 2006; Cumming and Johan, 2007; Strömberg, 2009; Makhene, 2009; De 
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Beer and Nhleko, 2009). Therefore, we propose that those previously confirmed 
determinants to define better macroeconomic conditions, better stock market 
development, better legal protections for minority shareholders and cultures favoring 
entrepreneurship development can also be applied to define the desired grounds to spawn 
more angel and PE/VC activities, as summarized in Hypothesis 3: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Higher density of angel and PE/VC funds activities is associated 
with better macroeconomic conditions, better stock market development, better legal 
protections for minority shareholders and lower cultural levels of individualism and 
uncertainty avoidance around the world. 
 
It has been documented that going public is one of the main objectives of VC-
backed companies (Black and Gilson, 1998). If entrepreneurs share this common 
objective with their investors, whether they are angels or PE/VC funds, they will follow 
the IPO disclosure rules to prepare their financial statements. Cumming and Walz (2010) 
find that higher-quality prospectus disclosure mitigates fraud and earnings management, 
and thus enhances the impact of VC finance on entrepreneurial activity. It is obvious that 
a higher-quality of securities regulation and better disclosure magnifies the impact of VC-
induced entrepreneurial spawning, and such an effect of changes on spawning outcomes 
are more pronounced for those countries with such disclosure rule changes (Cumming 
and Knill, 2012). We thus believe that angel and PE/VC activities will also be higher in 
countries that undergo more stringent disclosure regulation changes, as summarized in 
our Hypothesis 4a: 
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Hypothesis 4a: For countries with more stringent disclosure regulation change, 
the entrepreneurial spawning activities induced by angels and PE/VC funds will be more. 
 
Another important aspect of the legal environment is bankruptcy law. Personal 
bankruptcy law deals with individuals who are unable to pay off their debts; thus, the 
level of punishment or forgiveness from this law is the critical factor in determining the 
debtor’s consequences of failure. Both angels and entrepreneurs may face similar 
insolvent situations if misfortune happens with their own businesses. It has been 
documented that a more forgiving bankruptcy law can be understood as a partial 
insurance contract offered to entrepreneurs against the consequences of failure (Jackson, 
1985; Adler, Polack, and Schwartz, 2000; Lee, Peng and Barney, 2007). Moreover, 
bankruptcy law has also been shown to be related to the credit supply of entrepreneurial 
activities, where less severe bankruptcy laws are correlated with a greater incidence of 
credit rationing by lenders to small businesses (Berkowitz and White, 2004), and greater 
state-level exemptions in bankruptcy law in the U.S. are associated with an increase in 
overall entrepreneurship (Fan and White, 2003). 
In addition, bankruptcy law determines the availability of a “fresh start” in the 
event that any failures happen to the entrepreneurs (White, 2005). In this sense, a 
forgiving bankruptcy law, which can offer such “fresh start” opportunities from pre-
bankruptcy debts, permits entrepreneurs to enter into the economy again rapidly after 
business failures (Georgakopoulos, 2002; Landier, 2004; Ayotte, 2007). In fact, such 
repeat entrepreneurship is not uncommon in countries where a “fresh start” is permitted 
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(Baird and Morrison, 2005; Stam, Audretsch and Meijaard, 2008). In a cross-
jurisdictional setting, Armour and Cumming (2008) find that “forgiving” personal 
bankruptcy law has a statistically and economically significant positive effect on 
entrepreneurship using self-employment rates. We thus propose that in those countries 
with more “forgiving” bankruptcy law changes will have a positive impact on the 
activities of entrepreneurs, and such impacts are expected to be associated with a greater 
overall level of angel investment relative to the impact on PE/VC activity documented in 
prior work (Armour and Cumming, 2006), as summarized in our last Hypothesis 4b: 
 
Hypothesis 4b: For countries with more forgiving bankruptcy law change, the 
entrepreneurial spawning activities induced by Angel investors and PE/VC funds will be 
more. 
 
3.3. Data and Summary Statistics 
Our analysis exploits the comprehensive data collected at the deal level of 
investee firms from PitchBook, which comprise 85,940 completed PE deals in 42,617 
investee firms from 96 countries from 1977 to 2012. Among those deals, 5,397 deals in 
4,266 investee firms from 42 countries are involved with angels (either single funded by 
angels or coinvested/syndicated with PE/VC funds). Such a dataset allows us to compare 
angel deals and PE/VC deals at the same time to shed more lights on this underdeveloped 
area in academia. 
In order to provide a detailed picture for how angel investors evolve as a more 
and more important financial source for entrepreneurial firms, Figure 3.1 and 3.2 outline 
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both the angels and PE/VC funds activities from 1977 to 2012. Over a 36-year period, we 
can see that the overall trends for both angels and PE/VC funds activities are upward 
sloping, with small zigzags that capture the dot-com bubble and the recent financial crisis. 
In terms of the total number of deals for each year, we see that angels present a little 
different trend compared with PE/VC funds. It seems that the number of deals completed 
by angels was not hit too hard by the recent financial crisis, as the total numbers for each 
year rebounded very quickly. Combined with the trend for total deal sizes, we find that 
angels and PE/VC funds have quite different manners. In Figure 3.1 for angels, the total 
deal sizes peaked in 2007 and continued shrinking until recently. While in Figure 3.2 for 
PE/VC funds, the total deal sizes trend was much more synchronized with the total 
number of deals completed. Angels seemed to be more cautious after the financial crisis 
than PE/VC funds. 
After showing the overall picture of both angels and PE/VC funds activities 
during our sample period, we further present some key features of our PitchBook data. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the key features associated with the sample distribution of 
completed deals across the world. Table 3.1 Panel A presents the top 10 country 
distribution for those completed deals in three separate groups: All Deals, All Angel 
Deals, and All PE/VC Deals. The U.S., Canada, and the U.K. are always the Top 3 
players in all three categories. Most of the Top 10 countries in three categories are OECD 
countries in developed markets, but India and China cannot be neglected as active 
members from emerging markets. In terms of the industry distribution for our data, 
among the Top 10 industries we listed, in three categories, high-growth and high-tech 
industries interchanging their ranks with software industries always ranked No. 1 for each 
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category. However, we still see that angels prefer investing and becoming involved in 
deals in the retail industry, which differentiate them from PE/VC funds. 
In Table 3.2, we further present the characteristics of angel-involved deals in 42 
countries across the world. We aim to show a detailed picture for how angels were 
involved in all rounds, including the first round, and their successful exit rates, both at the 
investee firm level and the deal level. In Table 3.2 Panel A, we focus on investee firm 
level characteristics. For each of the 42 countries that have completed angel-involved 
deals, we calculate the total number of investee firms, the percentage of firms with angel 
financing (at all rounds), the percentage of firms with angel financing (during the first 
round), and the percentage of firms with successful exits. On average, we have shown 
that about 11% of investee firms in those 42 countries have angels involved, with about 8% 
of those firms with angels in the first round; about 24% of those investee firms will have 
successful exits in either IPO or acquisition. In Table 3.2 Panel B, we present similar 
characteristics as in Panel A, but with a focus at the deal level. As shown in Panel B, 
although there are, on average, more than 2,000 deals completed for each country yearly, 
only about 7% will be angel involved deals. This is not surprising, as angel data are rarely 
available; therefore, our PitchBook data only capture some of the big and prominent 
players in this market. Furthermore, only 5% of those deals will receive angel 
involvement in the first round, and about 15% of the total deals will have successful exits. 
Table 3.3 summarizes the main variables in our dataset. We aim to investigate the 
preferences of picking investee firms among different investor types. The different 
indicator variables of All Angels, Pure Angels, Mixed Angels, and PE/VC funds will be 
our main dependent variables. The explanatory variables include the GDP per capita for 
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the economic conditions, the domestic stock market capitalization and MSCI returns for 
each country’s stock market conditions, the minority shareholders protection index for 
the legal environment, Hofstede’s dimensions of cultural variables, as well as a variety of 
other control variables to capture investee firm and industry characteristics. 
From our data, we can empirically confirm that there are many differences 
between angels and PE/VC funds in different countries over our sample period. This 
provides us with a unique opportunity to explore all the possible reasons behind their 
investment and divestment behaviors and to compare the two investor types. Moreover, 
the PitchBook database provides detailed information on testing international differences 
across countries over time, which can shed further light on angel behaviors.  
In Table 3.4, we present a pair-wise correlation matrix for each of our variables 
for this study. Note that our correlations highlight some potential collinearity issues 
across different explanatory variables, which we explore in our multivariate empirical 
tests in the next section. We choose the most related variables and those ones having the 
most explanatory power in the following multivariate tests. 
Before we start the multivariate regression analysis, we must first show some of 
the highlighted details from our PitchBook data and provide the preliminary means 
difference tests results regarding the different characteristics between the several 
subgroups in Table 3.5. In panel A of Table 3.5, we divide our entire data sample by All 
Angel Deals versus All PE/VC deals. We then divide the All Angel Deals into Pure 
Angel and Mixed Angel deals to further compare different characteristics among those 
subgroups. Below, we summarize several interesting results in different categories: First, 
in terms of deal characteristics, angels will always involve themselves in smaller size 
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deals, and they prefer getting involved with active investee firms with more deal making 
every year. Second, in terms of investee firm characteristics, we find that angels’ firms 
have a smaller number of employees, and when PE/VC funds are co-
investing/syndicating in the same deal, the company valuation is significantly lower than 
Pure Angel-involved deals. This is consistent with the “Friends or Foes” theory 
proposition that when VC joins the deal in later stage they will lower the company 
valuation to squeeze the angels out (Hellmann and Thiele, 2015). Third, in terms of the 
country characteristics differences, angel deals are quite different in almost all facets we 
list: they prefer being in a) countries with larger entrepreneurial density, b) wealthier 
countries with a larger stock market, c) countries with a better legal environment, and d) 
countries with cultures favoring individualism and entrepreneurship. Although the means 
difference tests have shown those characteristic differences are significant, in actual 
numbers the differences are trivial, which will require more focus in future multivariate 
tests. Fourth, in the last category of exit outcomes, we find that angels are relatively poor 
performers in either taking the investee firms going public or being acquired, compared 
with PE/VC funds that possess more sophisticated investors. The only subpanel in which 
angels perform a little better is in comparing Pure Angels with Mixed Angels. It seems 
co-investment/syndication does not increase the likelihood of exiting successfully. Both 
parties fighting for control rights might explain the poor results here. 
As we outline several interesting comparison results between subgroups in Panel 
A of Table 3.5, we extend our analysis to present more results between the U.S. and the 
non-U.S. subsamples. Combined with the overall trends shown in Figure 3.1 and 3.2, we 
also separate our sample into a pre- and post-financial crisis period to provide a more 
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detailed picture for the data. In the first subpanel of Panel B in Table 3.5, we show that 
the U.S. is an active and mature market for entrepreneurial activities. Although the U.S. 
deals have smaller sizes and those U.S. investee firms are relatively smaller and receiving 
lower company valuations, this market is much more active in terms of the total number 
of deals per year and have much more angel activities each year. The density for both 
angels and PE/VC funds activities is much higher in the U.S. compared with the rest of 
the world. The U.S. is a quite different market in terms of country characteristics in this 
subpanel, which further emphasizes the importance of our study compared with previous 
studies, which focus only on the U.S. angel market. Our study provides more evidence 
that shows how angels and PE/VC funds differ internationally. The only category we 
highlight is the exit outcome. The U.S. subsample performs worse than counterparties 
around the world in terms of successful exit rates. 
With regards to the recent financial crisis, in the second subpanel of Panel B in 
Table 3.5, we find that deal making is decreasing while the sizes of the deals are 
shrinking. However, the angel market has actually become even more active since the 
financial crisis; the total numbers of deals are larger and the density of angel activities is 
even larger at the country level. Also, deals are occurring in wealthier countries with a 
larger stock market and a better legal environment. Moreover, we find that the recent 
financial crisis hit the IPO market harder than the acquisition market, as happened during 
the post-financial crisis period; the overall successful exit rates actually increase, and this 
is mainly driven by the increasing rates of acquisition. The IPO rates significantly 
declined after the financial crisis and such trend reflects possible prudent and cautious 
moods among entrepreneurs, angels, and PE/VC funds to bring private firms public. 
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3.4. Regression Analyses and Robustness Checks 
Now that we have laid out some of the unique interesting results from our means 
difference tests and some consistent findings from other studies, we perform our 
regression analyses in this section, mainly using clustered PROBIT models by controlling 
year effects in addition to controlling the industry and country fixed effects. We report 
associated marginal effects on each explanatory variable. We also perform several 
subsample tests and show several robustness checks before drawing our conclusions. 
 
3.4.1. What factors determine angel investments versus PE/VC investments? 
In our main regression analyses, as shown in Table 3.6, we use dummy variables 
to indicate different investor types as the main dependent variables. Throughout Models 
(1) to (4), the All Angels dummy is the major dependent variable and the dummies for 
Pure Angels, Mixed Angels, and PE/VC funds act as dependent variables in Models (5) 
to (7), respectively. We add different control variables from various facets in order to test 
how different investors prefer choosing investee firms and making their investments 
internationally. The regressions include control variables for economic and stock market 
conditions, legal environments, investee firm characteristics, as well as for Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions. The main PROBIT regression models in Table 3.6 use the following 
specification: 
 
Dummy Variable of Investor Type = f (Economic and Stock Market Conditions, Legal 
Environments, Investee Firm Characteristics, Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions, Industry 
and Country Dummies) 
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Most of the major variables are defined in Table 3.3. Note that there are a large 
number of explanatory variables that we could have included but chose to exclude. The 
primary reasons for our parsimonious specification are as follows. First, the selected 
variables are plausibly pertinent to investment choices across different facets and are 
chosen for the purpose of testing Hypothesis 1 and the following hypotheses. Second, 
note that the excluded variables are highly collinear. Hence, any additional control 
variables for the available sets of countries and years would not be perfectly suitable 
without potentially introducing spurious results into the regressions. Examples include 
some of the other dimensions of Hofstede’s cultural variables, as well as other legal and 
institutional variables. In untabulated tests and analysis, we included all of the six 
dimensions of Hofstede’s cultural variables in our main regressions and found out that 
the individualism and uncertainty avoidance indices are the most pronounced cultural 
factors and the main results did not change when including all six dimensions. Similar 
results have been found if we replace the minority shareholder protection index with 
other legal variables such as the legal origins or other legality indices. Our selection and 
reporting of variables was conducted to assess the factors that directly capture the 
differences of investors in different institutional environments across the world. 
In order to present a clear picture for how angels make investment decisions given 
different institutional environments, we add different facets step by step from Model (1) 
to Model (4). In Model (1) of Table 3.6 Panel A, we use the natural logarithm of GDP per 
capita to proxy the economic condition and the natural logarithm of domestic stock 
market capitalization, as well as the MSCI returns, to proxy the stock market conditions. 
From the results of Model (1), we find that angels prefer investing in and choosing 
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investee firms in countries with a higher GDP per capita (significant at 1%) and a smaller 
stock market (significant at 10%) with higher returns (significant at 5%). The economic 
significances are also large: angels are 12.59% more likely to be involved in deals where 
there is a 1% increase in the natural logarithm of GDP per capita; they are also 3.81% 
less likely to be involved in deals where there is a 1% increase in the natural logarithm of 
domestic stock market capitalization, and they are 3.60% more likely to be involved in 
deals where there is a 1% increase in the MSCI returns. 
In addition to the Model (1) specification, we added a minority shareholders 
protection index into the regression Model (2) to capture the legal environments. The 
minority shareholders protection index is the coded weighted average index on the ten 
key legal provisions identified by legal scholars as most relevant to the protection of 
minority shareholder rights (Guillén and Capron, 2015): 1) the power of the general 
meeting for de facto changes; 2) an agenda-setting power; 3) the anticipation of a 
facilitated shareholder decision; 4) the prohibition of multiple voting rights; 5) 
independent board members; 6) the feasibility of directors’ dismissal; 7) private 
enforcement of directors’ duties (derivative suit); 8) shareholder action against 
resolutions of the general meeting; 9) mandatory bid; and 10) disclosure of major share 
ownership (Lele and Siems, 2007; Siems, 2008). Higher values indicate “better” degree 
of minority shareholders’ protection and legal systems.9  From the results in Model (2), 
we see, somewhat surprisingly, that the marginal effects of the minority shareholders 
protection index returns negative results (significant at 1%). If there is a 1% increase in 
the minority shareholders protection index, the angel involvement will be 3.03% lower. 
                                                            
9 We are grateful to Mauro Guillén and Laurence Capron for sharing their minority shareholders protection 
index. This legal index is dynamic over the years to capture a more comprehensive legal environment with 
more countries and years covered. 
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Angels prefer investing in and choosing those investee firms in countries where the legal 
environment is worse relative to PE/VC funds. As discussed in Hellmann and Thiele 
(2015), a better legal environment might incur higher costs of contracting for angels, as 
they might circumvent to reduce such costs and prefer making more deals in those firms 
residing in worse legal environments. 
As we move on to test any impact from investee firm level characteristics, we 
utilize two variables to capture the size and activeness of the investee firm. The natural 
logarithm of the number of employees is used to capture the firm size effect, and the 
number of deals per year for each investee firm is used to capture the investee firm and 
entrepreneurs’ activities within a calendar year. Model (3) in Panel A returns consistent 
results for other explanatory variables; all signs remain the same, with three variables 
reducing the statistical significance. For our interested variable of investee firm 
characteristics, we find that angel investors prefer investing in and choosing those 
investee firms with more active entrepreneurs and in smaller sizes (both significant at 
1%). The marginal effects of Model (3) also indicate that at a 1% increase in the natural 
logarithm of the number of employees, angel involvement will be 1.20% lower, and a 1% 
increase in the number of deals per year will increase the angel involvement likelihood by 
0.62%. 
There are more and more international studies determining that cultural 
dimensions cannot be neglected in exploring institutional differences around the world. 
Following the literature confirming that cultural dimensions are related to 
entrepreneurship at the national level (Shane, 1993; Hayton, George and Zahra, 2002; 
Cumming, Johan and Zhang, 2014), we choose two out of six Hofstede’s cultural 
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dimensions: individualism (IDV) and uncertainty avoidance (UAI) in our study to further 
control for the cultural environment in Model (4) in Panel A. The results in Model (4) 
show that the national cultural environment seems to have an insignificant impact on the 
angel’s investment decisions; other factors, such as legal environments, stock market 
conditions, and investee firm characteristics are more important determinants for angel 
investors’ decisions. 
Up to Model (4), we have outlined a picture of how angels, relative to PE/VC 
funds, make their investment decisions and choose investee firms based on different 
preferences: smaller firms with active entrepreneurs residing in countries with better 
stock market returns and worse legal environments. In the next step, we further test 
whether Pure Angels and Mixed Angels will have any different preferences. In Model (5) 
of Panel A, we reserve all the explanatory variables as in Model (4) with the Pure Angels 
dummy as the main dependent variable; the results have shown that Pure Angel investors 
prefer investing in and choosing those smaller investee firms with active entrepreneurs in 
countries where stock market returns are higher and the legal environment is worse. In 
Model (6) of Panel A, we re-run the similar regression model using a Mixed Angels 
dummy as the dependent variable; the results are qualitatively unchanged compared with 
Model (4) for all angel investors. In the final Model (7) in Panel A, a PE/VC funds 
dummy is used as the dependent variable. The results show the quite different behaviors 
from such sophisticated investors as PE/VC funds; relative to angel investors, they prefer 
investing in and choosing larger investee firms with less active entrepreneurs residing in 
countries with worse stock market returns and better legal environments. Thus, our 
Hypothesis 1 is partially supported from our tests in Table 3.6 in Panel A. 
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As a robustness check, we present our regression tests using only the first-round 
deals to explore the different investor preferences in Panel B of Table 3.6. As most of the 
angels are involved in early and seed stages of start-up development, it is worthwhile to 
perform a subsample test to determine whether or not their decisions are similar at the 
initial stages, and we expect the results to be more compelling. Throughout our Models (8) 
to (14), all the tests replicate the specifications from Models (1) to (7) in Panel A, and the 
results support our Hypothesis 1 fully; the statistical significances are even more 
substantial for the first-round deal tests. Angels have quite different investment behaviors 
compared with PE/VC funds: They prefer investing in and choosing smaller investee 
firms with more active entrepreneurs residing in countries with better economic 
conditions, smaller stock markets with higher returns, as well as having national cultures 
favoring more individualism and less risk-taking. And the economic significances are 
much larger for the first-round deal tests: Given results from our Model (11) as a main 
example, a 1% increase in the natural logarithm of GDP per capita will increase the angel 
involvement likelihood by 14.88%; a 1% increase in the natural logarithm of domestic 
stock market capitalization will decrease the angel involvement likelihood by 5.56%; a 1% 
increase in the MSCI returns will increase the angel involvement likelihood by 3.62%; a 
1% increase in the minority shareholders protection index will decrease the angel 
involvement likelihood by 2.90%; a 1% increase in the natural logarithm of the number 
of employees will decrease the angel involvement likelihood by 1.17%; a 1% increase in 
the number of deals per year will increase the angel involvement likelihood by 3.57%; a 1% 
increase in the individualism index will increase the angel involvement likelihood by 
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1.28%; and a 1% increase in the uncertainty avoidance index will increase the angel 
involvement likelihood by 0.62%. 
 
3.4.2. Is there a certification effect from angel investors on successful exits? 
After we present the different investment behaviors between angels and PE/VC 
funds, we want to determine how angels perform from their investments in those investee 
firms. Are they receiving higher or lower returns compared with other investors? Since it 
is hard to get creditable performance measures like IRRs or performance multiples, we 
follow previous literature (Shane, 2005; Wiltbank, 2005; DeGennaro and Dwyer, 2010) 
to explore the successful exit rates as an alternate measure for the performances. The 
successful exits include either an initial public offering (IPO) exit or a successful 
acquisition exit. Similar to Table 3.6, we use clustered PROBIT models by controlling 
year effects in addition to controlling the industry and country fixed effects in Table 3.7. 
Our main regression models use the following specification10: 
 
Dummy Variable of Successful Exits Type = f (Investor Type Dummy, Economic and 
Stock Market Conditions, Legal Environments, Investee Firm Characteristics, Hofstede’s 
Cultural Dimensions, Industry and Country Dummies) 
  
We report the successful exit tests first in Panel A and then perform IPO and 
acquisition exit tests in Panels B and C, respectively. We also perform interaction tests of 
                                                            
10 For conciseness, we exclude all control variables which contain the exact same variables in Table 4.6: 
LN of GDP per capita, LN of Domestic Market Capitalization, MSCI Returns, Minority Protection Index, 
LN of Number of Employees, Number of Deals per Year, IDV, and UAI. These variables are all excluded 
in Table 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9. 
71 
 
the minority shareholders protection index to determine whether a better legal 
environment can help increase successful exit performance. 
In Panel A of Table 3.7, all dependent variables across Models (1) to (8) are the 
dummy variables indicating whether or not the deal is a successful exit, either in IPO or 
acquisition format. From Models (1) to (3), all three angel investor type dummies return 
significant negative marginal effects at the 1% level, which confirms our Hypothesis 2a, 
that firms funded by angels have a lower probability to exit successfully by either IPO or 
acquisition compared with firms with PE/VC funds. The economic significances are 
significant, as All Angels will be 26.61% less likely to exit successfully relative to 
PE/VC funds; and for Pure Angels and Mixed Angels, the likelihoods are 18.05% and 
31.89% lower, respectively. The certification effect as documented in the literature about 
VCs cannot apply to angels. Model (4) results confirm the previous view, and PE/VC 
funds will have a 26.61% higher probability of bringing investee firms public or exiting 
through acquisitions. In Model (5), we further include both the Mixed Angels dummy 
and the PE/VC funds dummy at the same time to compare whether the co-
investment/syndication actions with PE/VC funds of angels will increase their successful 
exit rates. Unfortunately, the PE/VC funds certification effect still exists. We have found 
that only pure PE/VC funds financed firms will achieve better exit outcomes; those 
companies do not mix angel and PE/VC funding, and the results are consistent with the 
view that VCs tend to do best when investing on their own (Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch 
and Triantis, 2012). The split of control rights drives one explanation for these results 
between angels and PE/VC funds that might aim to obtain more aggressive control rights 
(Goldfarb et al., 2012). Note that if we interacts the minority shareholders protection 
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index with the angel-related investor type dummies in Models (6) to (8), we find that 
better legal protection can help increase the successful exit rates for angels, especially for 
Pure Angels. But the marginal effects become statistically insignificant, which led us to 
perform additional subsample tests on IPO or acquisition exits of legal protection impacts. 
In Panels B and C of Table 3.7, the main results stay similar to the results in Panel 
A; firms funded by angels have a lower probability of exiting successfully by IPO or 
acquisition, and the certification effect only applies to PE/VC funds. For example, Panel 
B results indicate that angels will be 8.23% less likely to exit by IPO relative to PE/VC 
funds, and Panel C results indicate that angels will also be 20.73% less likely to exit by 
acquisition relative to PE/VC funds. Moreover, from our interaction tests in Panels B and 
C, we find that the legal environment is very important in shaping a good capital market. 
From the results of Models (14) and (15), we can see that better legal protection of 
minority shareholders increases the likelihood for angels to exit by IPO. But, from the 
results of Models (22) to (24), we do not find similar results to support that better legal 
protection of minority shareholders increases the likelihood for angels to exit by 
acquisition. Better legal protection of minority shareholders will have a much bigger 
impact on IPO exits than on acquisition exits for angels relative to PE/VC funds. 
Although our tests in Table 3.7 help support our proposition in Hypothesis 2a, we 
speculated whether angels could provide any favorable signals to future investors or 
buyers. We created a dummy variable to capture those firms that have received their first-
round funding from angels and re-ran similar tests of Table 3.7 to explore this possibility. 
In Table 3.8, we included the new dummy variable as the main explanatory variable with 
different exit dummies as dependent variables. The results from Table 3.8 did not support 
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our Hypothesis 2b and show that firms receiving angel investments in the first round will 
still have a relatively lower probability of exiting successfully, especially through an 
acquisition exit. Although Model (2) returns negative but insignificant marginal effects, 
combined with the results from Models (1) and (3), we can confirm that the “stepping 
stone” logic cannot be applied to angels, at least in our dataset. Furthermore, the 
economic significances cannot be neglected, for the firms receiving angel investments in 
the first round will be 4.41% less likely to exit successfully, 0.33% less likely to exit by 
IPO, and 4.72% less likely to exit by acquisition relative to those firms without first-
round angel investments. 
 
3.4.3. What environments spawn angel activities? 
After investigating the exit performance for angels as well as PE/VC funds, we 
extended our study to perform tests at the national level to determine what factors would 
spawn angel activities within a country and what policies might be utilized in the future 
to promote more entrepreneurial activities induced by angels and PE/VC funds. As a first 
step, we generated several dependent variables to capture the density of angels and 
PE/VC fund activities at the national level. For example, in Table 3.9 of Model (1), the 
dependent variable is Angel Density (scaled by Total Population), which is the sum 
number of all angel deals within a specific country in a calendar year; we then divided the 
sum by the total population of this country in that year (in millions). The other three 
dependent variables in Models (2) to (4) were created using similar methods, with Model 
(2) using total GDP as the denominator and Models (3) and (4) for PE/VC funds densities. 
We used the double clustered OLS models by controlling both investee firm and year 
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effects in addition to controlling the industry fixed effects, but we relaxed the country 
fixed effects to reduce collinearity issues. Our main regression models use the following 
specification: 
 
Density Variables = f (Economic and Stock Market Conditions, Legal Environments, 
Investee Firm Characteristics, Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions, Industry Dummies) 
 
We found very consistent results across all models in Panel A of Table 3.9, where 
higher angel density and PE/VC funds density are associated with larger GDP per capita, 
larger domestic stock market capitalization, better minority shareholder protection, 
smaller investee firms with more active entrepreneurs, and with national cultures favoring 
less individualism and encouraging more risk-taking. The economic significances are 
also non-negligible: for example, given results from Model (1) in Panel A, a one standard 
deviation increase in the natural logarithm of GDP per capita increases the angel density 
by 47.81%; a one standard deviation increase in the natural logarithm of domestic market 
capitalization increases the angel density by 38.84%; a one standard deviation increase in 
the MSCI returns increases the angel density by 11.32%; a one standard deviation 
increase in the minority shareholder protection index increases the angel density by 
26.22%; a one standard deviation decrease in the natural logarithm of number of 
employees increases the angel density by 6.42%; a one standard deviation increase in the 
number of deals per year increases the angel density by 4.60%; a one standard deviation 
decrease in the individualism index increases the angel density by 53.20%; and, a one 
standard deviation decrease in the uncertainty avoidance index increases increase the 
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angel density by 15.52%. All other models in Panel A of Table 3.9 return similar results 
with comparable economic significances. Note that our results are consistent with 
previous findings in the literature which emphasize that some key factors for successful 
angel investing will be in areas with more supplies of both wealthy people and 
entrepreneurs as well as those located in large cities or tech hubs where there are friendly 
attitudes towards entrepreneurship (Shane, 2005; DeGennaro, 2010). Our study extended 
such views on the U.S. studies to an international atmosphere, which could help policy 
makers across the world to build and foster a healthy space for both angels and PE/VC 
funds. 
Furthermore, we present additional one-year lead dependent variable analysis in 
Panel B, in addition to the contemporaneous analysis in Panel A of Table 3.9; the results 
are robust and consistent. All the main explanatory variable signs and statistical 
significances did not change, and such an effect is very consistent for increasing the 
density of entrepreneurial activities within a country. Overall, countries with a higher 
GDP per capita, a larger stock market, a better legal environment, and a culture favoring 
less individualism and more risk-taking will supply more entrepreneurs and investors. 
Thus, the density for entrepreneurial activities will be enhanced. Our Hypothesis 3 has 
been fully supported in tests of Table 3.9. 
 
3.4.4. Do changes in disclosure regulation and bankruptcy law have an impact on 
angel activities? 
In order to complement our previous results regarding angels and PE/VC funds 
activities around the world, we further performed difference-in-differences tests to assess 
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specifically the effects from regulatory changes in specific countries that are associated 
with more stringent disclosure rules and more forgiving bankruptcy law changes. 
Cumming and Johan (2013) found that more stringent securities regulation is positively 
associated with the supply and performance of VC as well as the entrepreneurial 
spawning induced by VC around the world. More stringent disclosure rules will enhance 
the entrepreneurial activities as predicted in their study, which inspired us to perform 
similar tests regarding angels11. Following Armour and Cumming (2008) who found that 
“forgiving” personal bankruptcy law has a positive effect on entrepreneurship, we carried 
out a similar search of all bankruptcy law changes across all of the countries and years 
covered by our sample12. 
Before we move on to talk about the difference-in-differences analysis results, we 
first ran preliminary means difference tests in Table 3.10. In panel A of Table 3.10, we 
compared the characteristics under the disclosure regulation changes. The first subpanel 
presents the results for all deals, then for angel deals and PE/VC deals, subsequently. We 
find that regulation changes that emphasize more disclosure have a significant impact 
with regard to different characteristics of our sample. After the disclosure regulation 
change, the total number of deals decreases while the number of angel deals increases; 
the investee firm company valuation becomes larger, but the firm sizes are shrinking; the 
four density variables all increase after the disclosure regulation change, indicating such 
                                                            
11 Following Cumming and Knill (2012), the countries with disclosure regulatory changes in the sample 
term examined are: the United States (“SOX,” 2002); South Korea (“Addendum to Securities Exchange 
Act,” 2004); Mexico (“Code of Best Practices,” 2005); Brazil (“Novo Mercado,” 2005); and India (“Clause 
49,” 2005). 
12 Following Armour and Cumming (2008) and the data from the International Insolvency Institute, the 
countries with bankruptcy law changes in the sample term examined are: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, and Vietnam. 
77 
 
rule change is favorable for fostering more angel and PE/VC activities. These trends are 
consistent for both angels and PE/VC funds. The successful exit rates are also declining, 
but such change is mainly driven by the decreasing IPO exit rates and PE/VC deal 
performances. 
In panel B of Table 3.10, we compare the characteristics under the bankruptcy 
law changes. Similar to Panel A, we have found quite similar results regarding the deal, 
the investee firm, and the density characteristics; only the exit outcomes return different 
results, where the acquisition rates increase after the bankruptcy law change, and such 
change is mainly driven by PE/VC deals. Moreover, we find that both regulatory changes 
are in favor of spawning more entrepreneurial activities induced by both angels and 
PE/VC funds. The four density variables and the number of angel deals are significantly 
higher during the periods after the regulatory changes and the results are consistent across 
all means tests in Table 3.10. However, for angels, both regulatory changes seem not to 
affect their divestment strategies which infer again that they are a different investor type 
compared with sophisticated investor types like PE/VC funds. Their risk profiles and 
preferences might be completely different.  
Table 3.11 reports the difference-in-differences regressions for the four alternative 
angel and PE/VC activity densities as dependent variables to test the impact from 
disclosure regulation changes. We looked for the key variables (Treat1 * After1) across 
all models to support our means difference tests of Table 3.10. From the results in Table 
3.11, we find that the four entrepreneurial density variables all return positive coefficients 
and are statistically significant at 1% level. We find these difference-in-differences tests 
to be quite compelling as they highlight the effect of changes on subsequent 
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entrepreneurial spawning densities, and show directly that entrepreneurial spawning 
activities induced by angels and PE/VC funds are more pronounced for countries with 
more stringent disclosure regulation change, in support of our Hypothesis 4a. We have 
also reports the difference-in-differences regressions results in Table 3.12 to test the 
impact from bankruptcy law changes. We find qualitative similar results in Table 3.12  
that the difference-in-differences tests results highlight the effect of changes on 
subsequent entrepreneurial spawning densities, and show directly that entrepreneurial 
spawning activities induced by angels and PE/VC funds are more pronounced for 
countries with more forgiving bankruptcy law change, in support of our H4b. 
In addition, Table 3.13 reports the difference-in-differences regressions for our 
four alternative angel and PE/VC activity densities as dependent variables in order to test 
the impact from both disclosure regulation and bankruptcy law changes jointly. We 
looked for the key variables of (Treat1 * After1) * (Treat2 * After2), Treat1 * After1, and 
Treat2 * After2. Table 3.13 indicates those key variables for testing the four 
entrepreneurial density variables all returned positive coefficients and most are 
statistically significant at a 1% level. These difference-in-differences tests are quite 
compelling, as they highlight the effect of changes on subsequent entrepreneurial 
spawning densities and show directly that entrepreneurial spawning activities induced by 
angels and PE/VC funds are more pronounced for countries with both more stringent 
disclosure regulation changes and more forgiving bankruptcy law changes. For countries 
with both policy changes, the angel activity density will increase by 83.88% (Model (1)) 
and 70.83% (Model (2)) and the PE/VC activity density will increase by 40.85% (Model 
(3)) and 22.02% (Model (4)). Both disclosure regulation and bankruptcy law changes will 
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have larger impact on angels than on PE/VC funds. When we look at the effect just from 
disclosure regulation change, it will have relatively larger impact on PE/VC funds as such 
a policy change will increase the PE/VC activity density by 49.47% (Model (3)) and 
53.65% (Model (4)) but will increase the angel activity density by 24.48% (Model (1)) 
and 27.33% (Model (2)). In untabulated results available on request, we have found 
qualitatively similar outcomes when testing bankruptcy law and disclosure regulation 
changes in separate regressions in terms of both the statistical and economic significance. 
 
3.5. Discussion of Limitations and Possible Future Datasets 
For the first time, we have presented large sample international evidence on angel 
deals around the world. However, our data are not without limitations; we hope our work 
will inspire others to continue to research in the future. We cannot rule out endogeneity 
fully, and our dataset suffers some problems that might cause concerns for the results. For 
example, we cannot identify the substantial heterogeneity across angels, as Lerner et al., 
(2015) did; we don’t know whether they are a group of wealthy investors, business angels, 
or some other organizational structures; but, given our summary statistics, the magnitude 
of the impact we have documented in this study is likely to capture some of the large and 
successful angels in the market. 
Moreover, we do not know all of the angels in all countries around the world; 
however, our findings are robust to subsamples of the data and randomly kick out 
different countries from of the sample. Our conclusions are based on the data we have 
from PitchBook; it might be better to consider other datasets in the future. Our data also 
have the limitations on variables regarding financial performance results at the investee 
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firms. If those variables are available in the future, we can investigate whether angels or 
PE/VC funds can bring benefits to those investee firms and by how much. 
 
3.6. Conclusions and Future research Directions 
Our analysis exploits the comprehensive data collected at the deal level of 
investee firms from PitchBook, which comprise 85,940 completed private equity deals 
from 96 countries spanning from 1977 to 2012. Within these deals, there are 5,397 deals 
in 42 countries involved with angels (either single funded by angels or 
coinvested/syndicated with PE/VC funds). Such dataset allows us to compare angels and 
PE/VC funds at both the deal and investee firm level at the same time. We find that, 
relative to PE/VC funds, angels prefer investing in active smaller entrepreneurial firms in 
wealthier countries with better stock market conditions, worse legal environments, and 
having cultures favored in higher levels of individualism and lower levels of risk-taking. 
Such behaviors are robust both for the first round deals and deals at all other stages. We 
also find that, relative to PE/VC funds, those investee firms funded by angels have a 
lower probability of having successful exits, in either IPO or acquisition; but, better legal 
environments can help mitigate the negative effects on IPO exits. Moreover, in our 
subsample tests, the “stepping stone” logic of angels still cannot be proven, because we 
find that firms who have received angel investments in the first round will have lower 
probabilities to successfully divest in later rounds. At a country/market level, we also find 
significant determinants, which can work together to build a well-rounded environment 
and spawn both angels and PE/VC funds activities. In addition to these results, we also 
performed difference-in-differences tests to confirm that more stringent disclosure 
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regulations and more forgiving bankruptcy law changes can also spawn the 
entrepreneurial activities induced by angels and PE/VC funds. Our test results are robust 
under various clustering methods to correct standard errors while controlling fixed effects 
and are robust when performing propensity score matching. 
Angels still remain an underdeveloped area for study in academia; with more 
creditable data becoming available in the future, researchers can explore more in this area 
and shed more lights on what angels prefer, how they make investments, both locally and 
internationally, where the preferred locations are, how they syndicate or co-invest with 
other investors, which financial contracts they are using to control the rights of the firms, 
what the real relationships between entrepreneurs and angels are, or how the 
heterogeneity among angels will have a different impact on their investments, etc.  
Our study also contains several policy implications that governments of countries 
around the world might consider to promote entrepreneurial activities; economic and 
stock market development conditions are important, but other factors like cultures and the 
national attitudes towards promoting entrepreneurship will also be an important area to 
develop. In addition, legal reforms could also be focused on setting more stringent 
disclosure regulations and drafting more forgiving personal bankruptcy laws. 
 
3.7. Appendix 
There are worries that possible sample selection bias might cause problems for 
our exit outcomes test results in the study; we use propensity score (PS) matching 
methods (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to address such problems following Lee and 
Wahal (2004), and after the PS matching, we generate two subsamples to perform the 
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counterfactual analysis on the exit outcomes in our study. We want to find the impact of 
angel funding against specific alternative counterfactuals, such as whether the investee 
firms would have been better off with PE/VC funding or been worse off with angel 
funding. 
It is true that PE/VC funds may choose those investee firms and deals which have 
certain types of inherent characteristics, making them fit their exit strategies as compared 
with angels. What if angels could choose and invest in similar firms and deals like PE/VC 
funds? What would the exit outcomes be? Is there any certification effect from angels? 
Such potential endogeneity problems may be particularly important with regards to 
successful exits, and we aim to address those problems.  
To create the first subsample, we performed the PS matching, based on the deal 
sizes and investee firm industries as PE/VC funds’ selection criteria to match angels’ 
criteria. Then we posed more strict matching criteria based on all characteristics, as 
presented in Table 3.5, to generate the second subsample. We present the means 
difference test results in Table A3.1, which include the original unmatched sample 
differences between All Angel Deals and All PE/VC deals and the two PS-matched 
subsamples differences in the other two subpanels. As shown in Table A3.1, we find that, 
as compared with the original unmatched sample, PE/VC funds select quite different 
deals, as the differences between almost all of their characteristics are significantly 
different from the angels’. In the subsequent two subpanels, we find that, after the PS 
matching, the two new subsamples present almost the same characteristics between 
angels and PE/VC funds. Those matched subsamples help us limit the selection bias to 
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some extent. We move on to perform our counterfactual analysis to see whether angels 
will have certification effects on the exit outcomes. 
As the two new subsamples present almost the same characteristics, we are 
confident in performing a similar regression test, as we did in Table 3.7. We report our 
PROBIT regression results in Table A3.2. What if angels were investing in and choosing 
investee firms and deals that have almost the same characteristics as those of PE/VC 
funds? We have previously found that the certification effects only apply to PE/VC funds; 
we propose that angels could also have such certification effects on exit outcomes. 
However, after we perform our subsample tests, we found as consistent results as we 
found in Table 3.7; Models (1) to (3) return similar results with the marginal effects, for 
the angel dummies are all negative and statistically significant at a 1% level. Angels will 
be 26.61% less likely to exit successfully in our original sample; they will also be 41.80% 
and 41.93% less likely to exit successfully in our two newly PS-matched samples, 
respectively. Angels do not provide any certification effects like their counterparts, 
PE/VC funds, even if they are investing in and choosing investee firms and deals having 
almost the same characteristics. It seems that PE/VC funds can bring more expertise to 
the investee firms and have a higher likelihood of exiting their investments by IPO or 
acquisition. There might be other unobserved characteristics that can explain such results, 
but by using propensity score matching methods, we provide another robustness check 
for our main results. 
In addition to the PS matching method we have applied to address the potential 
selection bias concerns, we further divide our whole sample into U.S. and Non-U.S. 
subsamples to provide additional support and evidences for our main hypotheses. In 
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Table A3.3, we replicate our main clustered PROBIT regression models used in Tables 
3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 and report the results in Panels A to C, respectively. In Panel A of Table 
A3.3, we can find that the U.S. subsample tests return even larger marginal effects for the 
main determinants for how angels make investments as compared with the original 
models in Table 3.6. Although the Non-U.S. subsample tests return less significant results, 
the firm size effect as well as the legal environment impact is still large and persistent. In 
Panel B of Table A3.3, the models for both the U.S. and Non-U.S subsamples return 
quite consistent results as the main models in Table 3.7. Firms that funded by angels have 
relatively lower probability of exiting successfully by IPO or acquisition, and the 
certification effect only applies to PE/VC funds. Similar to our speculation in Table 3.8, 
the “stepping stone” logic is still of interest and we perform similar tests for both the U.S. 
and Non-U.S subsamples in Panel C of Table A3.3. The results give us a little surprise 
that the Non-U.S. subsample returns statistically positive and significant marginal effects 
on the successful exit rates and IPO exit rates. Several possible reasons come out of mind 
that such worse results for the U.S. sample for angels might due to the fact that it is very 
easy or might be too easy to start a business in the U.S. And another explanation is that 
the data coverage on failed deals might better in U.S., and we deal with such possible 
sample bias by excluding the U.S. as a robustness check here. Although the U.S. 
subsample returns consistent results as the main models in Table 3.8, the results from the 
Non-U.S. subsample tests support our Hypothesis 2b. To some extent, this “stepping 
stone” logic works and we find partial evidence to support this proposition. 
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Table 3.1. Top 10 Country and Industry Distribution for Completed Deals 
This table summarizes the key features associated with the sample distribution of completed deals in the 
world. In this table, we show the top 10 countries and industry distribution for those completed deals in 
three separate groups: all, Angels and PE/VC. 
Panel A: Top 10 Countries in terms of Number of Deals 
All Deals All Angels Deals All PE/VC Deals 
Country   Country   Country   
United States 73910 United States 4839 United States 69071 
Canada 2770 Canada 143 Canada 2627 
United Kingdom 2281 United Kingdom 123 United Kingdom 2158 
India 735 Israel 52 India 694 
Germany 661 India 41 Germany 623 
France 592 Germany 38 France 569 
China 516 France 23 China 500 
Israel 512 Ireland 17 Israel 460 
Netherlands 306 China 16 Netherlands 299 
Ireland 255 Spain 11 Australia 239 
Panel B: Top 10  Industries in terms of Number of Deals 
All Deals All Angels Deals All PE/VC Deals 
Industry   Industry   Industry   
Software 17235 Software 2129 Software 15106 
Commercial Services 10096 Media 612 Commercial Services 9570 
Commercial Products 6751 Commercial Services 526 Commercial Products 6624 
Media 4809 Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 262 Healthcare Devices and Supplies 4554 
Healthcare Devices and Supplies 4794 Healthcare Devices and Supplies 240 Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 4279 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 4541 Retail 196 Media 4197 
Communications and Networking 3675 Communications and Networking 156 Communications and Networking 3519 
Healthcare Services 2833 Commercial Products 127 Healthcare Services 2758 
Consumer Non-Durables 2509 IT Services 114 Consumer Non-Durables 2417 
Computer Hardware 2379 Computer Hardware 94 Computer Hardware 2285 
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Table 3.2. Country Distribution Characteristics at Investee Firm-Level and Deal-Level - Angel Activities in All Rounds, 1st Round 
and Exits in Percentages 
This table summarizes the detailed features associated with the country distribution of investee firms and completed deals in the world. In 
Panel A, we show the total number of investee firms in each country and the associated angel activity percentages both in all rounds and in the 
1st round as well as the percentage of portfolio firms with successful exits. In Panel B, we show the total number of completed deals in each 
country and the associated angel activity percentages both in all rounds and in the 1st round as well as the percentage of portfolio firms with 
successful exits. 
 Panel A: Investee Firm-Level Country Distribution Characteristics Panel B: Deal-Level Country Distribution Characteristics 
Country Total Number of Firms 
% of Firms with Angel 
Financing, all rounds 
% of Firms with Angel 
Financing, first round 
% of Firms 
with Successful 
Exits 
Total Number 
of Deals 
% of Deals with Angel 
Financing, all rounds 
% of Deals with Angel 
Financing, first round 
% of Deals as 
successful 
exits 
Argentina 24 25.00 20.83 20.83 44 13.64 11.36 11.36 
Australia 177 3.39 3.39 23.73 247 3.24 2.43 17.81 
Austria 37 2.70  18.92 64 1.56  14.06 
Belgium 73 6.85 4.11 24.66 138 4.35 2.17 16.67 
Bermuda 53 13.21 11.32 41.51 126 6.35 4.76 18.25 
Brazil 120 5.00 4.17 19.17 185 4.32 2.70 15.68 
Bulgaria 17 5.88  29.41 34 2.94  14.71 
Canada 1542 7.85 6.16 23.15 2770 5.16 3.43 13.94 
Chile 23 4.35  13.04 34 2.94  8.82 
China 273 5.13 4.40 21.98 516 3.10 2.33 12.21 
Colombia 19 5.26 5.26 36.84 28 3.57 3.57 32.14 
Croatia 1 100.00   2 50.00   
Czech Republic 28 3.57  25.00 50 2.00  16.00 
Denmark 61 1.64 1.64 13.11 103 1.94 0.97 7.77 
Finland 67 8.96 8.96 17.91 105 5.71 5.71 11.43 
France 298 5.70 4.36 23.15 592 3.89 2.20 11.99 
Germany 369 9.49 8.13 25.75 661 5.75 4.54 15.89 
Hong Kong 61 3.28 3.28 18.03 87 2.30 2.30 12.64 
India 364 9.34 7.14 14.29 735 5.58 3.54 7.89 
Ireland 120 10.83 6.67 20.00 255 6.67 3.14 10.20 
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Israel 240 16.67 12.08 18.33 512 10.16 5.66 8.79 
Italy 104 4.81 4.81 26.92 200 2.50 2.50 17.50 
Japan 98 2.04 2.04 20.41 151 1.32 1.32 14.57 
Jordan 2 50.00 50.00 50.00 4 25.00 25.00 25.00 
Luxembourg 12 16.67 16.67 25.00 29 6.90 6.90 13.79 
Mexico 45 4.44  26.67 74 2.70  18.92 
Netherlands 161 3.73 2.48 25.47 306 2.29 1.31 14.38 
Norway 70 1.43  21.43 108 0.93  16.67 
Panama 3 33.33 33.33 33.33 4 25.00 25.00 25.00 
Poland 30 3.33 3.33 16.67 41 2.44 2.44 12.20 
Portugal 20 5.00 5.00  21 4.76 4.76  
Romania 11 9.09 9.09 27.27 13 7.69 7.69 23.08 
Russia 36 5.56 2.78 25.00 68 4.41 1.47 13.24 
Singapore 50 4.00 4.00 22.00 92 2.17 2.17 14.13 
Slovenia 5 20.00 20.00  6 16.67 16.67  
South Africa 20 5.00 5.00  24 4.17 4.17  
South Korea 47 2.13 2.13 27.66 77 1.30 1.30 23.38 
Spain 114 6.14 2.63 21.05 207 5.31 1.45 12.08 
Sweden 110 2.73 2.73 19.09 179 2.23 1.68 12.29 
Switzerland 106 4.72 3.77 25.47 209 2.87 1.91 13.88 
United 
Kingdom 1253 7.82 5.19 20.91 2281 5.39 2.85 12.10 
United States 35896 10.56 7.66 21.73 73910 6.55 3.72 11.31 
On Average 1003.81 10.87 8.42 23.81 2030.76 6.61 5.00 15.05 
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Table 3.3. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
This table provides definitions of the main variables in the dataset, the data sources, and summary statistics. 
Variable Name Definition Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
observations 
Main Dependent 
Variables               
All Angels Dummy A dummy variable equal to 1 for deals with angel investor. 0.063 0.000 0.243 0.000 1.000 85940 
Pure Angel Dummy A dummy variable equal to 1 for deals with only one angel investor. 0.017 0.000 0.128 0.000 1.000 85940 
Mixed Angels Dummy A dummy variable equal to 1 for deals with both angel investor and PE/VC investors. 0.046 0.000 0.210 0.000 1.000 85940 
Pure PE/VC Dummy A dummy variable equal to 1 for deals with PE/VC investors. 0.937 1.000 0.243 0.000 1.000 85940 
Deal Characteristics               
Deal Size Firm-level deal size (in M$) for the investee companies. 116.750 10.300 807.991 0.010 101002.500 52922 
No. of Deals per Year Firm-level number of deals has been made in a year for the investee companies. 1.186 1.000 0.523 1.000 11.000 85940 
Total No. of Deals Firm-level total number of deals has been made over the whole sample period for the investee companies. 3.508 3.000 2.889 1.000 41.000 85940 
No. of Angel Deals per 
Year 
Firm-level number of deals has been made in a year for the 
investee companies with angel investor. 343.993 365.000 264.790 1.000 818.000 76992 
No. of Investors Firm-level number of investors of each completed deal for the investee companies. 1.909 1.000 1.496 1.000 22.000 85940 
Investee Company 
Characteristics               
Company Valuation Firm-level valuation (in M$) for the investee companies at the time of deal completed. 611.590 120.355 2853.799 0.010 118802.500 12758 
No. of Employees Firm-level number of employees in the investee companies. 1368.882 110.000 9976.233 1.000 805600.000 42893 
Country Characteristics               
Angel Density (scaled by 
Total Population) 
The total number of angel deals within a country for a 
specific year divided by the total population of that country 
in the same year. 
1.162 1.190 1.017 0.001 30.977 76998 
Angel Density (scaled by 
Total GDP) 
The total number of angel deals within a country for a 
specific year divided by the total GDP of that country in the 
same year. 
0.024 0.025 0.017 0.000 0.360 76998 
PE/VC Density (scaled by 
Total Population) 
The total number of PE/VC deals within a country for a 
specific year divided by the total population of that country 
in the same year. 
14.983 18.667 9.421 0.001 232.475 80105 
PE/VC Density (scaled by 
Total GDP) 
The total number of PE/VC deals within a country for a 
specific year divided by the total GDP of that country in the 
same year. 
0.320 0.384 0.161 0.000 6.101 80084 
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GDP per Capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added 
by all resident producers in the economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of 
the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. 
dollars. Source: World Bank. 
43606.000 47001.430 9418.821 308.535 193892.300 80090 
Domestic Market 
Capitalization 
The domestic market capitalization of a stock exchange is 
the total number of issued shares of domestic companies, 
including their several classes, multiplied by their 
respective prices at a given time from the World Federation 
of Exchanges. This figure reflects the comprehensive value 
of the market at that time, in M$. Source: 
http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/statistics-
definitions. 
13900000.000 16200000.000 5566940.000 6.200 20300000.000 79782 
MSCI Returns 
The country-specific Morgan Stanley Capital International 
index return, a proxy for stock market conditions in each 
country. 
0.054 0.094 0.157 -0.684 1.437 79891 
Minority Shareholders 
Protection Index 
The minority shareholders protection index is the coded 
weighted average index on the ten key legal provisions 
identified by legal scholars as most relevant to the 
protection of minority shareholder rights (as per Guillen 
and Capron, 2015): powers of the general meeting for de 
facto changes; agenda-setting power; anticipation of 
shareholder decision facilitated; prohibition of multiple 
voting rights; independent board members; feasibility of 
directors’ dismissal; private enforcement of directors’ 
duties (derivative suit); shareholder action against 
resolutions of the general meeting; mandatory bid; and 
disclosure of major share ownership (as per Lele and Siems, 
2007 and Siems, 2008). Higher values indicate “better” 
degree of minority shareholders’ protection and legal 
systems. 
7.019 7.250 0.521 1.000 8.250 77240 
IDV 
Hofstede’s index of individualism versus collectivism. The 
high side of this dimension, called individualism, can be 
defined as a preference for a loosely-knit social framework 
in which individuals are expected to take care of only 
themselves and their immediate families. Its opposite, 
collectivism, represents a preference for a tightly-knit 
framework in society in which individuals can expect their 
relatives or members of a particular in-group to look after 
them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. A society's 
position on this dimension is reflected in whether people’s 
self-image is defined in terms of “I” or “we.” Source: 
http://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html. 
87.883 91.000 10.976 11.000 91.000 85514 
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UAI 
Hofstede’s index of uncertainty avoidance. The Uncertainty 
Avoidance dimension expresses the degree to which the 
members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty 
and ambiguity. The fundamental issue here is how a society 
deals with the fact that the future can never be known: 
should we try to control the future or just let it happen? 
Countries exhibiting strong UAI maintain rigid codes of 
belief and behavior and are intolerant of unorthodox 
behavior and ideas. Weak UAI societies maintain a more 
relaxed attitude in which practice counts more than 
principles. Source: http://geert-hofstede.com/national-
culture.html. 
46.928 46.000 7.681 8.000 112.000 85514 
Exit Outcomes               
Successful Exits A dummy variable equal to 1 for either IPO or Acquisition exit. 0.116 0.000 0.320 0.000 1.000 85940 
IPO Exits A dummy variable equal to 1 for an IPO exit. 0.017 0.000 0.128 0.000 1.000 85940 
Acquisition Exits A dummy variable equal to 1 for an Acquisition exit. 0.099 0.000 0.298 0.000 1.000 85940 
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Table 3.5. Mean Descriptive Statistics by Main Characteristics 
This table provides the main mean descriptive statistics across different main characteristics by different deals. The table also provides the two-sample means test results between major characteristics 
groups in our data. Panel A presents the mean comparison tests among all angel deals, pure angel deals, mixed angel deals and pure PE/VC deals, Panel B presents the mean comparison tests for US vs. 
Non-US deals and Pre vs. Post Financial Crisis deals. The means test is a two-sample t-test with equal variance. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean Comparison Tests among All Angels, Pure Angel, Mixed Angel and Pure PE/VC Deals 
  All Angel Deals vs. Pure PE/VC Deals  Pure Angel Deals vs. Mixed Angel Deals 
  All Angel Deals All PE/VC Deals Mean Differences   Pure Angel Deals Mixed Angel Deals Mean Differences 
Deal Characteristics          
Deal Size 27.821 124.884 -97.063***  10.481 33.437 -22.956 
No. of Deals per Year 1.223 1.183 0.040***  1.247 1.214 0.033** 
Total No. of Deals 3.482 3.509 -0.028  3.602 3.439 0.163** 
No. of Angel Deals per Year 431.338 337.825 93.513***  427.586 432.535 -4.948 
No. of Investors 2.799 1.849 0.950***  1.000 3.441 -2.441*** 
Investee Company Characteristics          
Company Valuation 595.046 611.848 -16.802  946.253 518.697 427.557 
No. of Employees 509.982 1413.984 -904.002***  500.153 513.275 -13.122 
Country Characteristics          
Angel Density (scaled by Total Population) 1.466 1.141 0.325***  1.424 1.479 -0.055 
Angel Density (scaled by Total GDP) 0.030 0.024 0.006***  0.029 0.030 -0.001 
PE/VC Density (scaled by Total Population) 16.696 14.867 1.828***  16.380 16.796 -0.417 
PE/VC Density (scaled by Total GDP) 0.349 0.318 0.031***  0.345 0.350 -0.005 
GDP per Capita 45513.550 43476.870 2036.683***  45068.630 45655.460 -586.836** 
Domestic Market Capitalization 14700000.000 13900000.000 846793.600***  14600000.000 14700000.000 101250.800 
MSCI Returns 0.057 0.054 0.003  0.062 0.055 0.007 
Minority Shareholders Protection Index 7.093 7.011 0.082***  7.088 7.094 -0.006 
IDV 88.840 87.819 1.021***  88.478 88.969 -0.491* 
UAI 46.726 46.942 -0.217**  46.797 46.700 0.097 
Exit Outcomes          
Successful Exits 0.005 0.123 -0.118***  0.010 0.003 0.007*** 
IPO Exits 0.000 0.018 -0.018***  0.001 0.000 0.001* 
Acquisition Exits 0.005 0.105 -0.100***   0.009 0.003 0.006*** 
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Table 3.5. Mean Descriptive Statistics by Main Characteristics (Continued) 
  Pure Angel Deals vs. Pure PE/VC Deals  Mixed Angel Deals vs. Pure PE/VC Deals 
  Pure Angel Deals All PE/VC Deals Mean Differences   Mixed Angel Deals All PE/VC Deals Mean Differences 
Deal Characteristics          
Deal Size 10.481 124.884 -114.403***  33.437 124.884 -91.447*** 
No. of Deals per Year 1.247 1.183 0.064***  1.214 1.183 0.031*** 
Total No. of Deals 3.602 3.509 0.092  3.439 3.509 -0.070 
No. of Angel Deals per Year 427.586 337.825 89.761***  432.535 337.825 94.710*** 
No. of Investors 1.000 1.849 -0.849***  3.441 1.849 1.592*** 
Investee Company Characteristics          
Company Valuation 946.253 611.848 334.405  518.697 611.848 -93.151 
No. of Employees 500.153 1413.984 -913.831**  513.275 1413.984 -900.709*** 
Country Characteristics          
Angel Density (scaled by Total Population) 1.424 1.141 0.283***  1.479 1.141 0.338*** 
Angel Density (scaled by Total GDP) 0.029 0.024 0.006***  0.030 0.024 0.006*** 
PE/VC Density (scaled by Total Population) 16.380 14.867 1.512***  16.796 14.867 1.929*** 
PE/VC Density (scaled by Total GDP) 0.345 0.318 0.027***  0.350 0.318 0.032*** 
GDP per Capita 45068.630 43476.870 1591.760***  45655.460 43476.870 2178.596*** 
Domestic Market Capitalization 14600000.000 13900000.000 770026.100***  14700000.000 13900000.000 871276.900*** 
MSCI Returns 0.062 0.054 0.008*  0.055 0.054 0.001 
Minority Shareholders Protection Index 7.088 7.011 0.077***  7.094 7.011 0.083*** 
IDV 88.478 87.819 0.659**  88.969 87.819 1.150*** 
UAI 46.797 46.942 -0.145  46.700 46.942 -0.242* 
Exit Outcomes          
Successful Exits 0.010 0.123 -0.113***  0.003 0.123 -0.120*** 
IPO Exits 0.001 0.018 -0.017***  0.000 0.018 -0.018*** 
Acquisition Exits 0.009 0.105 -0.096***   0.003 0.105 -0.102*** 
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Table 3.5. Mean Descriptive Statistics by Main Characteristics (Continued) 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics - Mean Comparison Tests for US vs. Non-US and Pre vs. Post Financial Crisis 
  US Deals vs. Non-US Deals  Pre Financial Crisis Deals vs. Post Financial Crisis Deals 
  US Deals Non-US Deals Mean Differences   Pre Financial Crisis Deals  Post Financial Crisis Deals  Mean Differences 
Deal Characteristics          
Deal Size 97.798 239.285 -141.487***  130.475 103.538 26.937*** 
No. of Deals per Year 1.195 1.129 0.065***  1.138 1.237 -0.099*** 
Total No. of Deals 3.619 2.826 0.793***  3.705 3.294 0.411*** 
No. of Angel Deals per Year 383.284 8.561 374.723***  169.358 507.261 -337.903*** 
No. of Investors 1.931 1.771 0.160***  1.932 1.883 0.048*** 
Investee Company Characteristics          
Company Valuation 522.527 940.119 -417.592***  492.290 806.369 -314.078*** 
No. of Employees 1133.142 3369.230 -2236.088***  1413.038 1310.516 102.523 
Country Characteristics          
Angel Density (scaled by Total Population) 1.251 0.400 0.851***  0.607 1.681 -1.074*** 
Angel Density (scaled by Total GDP) 0.026 0.008 0.018***  0.014 0.034 -0.020*** 
PE/VC Density (scaled by Total Population) 16.677 4.395 12.283***  11.759 18.046 -6.287*** 
PE/VC Density (scaled by Total GDP) 0.356 0.093 0.264***  0.268 0.369 -0.102*** 
GDP per Capita 45053.450 34546.230 10507.210***  39828.630 47194.830 -7366.194*** 
Domestic Market Capitalization 15800000.000 1802092.000 14000000.000***  13600000.000 14200000.000 -556171.400*** 
MSCI Returns 0.051 0.073 -0.022***  0.091 0.019 0.072*** 
Minority Shareholders Protection Index 7.101 6.298 0.804***  6.870 7.163 -0.293*** 
IDV 91.000 68.030 22.970***  88.372 87.352 1.020*** 
UAI 46.000 52.842 -6.842***  46.882 46.979 -0.097* 
Exit Outcomes          
Successful Exits 0.113 0.131 -0.018***  0.109 0.122 -0.013*** 
IPO Exits 0.016 0.023 -0.008***  0.023 0.010 0.013*** 
Acquisition Exits 0.097 0.107 -0.010***   0.086 0.113 -0.026*** 
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Table 3.6. PROBIT Regression Models for How Angel Investors Make Investments 
This table presents clustered PROBIT model results of the determinants of Angel versus PE/VC investments and we report the associated marginal 
effects on those determinants. All dependent variable across Model (1) to (14) is different indicator dummy variable to capture All Angels, Pure Angel, 
Mixed Angel and Pure PE/VC investors, all other variables are as defined in Table 3.3. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: For All Rounds Deals 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
  All Angels All Angels All Angels All Angels Pure Angel Mixed Angels Pure PE/VC 
  Marginal Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
LN of GDP per capita 0.1259 2.89*** 0.1961 3.43*** 0.0262 1.15 0.0262 1.15 -0.0059 -0.82 0.0326 1.73* -0.0262 -1.15 
LN of Domestic Market 
Capitalization -0.0381 -1.95* -0.0535 -2.96*** -0.0098 -1.10 -0.0098 -1.10 0.0003 0.11 -0.0103 -1.32 0.0098 1.10 
MSCI Returns 0.0360 2.00** 0.0418 2.51** 0.0208 1.93* 0.0208 1.93* 0.0087 3.07*** 0.0124 1.38 -0.0208 -1.93* 
Minority Protection Index    -0.0303 -2.58*** -0.0206 -3.36*** -0.0206 -3.36*** -0.0047 -2.19** -0.0165 -3.38*** 0.0206 3.36*** 
LN of Number of 
Employees       -0.0120 -8.67*** -0.0120 -8.67*** -0.0031 -9.19*** -0.0091 -7.20*** 0.0120 8.67*** 
Number of Deals per Year       0.0062 2.69*** 0.0062 2.69*** 0.0024 2.00** 0.0037 1.89* -0.0062 -2.69*** 
IDV          0.0028 1.04 0.0001 0.22 0.0024 1.04 -0.0028 -1.04 
UAI          0.0000 -0.03 0.0000 0.05 0.0001 0.07 0.0000 0.03 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 79229 76651 39304 39304 38171 39253 39304 
Pseudo R2 0.0609 0.0627 0.0709 0.0709 0.0682 0.0627 0.0709 
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Table 3.6. PROBIT Regression Models for How Angel Investors Make Investments (Continued) 
Panel B: For Only 1st Round Deals 
  Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) Model (12) Model (13) Model (14) 
  All Angels All Angels All Angels All Angels Pure Angel Mixed Angels Pure PE/VC 
  Marginal Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
LN of GDP per capita 0.2251 4.47*** 0.2891 4.84*** 0.1488 3.19*** 0.1488 3.19*** 0.0264 1.74* 0.1287 3.21*** -0.1488 -3.19*** 
LN of Domestic Market 
Capitalization -0.0779 -3.46*** -0.0928 -4.50*** -0.0556 -3.27*** -0.0556 -3.27*** -0.0069 -1.39 -0.0505 -3.37*** 0.0556 3.27*** 
MSCI Returns 0.0449 2.08** 0.0501 2.58*** 0.0362 1.92* 0.0362 1.92* 0.0105 1.63 0.0273 1.74* -0.0362 -1.92* 
Minority Protection 
Index    -0.0277 -2.34** -0.0290 -2.36** -0.0290 -2.36** -0.0140 -3.65*** -0.0177 -1.70* 0.0290 2.36** 
LN of Number of 
Employees       -0.0117 -5.82*** -0.0117 -5.82*** -0.0048 -5.24*** -0.0078 -4.80*** 0.0117 5.82*** 
Number of Deals per 
Year       0.0357 5.87*** 0.0357 5.87*** 0.0116 3.49*** 0.0245 5.14*** -0.0357 -5.87*** 
IDV          0.0128 2.62*** 0.0013 1.62 0.0100 2.43** -0.0128 -2.62*** 
UAI          0.0062 2.52** 0.0012 1.17 0.0048 2.34** -0.0062 -2.52** 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 37301 35981 15876 15876 14064 15800 15876 
Pseudo R2 0.1043 0.1072 0.1177 0.1177 0.131 0.0911 0.1177 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
Table 3.7. PROBIT Regression Models for Exits Outcomes (Continued) 
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Table 3.7. PROBIT Regression Models for Exits Outcomes (Continued) 
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Table 3.8. Regression Models for Testing 1st-Round Angel Certification Effect on Exits 
This table presents clustered PROBIT model results of the determinants of exit outcomes, and 
we report the associated marginal effects of those determinants. We analyze separately the 
impact of firms with first-round angel finance. All dependent variables across Model (1) to (3) 
are different exits with a dummy variable to capture all successful exits: all IPO exits and all 
acquisition exits; all other variables are as defined in Table 3.3. For conciseness, we exclude all 
control variables which contain the exact same variables in Table 3.6: LN of GDP per capita, 
LN of Domestic Market Capitalization, MSCI Returns, Minority Protection Index, LN of 
Number of Employees, and Number of Deals per Year, IDV and UAI. *, **, *** Significant at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
  Successful Exits IPO Exits Acquisition Exits 
  
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Firms with 1st-round 
Angel Financing -0.0441 -5.07*** -0.0033 -0.68 -0.0472 -5.82*** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 23504 23340 23494 
Pseudo R2 0.0601 0.1661 0.0492 
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Table 3.10. Mean Comparison Tests - Disclosure Regulation and Bankruptcy Law Changes (Continued) 
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Table 3.11. Countries with Disclosure Regulation Changes: Difference-in-Differences Tests 
This table presents the double clustering difference-in-differences testing model results by controlling individual 
investee firms and years effects estimates of testing the treat-after effects before and after the disclosure regulation 
changes on different investee firm, country and exits characteristics by controlling different facets of 
characteristics in addition to controlling the fixed effects of industry groups. All dependent variable across Model 
(1) to (4) are four major density variables, Treat1 is a dummy variable capturing the disclosure regulation change 
countries, After1 is a dummy variable capturing the after-disclosure regulation change effect, Treat1 * After1 is a 
dummy variable capturing the treat-after effect for disclosure regulation change. All control variables in all testing 
models in Table 3.6 are the same as those in Table 3.5.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
  
Angel Density (scaled by 
Total Population) 
Angel Density (scaled by 
Total GDP) 
PE/VC Density (scaled by 
Total Population) 
PE/VC Density (scaled 
by Total GDP) 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Treat1 * After1 1.5121 4.16*** 0.029 4.20*** 13.9633 9.67*** 0.2622 9.73*** 
Treat1 1.1409 2.60*** 0.0213 2.53** -3.837 -1.99** -0.0819 -2.34** 
After1 -1.344 -3.79*** -0.0261 -3.89*** -5.0875 -3.92*** -0.099 -4.07*** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effects No No No No 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 38594 38594 39740 39740 
R2 0.6204 0.6265 0.8516 0.8752 
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Table 3.12. Countries with Bankruptcy Law Changes: Difference-in-Differences Tests 
This table presents the double clustering difference-in-differences testing model results by controlling individual 
investee firms and years effects estimates of testing the treat-after effects before and after the bankruptcy law 
changes on different investee firm, country and exits characteristics by controlling different facets of 
characteristics in addition to controlling the fixed effects of industry groups. All dependent variable across Model 
(1) to (4) are four major density variables, Treat2 is a dummy variable capturing the bankruptcy law change 
countries, After2 is a dummy variable capturing the after-bankruptcy change effect, Treat2 * After2 is a dummy 
variable capturing the treat-after effect for bankruptcy law change. All control variables in all testing models in 
Table 3.6 are the same as those in Table 3.5.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
  
Angel Density (scaled 
by Total Population) 
Angel Density (scaled by 
Total GDP) 
PE/VC Density (scaled 
by Total Population) 
PE/VC Density (scaled by 
Total GDP) 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Treat2 * After2 0.8853 2.74*** 0.0171 2.85*** 16.193 7.89*** 0.3164 8.07*** 
Treat2 -0.6557 -0.94 -0.0166 -1.25 -23.4981 -9.64*** -0.4722 -10.45*** 
After2 -0.0956 -0.38 -0.0024 -0.57 -8.8898 -5.45*** -0.1976 -6.41*** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effects No No No No 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 38594 38594 39740 39740 
R2 0.6501 0.6517 0.8822 0.8778 
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Table A3.2. PROBIT Regression Models for Exits Outcomes - Propensity Score Matching Sample Tests 
This table presents clustered PROBIT model results by controlling individual investee firms and years effects 
estimates of testing the exits outcomes by controlling different facets of characteristics in addition to controlling the 
fixed effects of industry groups and countries and we report the associated marginal effects in the table. All 
dependent variable across Model (1) to (3) is successful exits dummy variable to capture all successful exits, either 
an IPO exit or an acquisition exit, all other variables are as defined in Table 3.3. All control variables in all testing 
models in Table A3.2 are the same as those in Table 3.5.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
  Unmatched Sample: Successful Exits 
Matched Sample 1: Successful 
Exits 
Matched Sample 2: Successful 
Exits 
  Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score 
All Angels -0.2661 -16.19*** -0.4180 -6.20*** -0.4193 -6.20*** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 39835 8053 7969 
Pseudo R2 0.0427 0.0678 0.0679 
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Table A3.3. Robustness Checks for U.S vs. Non-U.S. Subsamples 
This table presents clustered PROBIT model results by replicating main results from Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8. All dependent 
variable across Model (1) to (4) in Panel A is indicator dummy variable to capture All Angels investors. All dependent variables 
across Model (1) to (6) in Panels B and C are successful exits dummy variable to capture all successful exits, either an IPO exit or 
an acquisition exit, all other variables are as defined in Table 3.3. All control variables in all testing models in Table A3.2 are the 
same as those in Table 3.5.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: PROBIT Regression Models for How Angel Investors Make Investments - All Rounds and 1st Round Only 
  U.S. Subsample Non-U.S. Subsample 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
  All Angels - All Rounds All Angels - 1st Round Only All Angels - All Rounds All Angels - 1st Round Only 
  Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score 
LN of GDP per capita 0.0490 1.85* 0.2787 5.78*** -0.0069 -0.26 -0.0169 -0.55 
LN of Domestic Market Capitalization -0.0136 -1.39 -0.0856 -5.11*** -0.0086 -0.59 -0.0188 -1.12 
MSCI Returns 0.0225 1.78* 0.0544 2.59*** 0.0106 0.77 -0.0164 -0.74 
Minority Protection Index -0.0278 -3.65*** -0.0582 -4.68*** -0.0108 -1.09 -0.0169 -2.05** 
LN of Number of Employees -0.0124 -8.82*** -0.0116 -5.59*** -0.0065 -4.20*** -0.0081 -3.53*** 
Number of Deals per Year 0.0059 2.24** 0.0369 5.67*** 0.0057 0.71 0.0043 0.27 
IDV omitted omitted omitted omitted 0.0042 0.45 -0.0050 -0.44 
UAI omitted omitted omitted omitted 0.0028 0.42 -0.0051 -0.61 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effects No No Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 36399 14474 2640 1210 
Pseudo R2 0.0708 0.1237 0.0884 0.1005 
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Table A3.3. Robustness Checks for U.S vs. Non-U.S. Subsamples (Continued) 
 
112 
 
Chapter 4 
Private Equity Exits in Emerging Markets 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The development and importance of emerging markets within the global financial 
system can no longer be questioned. Emerging market economies contribute more than 
two-thirds of global growth and more so their growth is projected to increase. It is 
suggested by IMF (2014) that growth levels reached 4.7 percent in 2013, 4.9 percent in 
2014 and potentially 5.3 percent in 2015. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
(BRICS countries) currently rank within the top 10 largest economic entities. Without 
emerging markets, worldwide economic growth would be much lower than it currently is.   
Financial institutions have for years sought to take advantage of this growth. As a result 
of the unprecedented growth in many emerging markets in the 1990’s, increasing 
numbers of private equity (PE) investors have navigated these risky markets to profit 
from not only the economic growth but also the lowering of state intervention in those 
markets (Leeds and Sunderland, 2003). The opportunities for PE investments were 
thought to have developed significantly in both scale and quality in emerging markets 
over the past decades. However, at the same time, the same investors were quick to come 
to the realization that there were challenges within the emerging markets that they were 
not prepared for resulting in unmet expectations. Not only were these emerging markets 
still relatively immature and, under-developed, but there were, and arguably are, 
insurmountable regulatory restrictions and corporate governance weaknesses. Also amid 
the expectation of emerging hot spot PE markets such as China and India achieving GDP 
growth rates in double-digits, it is possible that as a result of too much capital chasing too 
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few good deals, PE investors may have rushed to invest without adequately preparing for 
the risks of a prolonged slowdown (Cumming and Macintosh, 2006; Ippolito, 2007; 
Aizenman and Kendall, 2012; Klonowski, 2013). Our study thus aims to explore the 
determinants of successful PE investments by measuring successful PE exits. We analyze 
the relationship between the development of business environments and legal protections 
and successful exit. We would be remiss in our analysis if we did not consider the role of 
corruption on the potential of success for PE investments in that previous researches have 
established the negative effect of corruption on the cost of doing business (Fisman and 
Wei, 2004; Fisman and Miguel, 2007; Fisman and Svensson, 2007; Fisman and Miguel, 
2007; Fisman et al., 2008). With more studies documenting the impact of corruption on 
the cost of doing business at both the economic and firm-specific levels (Mauro, 1995; 
Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck and Eden, 2005), very few of those studies focus on the PE 
investments in these corrupt jurisdictions. In a more recent study of Cumming, Fleming, 
Johan and Takeuchi (2010), they used 21 Asia-Pacific countries data to provide 
competing hypotheses regarding the impact of corruption on PE investments across 
markets. Our study aims to test similar competing hypotheses in emerging markets with 
wider range countries (35 jurisdictions worldwide) using a longer sample period (1992 - 
2012). Finally, we also seek to determine whether the dot com bubble and the recent 
financial crisis had any effect on PE investments in emerging economies.  
We believe our research will shed light on relatively opaque PE activities in 
emerging markets. PE investors, as sophisticated financial intermediaries catering to 
equally if not more sophisticated institutional investors, primarily invest in relatively high 
risk, illiquid securities in private firms. Given that such investee firm characteristics are 
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combined with high risk and volatile political environments in emerging markets, we can 
safely deduce that PE investments in emerging economies are riskier than that of 
developed countries. As such, the divestment or exit strategy which is the measure of 
success of an investment might be planned and executed by considering more critical 
factors. Our study is related to a growing body of research that establishes legal 
protection to be important factors to explain the size, structure and success of PE 
investments, results of course varying depending on the data analyzed (Lerner and Schoar, 
2005; Cumming et al., 2006; Cressy et al., 2007; Cao and Lerner, 2009; Johan and Najar, 
2011).  
Our study benefits from the comprehensiveness of PitchBook’s deal level 
database which provides us a unique opportunity to investigate the PE exit probabilities 
across emerging markets. The data documents the heterogeneities of investee firm-level 
characteristics together with business environments, legal conditions, security market 
structure and performance, macroeconomic and cultural dimensions as well as industry 
dispersions. We present our robust results based on 2,733 PE deals of 1,499 investee 
firms to investigate PE exits strategies and impact from multi-facet factors. Our findings 
suggest that better business and legal environments in emerging markets increase the 
probability of successful exits for PE investors. We also find that PE investors are better 
able to mitigate the potential costs associated with inefficient and corrupt business 
environments to increase the probability of exits by IPOs in countries with higher levels 
of corruption. Moreover, our findings suggest that market shocks arguably concentrated 
in the developed markets result in a negative ripple effect as the probability of successful 
exits, especially by way of IPOs, decreases for PE investors in emerging markets.   
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Our study complements the growing literature on private equity, business ethics, 
corruption and IPO. We believe our findings not only support those of Cumming, et. al 
(2006) and Cumming et. al, (2010), but also augment both studies as our analysis 
comprises more jurisdictions and include the unique period of the recent financial crisis. 
Our analysis of PE investments in emerging markets also adds to the existing 
international comparative literature on PE and emerging markets to provide more updated 
information regarding PE divestment strategies as well as to provide an analysis on the 
impacts from dot com bubble and the recent financial crisis on those divestment 
strategies in emerging markets. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We discuss extant literature 
and develop our hypotheses in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the data and our 
summary statistics, while section 4.4 presents the regression analyses. Section 4.5 
provides an outlook for future research and concludes. 
 
4.2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
PE investors divest their holdings or exit from their investments in five ways: 
initial public offerings (IPOs), acquisitions, secondary sales, buybacks and write-offs 
(Black and Gilson, 1998; Cumming and Johan, 2013). The last two methods of exits are 
deemed to be the least successful from the perspective of the PE investor and the investee 
firm as they do not result in any significant inflow of additional capital into the firm. The 
IPO is deemed to be the most successful method of exit from all parties concerned due to 
the potential for new capital inflow to the firm and the potential for profit for the PE 
investors (Black and Gilson, 1998; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003a, b; Fleming, 2004; 
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Schwienbacher, 2008; Cumming and Johan, 2013). In this study, we focus on the first 
two main strategies not only in unison but separately as well to test whether divestment 
strategies are different across emerging markets, and to acknowledge differences between 
public exits (IPOs) versus private exits (acquisitions). 
There is a developed body of literature examining how legal institutional 
environments impact economic growth and equity returns. Cross-jurisdictional studies 
categorize countries and financial markets by differences in legal origins and qualities 
(La Porta et al., 1998a, b; Botazzi et. al., 2009) and others use the World Bank’s ease of 
doing business index to proxy the business environment as the index ranks economies on 
their ease of starting a business, getting credit, protecting minority investors and/or 
enforcing contracts (Ho and Wong, 2007; Groh et. al., 2009). A high ease of doing 
business ranking means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting and 
operating a business and therefore PE investors investing in firms situated in these 
countries with better legal and business environments might potentially benefit as this 
enables PE investors to more effectively provide advice during the investment process 
but also to affect organizational changes to ensure efficient exits from the same firms 
(Cumming and Johan, 2007, 2008, and 2013). This is the basis of our first hypothesis. 
Furthermore, better legal conditions and business environments will together 
facilitate better enforcement of private equity contracts, and information asymmetries 
between PE investors, investee firms and outside investors during both investment and 
divestment periods can be alleviated in a more efficient way (La Porta et al., 1998a, b; 
Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Cumming et. al., 2006). Therefore, all else being equal, we 
believe that there is a higher probability for PE investors to exit from their investments in 
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high risk firms in relatively high risk emerging markets in countries with better legal and 
business environments. We therefore hypothesize the following Hypothesis H1a: 
 
H1a.  Better business and legal environments in emerging markets will increase the 
probability for PE investors to exit from their investments successfully. 
 
As we mentioned earlier, we would be remiss in our analysis if we did not take 
into account the role of corruption in the emerging markets we are considering. Extant 
research has established the distortionary effects of corruption on foreign direct 
investment (Habib and Zurawicki, 2001 and 2002; Wei, 2000; Javorcik and Wei, 2009). 
While corruption has previously been viewed was implicit in various measures of both 
economic and political risk, for the purposes of our study we believe it is appropriate to 
view corruption measures as separate explaining variable of PE investment success. For 
example, Tanzi (1998) suggests that by making regulatory controls ineffective, corruption 
acts as an arbitrary tax and Wei (1997) finds that the unpredictability of corruption adds 
to investment risk, therefore apart from the legal and business conditions PE investors 
consider while making investment and divestment decisions, another important 
institutional idiosyncrasy they take into consideration is the corruption level within 
certain jurisdictions (Wong et al., 2013). On the one hand, corruption might reduce 
economic endeavors by increasing transaction costs and business uncertainties (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993; Fisman and Svensson, 2007), building barriers to investments 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Hakkala, Norbäck and Svaleryd, 2008) and as suggested by 
Rose-Ackerman (1998), by increasing the misallocations of resources. On the other hand, 
118 
 
it has been suggested that some corruption might actually be beneficial, particularly in 
weak institutional settings such as those in emerging markets, to circumvent bureaucratic 
obstacles, inefficient public procurements and rigid legislation (Leff, 1964; Lien, 1990; 
Huntington, 1968; Vaal and Ebben, 2011). It can be beneficial to entrepreneurial 
endeavors and economic growth in dysfunctional institutional settings (Egger and Winner, 
2005; Levy, 2007; Méon and Weill, 2010). 
As sophisticated financial intermediaries, PE investors are expert at utilizing their 
skills and value-add capabilities to mitigate the potential agency problems, especially 
those resulting from corruption. We are in line with Cumming et. al. (2010) in their 
supposition that sophisticated PE investors are able to not only identify, but more 
significantly circumvent the bureaucratic and regulatory obstacles to bring about 
organizational change in the investee firms, thus generating absolutely higher returns as 
they exit successfully from their investments. By providing both advice and monitoring 
to investee firms and implementing both new governance and incentive structures within 
those firms, we expect PE investors to enjoy better returns from more successful exits in 
those markets (Cumming et. al., 2010). As such, we posit in Hypothesis H1b: 
  
H1b.  Higher levels of corruption in emerging markets will increase the probability for 
PE investors to exit from their investments successfully. 
 
There is a wide body of research that establishes the expertise of private equity 
investors at timing the market, or knowing when to most profitably exit from their 
investments (Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1996; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Gompers et. al., 
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2008). As we mentioned earlier, the IPO is deemed to be the most profitable, hence 
sought after, mode of exit for PE investors. While numerous studies have taken into 
account the effect of the dot com bubble in their analysis of IPOs, we seek to include the 
recent financial crisis in ours for the following reasons. Although the global financial 
crisis broke out in earnest in soon after August 2007, it was clear that an earthquake had 
hit the developed economies and that emerging economies would be affected, but it was 
unclear how and when it would do so. There was no doubt there would be a negative 
ripple effect but as to whether the ripple would be more tsunami-like for some economies 
but not others was unknown then. Like the dot com bubble, the crisis originated in a 
developed economy, but unlike the dot com bubble, the recent financial crisis occurred 
during an unprecedented period of heightened interconnectivity of global financial 
markets. PE investors, who albeit are skilled at making and divesting from investments 
may not have been adequately prepared for the extent of the effects of the crisis on the 
financial markets in emerging economies. The recent global financial crisis also gave 
policymakers a chance to pass more stringent rules to regulate the financial market, and 
the activities of financial intermediaries more specifically. The adoption of Dodd-Frank 
Act in the U.S. and the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) in the 
E.U. are two examples of regulatory changes resulting in closer monitoring of the PE 
industry in developed markets. The combination of an unforeseen market shock 
originating from a developed economy and the ensuing increased oversight of PE 
activities also originating from developed economies makes this analysis more pertinent 
in the context of emerging markets. We are thus taking this opportunity to determine the 
extent of the ripple effects of the global financial crisis on PE investors in emerging 
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economies. We use as guidance the findings of Cumming and Zambelli (2013) that use 
Italy as a unique example to test the impact of excessive regulatory changes on PE 
returns and firm performance. They find that extreme regulatory changes in Italy reduced 
the supply of capital as well as the likelihood of a PE investor to exit from his investment 
by an IPO, especially during the post-crisis period. In addition, we also refer to Ritter 
(1998, 2003) who suggests that it is more expensive to go public than to exit via other 
vehicles due to the obligatory legal, financial, and other professional advisors required to 
initiate the process, the transaction costs of preparing a prospectus, and the well 
documented “under-pricing effect” of IPOs, not to mention the ongoing costs of reporting 
requirements for publicly listed firms. Considering increased costs associated with IPOs 
during and after the global financial crisis, numerous IPO market professionals have 
expressed the view that regulatory changes together with changes in investor sentiment 
have changed the dynamics of the IPO marketplace (Henry and Gregoriou, 2013). In 
brief, while the literature in the area of law and finance and corporate governance 
document that better legal environments will foster better financial markets, few have 
considered the altered business environment after the recent global financial crisis. In our 
investigation into whether the financial markets in emerging markets have been reshaped 
during and after the crisis, we hypothesize in Hypothesis H2: 
 
H2.  The recent financial crisis as a market shock will decrease the probability for PE 
investors to exit from their investments successfully. 
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4.3. Data and Summary Statistics 
We use PitchBook’s PE deals database as our main data source while at the same 
time merging other data from Transparency International, the World Federation of 
Exchanges and the World Bank to construct our main variables. The PitchBook data 
provide investee firm-level PE deal characteristics which include not only deal sizes but 
also PE investee firms’ geographical and industry information. Our sample data span 
from 1992 to 2012, with a total of 3,087 PE deals in 1,648 investee firms from 35 
countries around the world. As we are primarily focusing of PE exits from investments as 
a measure of success, we only track completed deals. Other deals which are in progress, 
postponed or failed, we exclude from the following analysis. Our final sample comprises 
a total of 2,733 PE deals in 1,499 investee firms from 35 countries.13  
Our cross-jurisdictional analysis across different PE divestment strategies adds to the 
existing literature on single country or regional analysis. Our study is the first and 
relatively the most comprehensive study to discuss PE investments in emerging markets 
and the associated main exit strategies for PE investors. Not only the BRICS countries 
are included in our sample, we also have PE deals in other countries where less attention 
has been paid so far. We believe this significantly differentiates our study from recent 
work that has only focused PE exits in China, India or the Asian region (Kuchimov, 2010; 
Prahl, Zeisberger and Cannarsi, 2011). 
Figure 4.1 illustrates how PE investments in the emerging markets have changed 
over the periods from 1992 to 2012. The number of deals per year increased dramatically 
within this period with a peak of 361 deals in 2011. Although we notice a sharp decline 
                                                            
13 Note: In the subsequent reported Table 4.2, not all variables have 2,733 observations (88.5% of the 
original data 3,087 observations) because of data limitation. Some of the variables do not occur in some of 
the years or not reported for some of the countries and territories. 
122 
 
from 328 deals in 2007 to 247 deals in 2009 due to the recent financial crisis around the 
world, PE investments rebounded very quickly in these young and growing markets. In 
terms of dollar amounts invested in emerging markets, Figure 4.1 shows us that the trend 
almost co-moves with the total number of deals in each year. The aggregated deal sizes in 
each year are increasing from about only $1.5 billion in 2002 to the peak of about $51 
billion in 2007. Both PE investors and entrepreneurs in emerging markets have obviously 
built fast-growing and promising alternative investment markets to fuel the economic 
growth. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the key features associated with our sample distribution of 
a total of 2,733 completed PE deals in emerging markets. The industry distribution is 
widely dispersed in emerging markets with a total of 40 industries related to those PE 
investee firms. The top 5 most invested deals are in the software, commercial services, 
media, communications and networking and retail industries. Among the top are 
traditionally preferred PE investor industries such as software, pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology; but we also find several other PE investments made in less traditional 
industries such as agriculture or the forestry industry. This enables us to investigate the 
heterogeneity of industries in our exploration of the determinants of successful PE exits 
in emerging markets. 
Moreover, there are ten major terminology definitions from international 
organizations and financial institutions for emerging markets: IMF, BRICS plus Next 
Eleven, FTSE, MSCI, S&P, J.P. Morgan EM bond index, Dow Jones, Russell, Columbia 
University's Emerging Market Global Players (EMGP) and BBVA Research. We 
matched all countries in our PitchBook dataset to make sure at least one of the definitions 
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can be applied. In this way, we have found 35 countries in our sample can be defined as 
an emerging market and we list those countries in Table 4.1, with BRICS countries 
coming on top of the league table in terms of total number of deals completed.14 Usually 
when referring to emerging markets, BRICS countries are mentioned and studied the 
most extensively. However, in Table 4.1, we provide additional information on deals in 
other less researched countries like Argentina, Poland, Turkey, etc, which enriches our 
study and adds to existing literature. We believe the obvious heterogeneity in country-
specific characteristics such as business environments, legal origins, business cultures 
and levels of economic developments, will help us perform a more comprehensive study. 
Another point to note from Table 4.1 is that the emerging market countries seem to be 
concentrated in the middle income group as defined by the World Bank. This creates 
another facet to discuss as to whether the income levels of those emerging market 
countries affect both PE investments and divestments in these countries. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the main variables in our dataset. As we investigate the 
probability of successful exits within emerging markets, we use the IPO exits dummy and 
acquisition exits dummy as the main dependant variables. The explanatory variables 
include the country-specific corruption perceptions indices (CPI) from Transparency 
International, the ease of doing business rankings from the World Bank, and the legal 
origins to proxy the business environments and legal conditions; the GDP per capita, the 
MSCI returns, the domestic stock market capitalizations and the financial crisis period 
dummy to proxy the security market and macroeconomic conditions in emerging markets 
                                                            
14 3 out of 5 BRICS countries are in the TOP 5 list and 4 out 5 countries are in the TOP 10 list, South 
Africa is an outlier within the BRICS group in our sample with fewer deals completed. 
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and one of the six Hofstede’s dimensions of cultural variables, as well as a variety of 
control variables to capture the investee firm  and industry characteristics. 
Our primary variables of interest are those variables that proxy the emerging 
markets’ business environments and legal origins as well as the financial crisis period 
dummy, which is defined as a variable that equals to one for all PE deals completed 
during the 2007 to 2009 period, and equals to zero otherwise. We believe our study 
serves to fill a research gap as it focuses on the potential business environment change 
brought about by the financial crisis and empirically tests whether global financial crisis 
changes PE investors’ behavior, especially their exit strategies in emerging markets. 
Table 4.3 presents the pair-wise simple correlations to highlight the relationship 
across major variables. The correlations in Table 4.3 confirm the hypothetical 
relationship between PE exit strategies and the business environment as well as the global 
financial crisis at the investee firm deal level. For example, we find that when the ease of 
doing business ranking is lower (the rank number is larger and thus the business 
environment is worse), it is less likely for PE investors to exit, and especially to 
successfully exit by using acquisition strategies. And when we look at the financial crisis 
period dummy’s relationship with other variables, we also find that the business 
environment gets worse in emerging markets and the security market performance lower 
during the global financial crisis period. However, note that our correlations also 
highlight some potential colinearity issues across different explanatory variables, which 
we explore in our multivariate empirical tests in the next section. 
Our data provides us with a unique opportunity to explore all possible reasons 
behind PE investors’ behavior. For example, in addition to the different business 
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environments factors, there might be other reasons or factors influencing such divestment 
strategies for PE investors, for example, cultural dimensions or income levels in those 
countries. Moreover, the PitchBook database provides detailed information on testing 
international differences across countries and over time, which can further explain the 
reasons behind those strategies. 
We examine the data in PROBIT regression models across countries and years. 
Our first step is to show some of the highlighted features from our PitchBook deals data, 
and provide preliminary means difference tests results. In panel A of Table 4.4, we divide 
our entire data sample into two groups to determine whether a specific completed deal is 
a result of a PE exit strategy or not. Regarding the comparison of business environments, 
on average, those exited deals are in countries with better business environments. The 
ease of doing business rankings are relatively higher (ranked about 6 ranks higher), 
although there is no significant difference with regards to the CPI scores.  
In panel A of Table 4.4, we also find that compared with those exited deals, other 
types of deals are significantly smaller in terms of deal sizes. This is not surprising, 
because PE exits usually occur at later stages over the investment cycles; the larger the 
size of such deal, the higher chance PE investors will get higher realized returns from 
their initial investments. Moreover, when we look at the macroeconomic and security 
market conditions in emerging markets for those exited and other types of deals, we can 
find that the stock market returns are relatively higher in those countries for exited deals, 
which implies that if PE investors and entrepreneurs use equity as their main security 
alignment in the contracts, market timing is an important sentiment to consider before 
executing the exit strategies. We should also note that the domestic market capitalizations 
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in those countries for exited deals are relatively smaller (on average about 12% less) than 
those countries for other types of deals, suggesting that PE investors may find it easier to 
exit in smaller emerging security markets. 
Panel B of Table 4.4 divides our sample by PE exit types, and then further sorts 
them by the financial crisis period dummy to show if PE investors’ exit strategies change 
during this specific crisis period. Clearly, when combining all the successfully exited 
deals together, we can observe several interesting features in our dataset: First, the 
business environment seems to be worse in emerging markets during the financial crisis 
period. The CPI scores are lower, the ease of doing business ranks are lower and the legal 
environment is relatively worse, especially for those IPO deals. Second, deal sizes are 
smaller during the global financial crisis, only IPO deals have bigger deal sizes during the 
crisis period. PE investors seem to act as more cautious players and exit their investments 
only if the deal sizes are large enough to get the expected realized returns. Third, in terms 
of the macroeconomic and security market conditions changes, we can also find that 
during the crisis period, PE investors tend to choose larger security markets to exit their 
investments. As larger security market might be more liquid than smaller ones; therefore, 
such type of markets will accelerate the exits.  
Another important point to note from Table 4.4 Panel B is the number of 
employees across different type of exit strategies. Although the differences between the 
two categories are insignificant, this number decreases in two out of three sub-panels, 
especially for the IPO deals. The financial crisis did have impact on the investee firms 
with possible layoffs and size shrinking. IPO exits have the highest number of employees 
for our two types of exit strategies. This suggests that the number of employees in 
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investee firms may serve as a good control variable to measure the determinants of 
investee firm success. Moreover, other type of exit strategies usually have less number of 
investee firm employees which also suggests that acquisition strategy is usually carried 
out during growth and expansion stages or when such investee firms need to seek 
restructuring. We discuss this notion in more detail in later sections, and we provide 
robust results to confirm our findings. 
 We mentioned in an earlier section that La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) have found 
legal origin to be a significant determinant in shaping financial markets around the world. 
In panel C of Table 4.4, we summarize the different deal characteristics by legal origins 
in our dataset. Those exited deals in common law countries will have relatively better 
business environment, macroeconomic and cultural conditions in terms of significantly 
higher CPI scores, significantly higher GDP per capita and higher entrepreneurial risk-
taking scores (UAI). Although other indicators return insignificant results, we still find 
consistent results with La Porta et al. (1998, 2006) that residing in a better legal 
environment helps protect PE investors’ values. In return, those PE investors will have 
higher chances to exit their investments easier, and enjoy a better governance 
environment where barriers to exit can be lowered.  
 Panel D of Table 4.4 summarizes the mean characteristics test results between the 
BRICS and non-BRICS subsamples in emerging markets. As their important roles in the 
global economy have been more and more recognized, BRICS countries usually referred 
the most as emerging markets in the literature and media which encourages us to perform 
additional tests to find out more interesting results in this subsample. In our tests, we did 
find that 7 out of 9 main features of our BRICS subsample return significant differences 
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between their counterpart countries in emerging markets. BRICS emerging markets have 
relatively worse business environment in terms of lower CPI scores and lower ranks in 
the ease of doing business ranks; and they have lower GDP per capita but larger and 
better performed security market in terms of larger domestic market capitalization and 
MSCI returns as well as a cultural environment favoring risk-taking with larger sizes of 
investee firms in terms of the number of employees. Such differences are worthy of 
performing more detailed regression analysis in the following section. 
 
4.4. Regression Analyses 
Now that we have laid out some of the unique features and consistent findings 
from other studies, we perform our regression analyses using clustered PROBIT models 
by controlling year effects in addition to controlling the industry and country fixed effects. 
We report associated marginal effects on each explanatory variable. We also perform 
several subsample tests and show several robustness checks before drawing our 
conclusions.  
 In our main regression analyses, we consider whether the exit strategy is 
associated with different business environments and legal origins, macroeconomic and 
security market conditions as well as other factors. We then consider the subsamples of 
the two main exit strategies of IPO and acquisition to investigate how different types of 
exits will be affected by the same set of factors considered in emerging markets. In 
addition, we also perform tests regarding the BRICS countries to provide more 
comprehensive analysis. The main regression models use the following specification: 
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Dummy Variable of Successful Exits Type = f (Business Environment Conditions, Legal 
Origins, Macroeconomic and Security Market Conditions, Cultural Variables, Investee 
Firm Characteristics and Industry and Country Dummies) 
 
 Most of our major variables are defined in Table 4.2. Note that there are a large 
number of explanatory variables that we could have included but chose to exclude. The 
primary reasons for our parsimonious specification are as follows. First, the selected 
variables are plausibly pertinent to the probability of PE exits in emerging markets for the 
purposes of testing H1a and H1b. The specifications enable us to assess the factors on 
possible different exit strategies through other control variables in order to test other 
hypotheses. Second, note that the excluded variables are highly collinear. Hence, any 
additional control variables for the available sets of countries and years would not be 
perfectly suitable without potentially introducing spurious results into the regressions. 
Examples include some other cultural variables measured by Hofstede, as well as other 
legal variables such as the German or French law origin dummies. Our selection and 
reporting of variables was conducted to assess the factors that directly impact possible PE 
exiting strategies and hopefully to capture all related facets of factors that PE investors 
would consider before making such business decisions. 
 Before we present the main regression results, let us look at Figure 4.2 first. We 
use time-series graph to show the trend for the number of PE exits over the sample period 
from 1993 to 2012. These three trend lines almost co-move with each other and move in 
the similar upward directions. For each sample year, usually the numbers of acquisition 
exits are more than IPO exits. One interesting feature from Figure 4.2 is that those 
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numbers of exits by different strategies all peak in 2007, the PE investors seem to choose 
exits around the financial crisis and they seem to have the possible “crisis timing” ability. 
Another important feature from Figure 4.2 is the upward slopes we observe for the 
different types of exits, the emerging PE market is growing in a healthier and more 
mature manner with more and more PE investors divest by using different strategies. We 
thus want to perform additional subsample tests to confirm whether different type of 
divestment strategies will have been associated with different levels of impacts from our 
explanatory variables. 
In Panel A of Table 4.5, all dependent variables across Models (1) to (3) are the 
dummy variables indicating whether or not the deal is a successful exit (as a whole), or 
either in an IPO or acquisition format, respectively. From Models (1) to (3), most of our 
two business and legal environment conditions variables return statistically significant 
marginal effects at the 1% and 5% levels, which confirms our H1a that better business 
and legal environments in emerging markets will increase the probability for PE investors 
to exit from their investments successfully. Although Model (3) for acquisition exits 
returns insignificant results on these two variables, the other two models generate non-
negligible economic significance. For example, in Model (1), a 1% increase in the ease of 
doing business rankings will increase the successful exits likelihood by 0.50%. Put it in a 
more numerical and vivid way, if the ease of doing business ranking for a country will 
increase from a rank of 86 to 80, the successful PE exits likelihood will increase by 
3.75%. And a 1% increase in the common law legal origin will increase the successful 
exits likelihood by 41.66%. Model (2) for our IPO exits returns even larger marginal 
effects as expected.  Therefore, our hypothesis H1a is confirmed. 
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With regards to our hypothesis H1b, we only found statistically significant result 
in Model (3) on the acquisition exits. A 1% increase in the CPI score will increase the 
acquisition exits likelihood by 16.18%, which is quite compelling and this model 
indicates that the higher the CPI score, the less corrupt environment is in that country and 
the higher acquisition exits likelihood will be in such an environment. If we view that less 
corruption is an indicator for better business environment, our H1a gets another support 
from our Model (3) result. However, since Models (1) and (2) in Panel A did not return 
statistically significant results with different signs, our hypothesis H1b cannot be 
validated. In addition to these results, we also find that the size of the exited deals is an 
important factor in the divestment decisions as larger deals will drive higher probability 
to divest, no matter what exit format is used. Throughout Models (1) to (3) in Panel A, all 
the marginal effects for LN of deal size are statistically positive at 1% level and the 
economic significance is also large with a 1% increase in the LN of deal size will 
increase the successful exits likelihood by 9.01% (also about 6.50% and 3.56% increases 
for IPO and acquisition exits, respectively). The higher the deal size both parties agree on 
a PE exit, the higher probability such a deal will be successfully completed. Moreover, 
the domestic security market capitalization matters more for IPO deals while a cultural 
environment favoring less risk-taking will increase the acquisition exits probability. 
In order to provide more robust results regarding our H1a and H1b, we followed 
previous literature that using BRICS countries as our major emerging markets players. In 
Panel B of Table 4.5, we replicated all the specifications in Panel A by using BRICS 
countries only. Although Model (4) did not return statistically significant result, Models 
(5) and (6) gave some support for our H1a and H1b. For example, Model (5) indicates 
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qualitatively similar results to Model (2) in Panel A with quite comparable economic 
significance on the ease of doing business rankings. Surprisingly, the CPI score returns 
quite different results in Models (5) and (6). For acquisition exits test in Model (6), the 
result is very similar to our Model (3) in Panel A and helped support H1a instead. But the 
results for IPO exits in Model (5) for BRICS countries, we find some supporting 
evidence for H1b that higher levels of corruption in emerging markets will increase the 
probability for PE investors to exit from their investments successfully, especially by 
using IPO strategy. A 1% decrease in the CPI score will increase the IPO exits likelihood 
by 27.57%, indicating that a more corrupt business environment in BRICS countries will 
enhance the PE investments exit probability. Partially this finding is consistent with the 
results found in Cumming et. al (2010) which finds that PE managers have the ability to 
mitigate the potential for corruption in such a country. While their study focuses on the 
buyout returns, ours look at the probability of successfully divesting in emerging markets. 
Our new results add to the literature to help understand and explore divestment strategies 
in a different manner in emerging markets. 
Given all of the results we have found in Table 4.5, we can confirm that our 
hypothesis H1a is fully supported that better business and legal environments in emerging 
markets will increase the probability for PE investors to exit from their investments 
successfully. Although we cannot find strong support for our hypothesis H1b, what we 
want to argue is that the corruption level within a country still has non-negligible impact 
on the divestment strategies, the format of the exit strategy will be quite different given 
different levels of corruption and somehow PE managers might have the ability to 
mitigate the potential impact from the corrupt environments. It seems the debate 
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regarding this double-sword role of corruption will continue in the literature and we 
should take a separate view on the divestment strategies of different formats. 
In order to explore whether the global financial crisis as a market shock will have 
any impacts on the PE investments exit probability, we use the dummy variable which 
equals one for all completed PE deals in emerging markets occurred during the period of 
2007 to 2009 and equals zero for rest of the deals throughout all of the model 
specifications. We expect the sign for the financial crisis dummy to be negative, 
indicating less likelihood for PE investors to divest during the financial crisis due to 
possible changes in emerging markets business environments, the security market 
conditions and the investee firm characteristics. Combining the means difference test 
results from Panel B in Table 4.4, we did notice several changes in emerging markets for 
those exited deals, especially for those IPO deals. For example, during the financial-crisis 
period, PE investors tend to exit in countries with larger security market with relatively 
better business and legal environments, and “time” the market to exit in those security 
markets when higher returns observed. In this manner, it seems that PE investors have 
some possible “crisis timing” ability to circumvent the negative impact from the financial 
crisis to exit successfully. From our regression models in Table 4.6, we can find that 
Models (1) to (3) return all negative marginal effects with Model (2)’s result is 
significantly negative at 5% level.  The economic significance is also large: a 1% 
increase in the likelihood of deals completed during the financial crisis period, the 
probability for successful exits will decrease by 5.94% and for IPO exits, such probability 
will decrease even larger by 12.72%. Although Models (4) to (6) in Panel B of Table 4.6 
to test the BRICS countries subsample did not return any significant results regarding the 
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financial crisis period dummy, we believe that our proposition in hypothesis H2 still 
stands and the recent financial crisis as a market shock did decrease the PE exits 
probabilities, especially for IPO exits. BRICS countries can be viewed as featured 
emerging markets, but our more broad analysis highlights the importance to consider 
other emerging economies to come to a thorough conclusion. 
Moreover, as documented in Ritter (1998, 2003), it is more expensive to go public 
than to exit via other vehicles due to the obligatory legal, financial, and other professional 
advisors required to initiate the process, the transaction costs of preparing a prospectus, 
and the well documented “under-pricing effect” of IPOs, not to mention the ongoing 
costs of reporting requirements for publicly listed firms. Considering more expensive 
costs associated with IPOs and during the global financial crisis, numerous IPO market 
professionals have expressed that regulatory changes together with changes in investor 
sentiment, have changed the dynamic of the IPO marketplace (Henry and Gregoriou, 
2013), our results in Model (2) of Panel A in Table 4.6 concur those views and confirm 
our hypothesis H2 in a robust way. For PE investors in emerging markets, they tend to 
bring investee firms public in countries with relatively better business and legal 
environments as well as larger domestic security markets but be more cautious to 
complete such IPO deals during the crisis period. After we controlled for multiple facets 
of variables and clustered the countries, industries and years fixed effects to correct the 
model standard errors, we still can find very robust results. In this way, we think our tests 
confirm our hypothesis H2 that the recent financial crisis as a market shock will decrease 
the probability for PE investors to exit from their investments successfully, especially by 
using IPO as the main strategy. 
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Besides our predicted negative ripple effect from the recent global financial crisis, 
in Table 4.7, we also included another dummy variable which equals to one for deals 
exited during the period of 2000 to 2002 capturing the dot com bubble and equals to zero 
otherwise. This market crash caused about $5 trillion loss of market values of companies 
and if this crash had the similar contagious effect on the emerging PE markets, we would 
see a similar negative coefficient for this dummy variable. However, in our Table 4.7 
tests, the marginal effects are zero across all main and subsample tests specifications and 
the standard errors and t-statistics are automatically omitted. Given all the other results 
did not change at all, our proposition is that during the dot com bubble period, the PE 
market development in emerging markets is trivial and we can barely find many 
successful exits during that period, at least in our data sample, as recalled results in our 
Figure 4.1 and 4.2. Moreover, this result also serves emphasis on the later contagious 
effect from the recent financial crisis on emerging PE market. With the geometric 
progressive development in emerging markets, the connections between developed and 
emerging markets countries reinforced, thus the ripple effect from the recent financial 
crisis will be much more contagious as compared with the dot com bubble.  
Overall, our PitchBook deals data and the associated full sample and subsample 
tests strongly support our hypothesis H1a that better business and legal environment in 
emerging markets will increase the probability for PE investors to divest. Our hypothesis 
H1b still cannot be fully confirmed as different divestment strategies will have quite 
opposite views on corruptions. The “greasing the wheels” hypothesis by Vaal and Ebben 
(2011) seems to be effective in some of our settings for the IPO exits which highlight the 
superb abilities of those PE investors in emerging markets. They still can circumvent and 
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execute their divestment strategies successfully even in those emerging markets with 
higher levels of corruptions. But for acquisition exits, such argument will be invalid and 
the debate for the role of corruptions in business and finance literature will be continued. 
In addition, our hypothesis H2 is also supported by our tests that the recent financial 
crisis as a market shock will decrease the probability for PE investors to exit from their 
investments successfully because this crisis will change the business and legal 
environments, the security market conditions and the investee firm characteristics and 
thus the IPO exits will be much less likely relative to acquisition exits during this crisis 
period. 
 
4.5. Discussions and Conclusions 
This essay investigates the success of PE investment in emerging markets by 
analyzing successful PE exits. We use private equity deal level data from 2,733 PE deals 
in 1,499 investee firms from 35 countries worldwide, spanning the 1992-2012 period. We 
find that better business and legal environments in emerging markets increases the 
probability for PE investors to exit successfully. We also find that PE investors are better 
able to mitigate the potential costs associated with inefficient and corrupt business 
environments to increase the probability of exits by IPOs in countries with higher levels 
of corruption. However, such “greasing the wheels” proposition cannot be applied to 
acquisition exits and the competing views of corruption will still be a debate in the 
literature. Moreover, we document that the recent global financial crisis as a market 
shock decreases the PE exits probabilities in emerging markets, especially for the strategy 
to divest by IPOs. All impacts are relatively persistent after controlling for the 
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macroeconomic and security market conditions, cultural dimensions, deals and investee 
firms’ characteristics in addition to controlling for the fixed effects of industries, 
countries and years.  
However, while our results shed light on an area less well researched, we also 
need to highlight some of the limitations in our study and encourage future researchers in 
their studies of private equity investments in emerging markets. First, our study suffers to 
a certain extent from data limitation in that we do not have the detailed performance data 
associated with those exited deals of different PE investors. If we had been able to obtain 
such data, we would have been able to perform a deeper analysis to which exit strategy 
would generate the highest realized returns for PE investors. Second, the financial data at 
the investee firm level is in our view still rather limited. When we add those data into the 
multivariate regression models, we suffer lack of observations after controlling a wide 
variety of important variables. Although we suffer such data limitation, we also perform 
another means comparison tests in Appendix based on very limited investee firm-level 
financial data on hand and aimed to compare, at the time of exits, what type of exits will 
bring investee firm the relatively better performance. We believe that when more detailed 
financial information is made available, future researchers could, for example, determine 
what changes PE investors bring to the investee firms, both financially and operationally. 
Another question that could potentially be answered is what will be the future for 
emerging PE market development after the financial crisis?   
Overall, we believe our findings are useful for policymakers, PE investors as well 
as entrepreneurs in emerging markets. All three parties should work together to build a 
more attractive PE playground in emerging markets not just because this market is 
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perceived to gain from diversification benefits and returns, but because it is actually a 
market with prosperity and broader growth opportunities. Entrepreneurs can use the 
capital and advanced skills learned from PE investors to make projects more successful, 
PE investors can add value in terms of management skills and operational strategies to 
the investee firms and can divest more efficiently and profitable thus encouraging more 
fund inflows. A virtuous circle thus can be built up to increase private equity investments 
in emerging markets. 
 
4.6. Appendix 
Although our sample suffers data limitation, we still want to perform means 
comparison tests to our best efforts with the rather limited investee firm-level financial 
data on hand to get a brief picture of how investee firms performed at the time of exits 
across different divestment strategies. In Table A4.1, our analysis focused on IPO and 
acquisition exits and our comparison tests did reveal some interesting features based on 
our very limited financial data at the investee firm level. 
As shown in Table A4.1, we used five financial performance variables and one 
operational performance variable for IPO exits and acquisition exits, respectively. We 
aim to compare and find out which divestment strategy can bring the investee firms 
relatively better firm-level performances at the time of exits. From the results in Table 
A4.1, we can find that the means tests of the five financial variables return mixed results. 
First, acquisition exits outperformed IPO exits in three out of five financial variables. In 
terms of revenue, gross profit and EBITDA for those exited deals by using acquisition 
strategy, the investee firm will have better performances compared with IPO counterparts 
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and for EBITDA, the difference is statistically significant. Second, IPO exits 
outperformed in two out of five financial variables. At the time of exits, those investee 
firms will have significantly higher net income level, while the EBITDA margin 
(EBITDA scaled by total revenue) is about 7.6% higher but statistically insignificant. The 
financial performance variables gave us a rather vague picture of the investee firm 
performance at the time of exits: sometimes IPO exits will do better, sometimes 
acquisition exits will be the winner. Third, in terms of the only one operational 
performance variable of investee firm employee number, IPO exits will have significant 
higher number of employees at the investee firm level. As documented in former sections, 
we used this operational performance variable to proxy the size of the investee firm. It is 
understandable that PE investors will bring investee firms public only if such a firm is 
relatively more successful and mature, which can be reflected in the number of 
employees. In this way, from our means tests, we have shed some lights on the different 
performances that, both financially and operationally, PE investors bring to the investee 
firms. In the future, when more financial and operational performance data can be made 
available, more detailed univariate and multivariate tests can be performed to find out 
more interesting results. 
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Table 4.1. Sample Distribution for Completed Deals 
This table summarizes the key features associated with the sample distribution of 2,733 completed 
private equity deals in the emerging market. 
Year Distributions Industry Distributions Country Distribution Company Country Income Group 
1992 2 Agriculture 10 Argentina 44 High income: non-OECD 91 
1993 1 Apparel and Accessories 32 Brazil 185 High income: OECD 748 
1994 1 Capital Markets/Institutions 51 Bulgaria 34 Lower middle income 796 
1995 5 Chemicals and Gases 24 Chile 34 Upper middle income 1098 
1996 6 Commercial Banks 69 China 516 
 
  
1997 11 Commercial Products 131 Colombia 28 
 
  
1998 11 Commercial Services 346 Czech Republic 50 
 
  
1999 22 Commercial Transportation 56 Egypt 5 
 
  
2000 47 Communications and Networking 142 Estonia 12 
 
  
2001 29 Computer Hardware 77 Greece 16 
 
  
2002 36 Construction (Non-Wood) 4 Hungary 41 
 
  
2003 48 Consumer Durables 20 India 735 
 
  
2004 75 Consumer Non-Durables 105 Indonesia 16 
 
  
2005 137 Containers and Packaging 14 Israel 512 
 
  
2006 206 Energy Equipment 38 Latvia 3 
 
  
2007 328 Energy Services 33 Lithuania 3 
 
  
2008 295 Exploration, Production and Refining 45 Malaysia 10 
 
  
2009 247 Forestry 10 Mexico 74 
 
  
2010 330 Healthcare Devices and Supplies 98 Morocco 2 
 
  
2011 361 Healthcare Services 79 Nigeria 6 
 
  
2012 306 Healthcare Technology Systems 1 Peru 10 
 
  
    Insurance 45 Philippines 16 
 
  
    IT Services 65 Poland 41 
 
  
    Media 151 Romania 13 
 
  
    Metals, Minerals and Mining 16 Russia 68 
 
  
    Other Business Products and Services 65 Slovenia 6 
 
  
    Other Energy 1 South Africa 24 
 
  
    Other Financial Services 81 South Korea 77 
 
  
    Other Healthcare 2 Taiwan 45 
 
  
    Other Information Technology 1 Thailand 29 
 
  
    Other Materials 6 Turkey 40 
 
  
    Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 94 Ukraine 4 
 
  
    Restaurants, Hotels and Leisure 58 United Arab Emirates 17 
 
  
    Retail 135 Venezuela 5 
 
  
    Semiconductors 23 Vietnam 12 
 
  
    Services (Non-Financial) 79 
 
  
 
  
    Software 458 
 
  
 
  
    Textiles 15 
 
  
 
  
    Transportation 41 
 
  
 
  
    Utilities 12         
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Table 4.2. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
This table provides definitions of the main variables in the dataset, the data sources, and summary statistics. 
Variable Name Definition Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
observations 
Business Environments 
and Legal Origins:               
Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) 
The CPI scores and ranks countries/territories based on how 
corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to be. The CPI is 
the most widely used indicator of corruption worldwide. Ranges 
from 0 to 10. Higher numbers indicate less corrupt countries. 
Source: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview.  
4.140 3.600 1.232 2.000 8.000 2498 
Ease of Doing Business 
Rankings 
Economies are ranked on their ease of doing business, from 1–
189. A high ease of doing business ranking means the regulatory 
environment is more conducive to the starting and operation of a 
local firm. The rankings are determined by sorting the aggregate 
distance to frontier scores on 10 topics, each consisting of 
several indicators, giving equal weight to each topic. Source: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings. 
86.042 89.000 40.854 8.000 163.000 2073 
Common Law Dummy A dummy variable equal to 1 if a country’s legal origin is common law as specified in LLSV 1998. 0.488 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 2733 
Security Market and 
Macro Conditions:               
GDP per capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. Source: World Bank 
9554.902 5196.895 10199.700 308.535 46402.640 2463 
LN of GDP per capita The natural log of GDP per capita. 8.500 8.556 1.230 5.732 10.745 2463 
MSCI Returns 
The country-specific Morgan Stanley Capital International index 
return over the entire 1992-2012 sample period, a proxy for stock 
market conditions in each country. 
0.114 0.059 0.285 -0.684 1.437 2486 
Domestic Market 
Capitalization 
The domestic market capitalization of a stock exchange is the 
total number of issued shares of domestic companies, including 
their several classes, multiplied by their respective prices at a 
given time from the World Federation of Exchanges. This figure 
reflects the comprehensive value of the market at that time, in 
$M. Source: http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/statistics-
definitions 
1315914.000 860396.300 1215525.000 6.200 3941039.000 2365 
LN of Domestic Market 
Capitalization The natural log of domestic market capitalization, in $M. 13.309 13.665 1.541 1.825 15.187 2365 
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Financial Crisis Period 
Dummy 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for the period between 2007 to 
2009 to cover the recent financial crisis period. 0.347 0.000 0.476 0.000 1.000 2504 
Dot-com Bubble Period 
Dummy 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for the period between 2000 to 
2002 to cover the dot-com bubble period. 0.036 0.000 0.185 0.000 1.000 2504 
BRICS Country Dummy A dummy variable equal to 1 for the BRICS countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 0.559 1.000 0.497 0.000 1.000 2733 
Investment 
Characteristics:               
Deal Size Firm-level deal size, in $M. 138.611 19.725 514.138 0.010 12450.000 1782 
LN of Deal Size The natural log of deal size, in $M. 3.032 2.982 2.008 -4.605 9.429 1782 
Number of Employees  Firm-level number of employees in the investee companies. 6429.075 1000.000 27943.030 2.000 385609.000 850 
LN of Number of 
Employees  The natural log of number of employees. 6.848 6.908 2.061 0.693 12.863 850 
Culture Conditions:               
UAI 
Hofstede’s index of uncertainty avoidance. The uncertainty 
avoidance dimension expresses the degree to which the members 
of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. 
The fundamental issue here is how a society deals with the fact 
that the future can never be known: should we try to control the 
future or just let it happen? Countries exhibiting strong UAI 
maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior and are intolerant of 
unorthodox behavior and ideas. Weak UAI societies maintain a 
more relaxed attitude in which practice counts more than 
principles. Source: http://geert-hofstede.com/dimensions.html.  
59.258 64.000 23.349 30.000 112.000 2718 
Exits Outcomes:               
Successful Exits Dummy A dummy variable equal to 1 for IPO or Acquisition exit. 0.115 0.000 0.319 0.000 1.000 2733 
IPO Exits Dummy A dummy variable equal to 1 for an IPO exit. 0.033 0.000 0.178 0.000 1.000 2733 
Acquisition Exits Dummy A dummy variable equal to 1 for an Acquisition exit. 0.082 0.000 0.275 0.000 1.000 2733 
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Table 4.4. Mean Descriptive Statistics by Main Characteristics 
This table provides the main mean descriptive statistics across different main characteristics by exited and other deals, during and non-during financial 
crisis by different exit channels, common law legal origin vs. other legal origins as well as BRICS emerging markets versus Non-BRICS emerging 
markets comparisons. The table also provides the two-sample means test results between major characteristics groups in our data. The means test is a 
two-sample t-test with equal variance. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics - Mean Characteristics of Completed Deals, Exits vs. Other Deals 
  Corruption Perceptions Index 
Ease of Doing 
Business Ranks 
Legal Origin - 
Common Law 
GDP per 
capita ($) 
MSCI 
Returns 
Domestic Market 
Capitalization (M$) 
Deal Size 
(M$) UAI 
Number of Investee 
Company Employees 
Exits Deals 4.091 80.598 0.362 9755.410 0.163 1188243.000 479.098 61.901 9644.444 
Other Deals 4.147 86.803 0.504 9526.138 0.107 1334109.000 98.453 58.913 5832.640 
Difference -0.056 -6.204** -0.142*** 229.272 0.056*** -145866.300* 380.645*** 2.989** 3811.803 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics - Mean Characteristics of Completed Exited Deals, Financial-Crisis Period vs. Non-Financial-Crisis Period 
  All Successful Exits 
  Corruption Perceptions Index 
Ease of Doing 
Business Ranks 
Legal Origin - 
Common Law 
GDP per 
capita ($) 
MSCI 
Returns 
Domestic Market 
Capitalization (M$) 
Deal Size 
(M$) UAI 
Number of Investee 
Company Employees 
Financial-Crisis 
Period 4.068 83.775 0.333 9051.447 0.196 1363695.000 437.301 60.091 7895.250 
Non-Financial-
Crisis Period 4.104 78.133 0.381 10139.070 0.144 1088384.000 497.354 63.203 10767.380 
Difference -0.036 5.642 -0.048 -1087.623 0.052 275311.400* -60.053 -3.112 -2872.133 
  IPO Exits 
  Corruption Perceptions Index 
Ease of Doing 
Business Ranks 
Legal Origin - 
Common Law 
GDP per 
capita ($) 
MSCI 
Returns 
Domestic Market 
Capitalization (M$) 
Deal Size 
(M$) UAI 
Number of Investee 
Company Employees 
Financial-Crisis 
Period 3.639 91.361 0.222 4730.750 0.424 2077805.000 557.464 45.028 10759.140 
Non-Financial-
Crisis Period 4.000 94.781 0.453 7062.451 0.216 1515352.000 533.396 54.019 20601.200 
Difference -0.361 -3.420 -0.231** -2331.701 0.208*** 562452.800** 24.068 -8.991* -9842.064 
  Acquisition Exits 
  Corruption Perceptions Index 
Ease of Doing 
Business Ranks 
Legal Origin - 
Common Law 
GDP per 
capita ($) 
MSCI 
Returns 
Domestic Market 
Capitalization (M$) 
Deal Size 
(M$) UAI 
Number of Investee 
Company Employees 
Financial-Crisis 
Period 4.275 80.133 0.387 11182.200 0.084 1001611.000 317.138 67.419 5795.067 
Non-Financial-
Crisis Period 4.141 73.333 0.356 11220.040 0.119 933685.300 470.457 66.470 4982.784 
Difference 0.134 6.800 0.031 -37.843 -0.035 67926.220 -153.319 0.949 812.282 
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Table 4.4. Mean Descriptive Statistics by Main Characteristics (Continued) 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics - Mean Characteristics of Completed Exited Deals, by Country Legal Origins 
  Corruption Perceptions Index 
Ease of Doing 
Business Ranks 
Legal Origin - 
Common Law 
GDP per 
capita ($) 
MSCI 
Returns 
Domestic Market 
Capitalization (M$) 
Deal Size 
(M$) UAI 
Number of Investee 
Company Employees 
Legal Origin - 
Common Law 4.514 81.183 N/A 12123.220 0.169 1187324.000 354.430 57.553 7089.667 
Other Legal 
Origins 3.853 80.261 N/A 8371.151 0.159 1188789.000 556.478 64.380 10950.860 
Difference 0.661*** 0.922 N/A 3752.071*** 0.009 -1465.197 -202.048 -6.827** -3861.197 
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics - Mean Characteristics of Completed Exited Deals, by China and the rest of Emerging Markets 
  Corruption Perceptions Index 
Ease of Doing 
Business Ranks 
Legal Origin - 
Common Law 
GDP per 
capita ($) 
MSCI 
Returns 
Domestic Market 
Capitalization (M$) 
Deal Size 
(M$) UAI 
Number of Investee 
Company Employees 
BRICS Emerging 
Markets 3.381 110.138 0.365 3892.654 0.225 2081077.000 504.549 45.717 14880.560 
Non-BRICS 
Emerging 
Markets 
4.806 45.457 0.359 15811.020 0.099 264620.400 446.900 78.503 3273.833 
Difference -1.426*** 64.681*** 0.006 -11918.370*** 0.126*** 1816457.000*** 57.649 
-
32.786*** 11606.730* 
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Table 4.5. Probit Models for Successful Exits 
This table presents clustered PROBIT model results of the determinants of successful exit 
outcomes and we report the associated marginal effects of those determinants. The dependent 
variables across Model (1) to (6) are different exits dummy variable to capture all successful 
exits, all IPO exits and all acquisition exits, all other variables are as defined in Table 4.2. *, 
**, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: All Sample Tests 
  (1) Successful Exits (2) IPO Exits (3) Acquisition Exits 
  
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) 0.0348 0.30 -0.0934 -1.10 0.1618 2.52** 
Ease of Doing Business 
Rankings -0.0050 -2.65*** -0.0054 -3.52*** -0.0009 -0.44 
Common Law Dummy 0.4166 2.40** 0.7149 4.21*** -0.2105 -1.06 
LN of GDP per capita -0.1462 -0.56 -0.2040 -1.48 0.1306 0.82 
MSCI Returns 0.1401 1.20 0.1041 1.43 0.0851 1.57 
LN of Domestic Market 
Capitalization 0.1191 1.00 0.1880 2.69*** -0.1002 -1.23 
LN of Deal Size 0.0901 6.95*** 0.0650 4.85*** 0.0356 4.60*** 
UAI 0.0565 1.35 0.0270 0.90 0.0616 1.94* 
LN of Number of Employees  -0.0173 -1.18 0.0098 0.99 -0.0191 -1.61 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 358 317 321 
Pseudo R2 0.2726 0.4379 0.2347 
Panel B: BRICS Sub-Sample Tests 
  (4) Successful Exits (5) IPO Exits (6) Acquisition Exits 
  Marginal Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) 0.1445 1.63 -0.2757 -1.82* 0.1457 2.29** 
Ease of Doing Business 
Rankings -0.0021 -0.60 -0.0055 -2.61*** 0.0000 0.00 
Common Law Dummy -0.2389 -0.59 -0.1948 -0.85 0.1583 0.64 
LN of GDP per capita -0.1694 -0.62 -0.2507 -1.55 0.1341 0.75 
MSCI Returns 0.1642 1.25 0.1228 1.39 0.0910 1.17 
LN of Domestic Market 
Capitalization 0.0888 0.83 0.2152 2.51** -0.1120 -1.81* 
LN of Deal Size 0.0891 4.93*** 0.0954 4.37*** 0.0236 1.85* 
UAI 0.0090 1.66* 0.0022 0.61 0.0015 0.36 
LN of Number of Employees  -0.0142 -0.87 -0.0020 -0.22 -0.0123 -0.70 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 265 235 204 
Pseudo R2 0.2867 0.4654 0.1336 
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Table 4.6. Probit Models for Successful Exits - Financial Crisis Impacts 
This table presents clustered PROBIT model results of the determinants of successful exit 
outcomes and we report the associated marginal effects of those determinants and discuss the 
impacts from the recent financial crisis. The dependent variables across Model (1) to (6) are 
different exits dummy variable to capture all successful exits, all IPO exits and all acquisition 
exits, all other variables are as defined in Table 4.2. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: All Sample Tests 
  (1) Successful Exits (2) IPO Exits (3) Acquisition Exits 
  Marginal Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Financial Crisis Period Dummy -0.0594 -1.16 -0.1272 -2.57** -0.0079 -0.32 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 0.0548 0.46 0.0587 0.51 0.1631 1.91* 
Ease of Doing Business Rankings -0.0042 -1.99** -0.0034 -2.01** -0.0008 -0.32 
Common Law Dummy 0.5015 2.14** 0.8970 5.26*** -0.2029 -0.92 
LN of GDP per capita -0.3304 -0.83 -0.6156 -2.68*** 0.1053 0.47 
MSCI Returns 0.0928 0.64 0.0188 0.22 0.0789 1.15 
LN of Domestic Market 
Capitalization 0.2002 1.15 0.3775 3.36*** -0.0891 -0.77 
LN of Deal Size 0.0897 6.79*** 0.0675 4.73*** 0.0356 2.49** 
UAI 0.0384 0.87 0.0108 0.35 0.0582 1.34 
LN of Number of Employees  -0.0167 -1.13 0.0087 0.92 -0.0189 -1.39 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 358 317 321 
Pseudo R2 0.2756 0.4568 0.2348 
Panel B: BRICS Sub-Sample Tests 
  (4) Successful Exits (5) IPO Exits (6) Acquisition Exits 
  Marginal Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Marginal 
Effects z score 
Financial Crisis Period Dummy -0.0811 -1.26 -0.0315 -0.35 0.0148 0.43 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 0.2112 2.29** -0.2164 -0.85 0.1359 1.93* 
Ease of Doing Business Rankings -0.0011 -0.36 -0.0049 -1.70* -0.0003 -0.08 
Common Law Dummy -0.6303 -1.04 -0.3380 -0.70 0.2394 0.63 
LN of GDP per capita -0.4565 -1.08 -0.3490 -1.07 0.1915 0.75 
MSCI Returns 0.0949 0.56 0.1019 1.11 0.1045 1.25 
LN of Domestic Market 
Capitalization 0.2124 1.20 0.2575 1.69* -0.1368 -1.32 
LN of Deal Size 0.0915 5.12*** 0.0958 4.53*** 0.0230 1.81* 
UAI 0.0158 1.76* 0.0048 0.52 0.0002 0.04 
LN of Number of Employees  -0.0141 -0.88 -0.0020 -0.21 -0.0123 -0.70 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 265 235 204 
Pseudo R2 0.2905 0.4661 0.1339 
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Table 4.7. Probit Models for Successful Exits - Dot Com Bubble and Financial Crisis Impacts 
This table presents clustered PROBIT model results of the determinants of successful exit outcomes and we report the 
associated marginal effects of those determinants and discuss the impacts from both the dot com bubble and the recent 
financial crisis. The dependent variables across Model (1) to (6) are different exits dummy variable to capture all 
successful exits, all IPO exits and all acquisition exits, all other variables are as defined in Table 4.2. *, **, *** Significant 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: All Sample Tests 
  (1) Successful Exits (2) IPO Exits (3) Acquisition Exits 
  Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score 
Financial Crisis Period Dummy -0.0594 -1.16 -0.1272 -2.57** -0.0079 -0.32 
Dot-com Crisis Period Dummy 0.0000 Omitted 0.0000 Omitted 0.0000 Omitted 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 0.0548 0.46 0.0587 0.51 0.1631 2.42** 
Ease of Doing Business Rankings -0.0042 -1.99** -0.0034 -2.01** -0.0008 -0.32 
Common Law Dummy 0.5015 2.14** 0.8970 5.25*** -0.2029 -0.96 
LN of GDP per capita -0.3304 -0.83 -0.6156 -2.68*** 0.1053 0.47 
MSCI Returns 0.0928 0.64 0.0188 0.22 0.0789 1.24 
LN of Domestic Market Capitalization 0.2002 1.15 0.3775 3.35*** -0.0891 -0.80 
LN of Deal Size 0.0897 6.79*** 0.0675 4.72*** 0.0356 4.19*** 
UAI 0.0384 0.87 0.0108 0.35 0.0582 1.48 
LN of Number of Employees  -0.0167 -1.13 0.0087 0.92 -0.0189 -1.56 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 358 317 321 
Pseudo R2 0.2756 0.4568 0.2348 
Panel B: BRICS Sub-Sample Tests 
  (4) Successful Exits (5) IPO Exits (6) Acquisition Exits 
  Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score 
Financial Crisis Period Dummy -0.0811 -1.26 -0.0315 -0.35 0.0148 0.43 
Dot-com Crisis Period Dummy 0.0000 Omitted 0.0000 Omitted 0.0000 Omitted 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 0.2112 2.29** -0.2164 -0.85 0.1359 1.93* 
Ease of Doing Business Rankings -0.0011 -0.36 -0.0049 -1.70* -0.0003 -0.08 
Common Law Dummy -0.6303 -1.04 -0.3380 -0.70 0.2394 0.63 
LN of GDP per capita -0.4565 -1.08 -0.3490 -1.07 0.1915 0.75 
MSCI Returns 0.0949 0.56 0.1019 1.11 0.1045 1.25 
LN of Domestic Market Capitalization 0.2124 1.20 0.2575 1.69* -0.1368 -1.32 
LN of Deal Size 0.0915 5.12*** 0.0958 4.53*** 0.0230 1.81* 
UAI 0.0158 1.76* 0.0048 0.52 0.0002 0.04 
LN of Number of Employees  -0.0141 -0.88 -0.0020 -0.21 -0.0123 -0.70 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 265 235 204 
Pseudo R2 0.2905 0.4661 0.1339 
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Table A4.1. Mean Descriptive Statistics Comparisons between IPO and Acquisition Exits 
This table provides the main mean financial data descriptive statistics across different main characteristics by 
IPO and Acquisition exits. The table also provides the two-sample means test results between major 
characteristics groups in our data. The means test is a two-sample t-test with equal variance. *, **, *** 
Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Investee 
Company 
Revenue 
Investee 
Company Gross 
Profit 
Investee Company 
Net Income 
Investee Company 
ebitda 
Investee 
Company ebitda 
Margin 
Number of Investee 
Company Employees 
IPO Exits 326.575 138.682 55.372 62.224 0.268 16437.250 
Acquisition Exits 446.702 163.602 -147.073 153.694 0.192 5283.630 
Difference -120.127 -24.921 202.445*** -91.470*** 0.076 11153.620** 
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Chapter 5 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Entrepreneurial finance is the study of valuation and resource allocation in new 
business ventures and it has played a more and more important role in the development of 
the economy and financial markets. This dissertation contributes to the literature of both 
entrepreneurship and finance by providing insights about the economic impact of 
entrepreneurship, the angel investors’ investment behaviors and performances as 
compared with PE/VC funds around the world as well as the divestment strategies of PE 
investors in the emerging markets. 
 In the first essay, we tested the hypothesis that the economic activity that results 
from entrepreneurial activity is relatively more pronounced in newly established firms, 
and therefore new business entry has a positive impact on GDP/capita, exports/GDP, and 
patents per population, and a negative impact on unemployment. Our findings point to 
institutional and cultural impediments to the effectiveness of entrepreneurship. Most 
notably, the impact of entrepreneurship is significantly mitigated by excessively strong 
creditor rights that limit entrepreneurial risk taking. Furthermore, the data indicate 
cultural attitudes that are associated with low risk taking limit the effectiveness of 
entrepreneurship. By contrast, the impact of entrepreneurship on exports/GDP does not 
appear to be directly tied to costs of exporting, which is perhaps best explained by the 
new economy goods and services created by entrepreneurs that depend less on such costs. 
For some subsets of the data we find evidence consistent with the view that top tier 
venture capital funds enhance the impact of entrepreneurship on GDP/capita. Finally, our 
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results show how different definitions of new business entry matter for empirical analysis 
of entrepreneurship across countries. 
 The second essay proposed new theory that examined for the first time whether or 
not institutions had a more pronounced impact on individuals versus organizations. We 
specifically examined the case of individuals versus PE/VC funds. Theoretical arguments 
suggested that institutions, including law and culture, would have a more pronounced 
impact on individuals relative to organizations. We find that, relative to PE/VC funds, 
angels prefer investing in active smaller entrepreneurial firms in wealthier countries with 
better stock market conditions, worse legal environments, and having cultures favored in 
higher levels of individualism and lower levels of risk-taking. Such behaviors are robust 
both for the first round deals and deals at all other stages. We also find that, relative to 
PE/VC funds, those investee firms funded by angels have a lower probability of having 
successful exits, in either IPO or acquisition; but, better legal environments can help 
mitigate the negative effects on IPO exits. Moreover, in our subsample tests, the 
“stepping stone” logic of angels still cannot be proven, because we find that firms who 
have received angel investments in the first round will have lower probabilities to 
successfully divest in later rounds. At a country/market level, we also find significant 
determinants, which can work together to build a well-rounded environment and spawn 
both angels and PE/VC funds activities. In addition to these results, we also performed 
difference-in-differences tests to confirm that more stringent disclosure regulations and 
more forgiving bankruptcy law changes can also spawn the entrepreneurial activities 
induced by angels and PE/VC funds. 
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 The third essay investigated the success of PE investment in emerging markets by 
analyzing successful PE exits. We find that better business and legal environments in 
emerging markets increases the probability for PE investors to exit successfully. We also 
find that PE investors are better able to mitigate the potential costs associated with 
inefficient and corrupt business environments to increase the probability of exits by IPOs 
in countries with higher levels of corruption. However, such “greasing the wheels” 
proposition cannot be applied to acquisition exits and the competing views of corruption 
will still be a debate in the literature. Moreover, we document that the recent global 
financial crisis as a market shock decreases the PE exits probabilities in emerging 
markets, especially for the strategy to divest by IPOs. All impacts are relatively persistent 
after controlling for the macroeconomic and security market conditions, cultural 
dimensions, deals and investee firms’ characteristics in addition to controlling for the 
fixed effects of industries, countries and years. 
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